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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES: A CASE STUDY
OF THE CONVENTION ON BIODIVERSITY (CBD)
by
George Atisa
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Mahadev Bhat, Co-Major Professor
Professor Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, Co-Major Professor
The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) was created in 1992 to coordinate global
governments to protect biological resources. The CBD has three goals: protection of
biodiversity, achievement of sustainable use of biodiversity and facilitation of equitable
sharing of the benefits of biological resources. The goal of protecting biological resources
has remained both controversial and difficult to implement. This study focused more on
the goal of biodiversity protection. The research was designed to examine how globally
constructed environmental policies get adapted by national governments and then passed
down to local levels where actual implementation takes place. Effectiveness of such
policies depends on the extent of actual implementation at local levels. Therefore,
compliance was divided and examined at three levels: global, national and local. The
study then developed various criteria to measure compliance at these levels. Both
qualitative and quantitative methods were used to analyze compliance and
implementation. The study was guided by three questions broadly examining critical

v

factors that most influence the implementation of biodiversity protection policies at the
global, national and local levels. Findings show that despite an overall biodiversity deficit
of 0.9 hectares per person, global compliance with the CBD goals is currently at 35%.
Compliance is lowest at local levels at 14%, it is slightly better at national level at 50%,
and much better at the international level 64%. Compliance appears higher at both
national and international levels because compliance here is paper work based and policy
formulation. If implementation at local levels continues to produce this low compliance,
overall conservation outcomes can only get worse than what it is at present. There are
numerous weaknesses and capacity challenges countries are yet to address in their plans.
In order to increase local level compliance, the study recommends a set of robust policies
that build local capacity, incentivize local resource owners, and implement biodiversity
protection programs that are akin to local needs and aspirations.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
1.0 Introduction
The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) provides a global governance structure
for coordination of countries to try implementing the global goals of biodiversity
conservation. The three goals of the CBD include: Protection of biodiversity,
achievement of sustainable use of biodiversity and facilitation of equitable sharing of the
benefits of biological resources. The CBD only binds national governments.
Implementation of these goals requires the binding of national and local institutions,
individuals, and conservation organizations through legislation, negotiation, planning and
contracting. It is through actual local level implementation of globally and nationally
designed policies that meaningful compliance by member states can be attained.
Although good progress in these goals has been made in a number of areas such
as national planning structures and information sharing tools, implementation has
continued to present very difficult challenges arising from low capacities, lack of political
will, and less than optimal decision making (South Africa National Report, 2009). Key
aspects of compliance should be comprised of enforcement ability, human and financial
resources, action oriented planning, strong national policies, supportive national
legislation and institutional capacity building (Kline & Raustiala, 2000). International
conservation organizations also need to find better ways to improve national capacities as
well as build structures that support local implementation using local institutions.
The way compliance with the goals of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) is
defined and measured determines how countries formulate their compliance policies.
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Countries select conservation strategies and determine how compliance is defined.
Currently, compliance requirements range from just signing and ratifying an international
treaty, sending country representatives to conferences organized by treaty secretariats,
and submitting reports. Compliance is not an event but a process that should generate
new actions at different levels that continue to set standards, enable participation, and
offer knowledge to address implementation challenges.
Effective protection of biodiversity should require that a clear distinction be made
between policy formulation and policy implementation. Compliance under the CBD
needs more than the fear of reputational implications and sanctions to include financial,
human, and institutional capacities within a country to implement the three goals of the
CBD. According to Pressman & Wildavsky (1984), policy formulation is comprised of
actions taken by governments to secure objectives whose attainment is difficult. Policy
implementation involves the interaction between the setting of goals and actions taken to
achieve them, a situation where each element is dependent on the other (Pressman &
Wildavsky, 1984). By “other”, here, I mean all stakeholders from local to international
levels.
Most compliance theories make assertions that do not explain in-country
compliance variables such as different levels of influence from state, non-state actors, and
international treaties. Guzman (2002) argues that without a good understanding of the
connections between international treaties and how these influence country actions, it
would be difficult to articulate policy advice with respect to compliance with
international systems. This is one of the reasons there is poor coordination, insufficient
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collaboration and cooperation across levels between organizations involved in
biodiversity protection.
It was necessary at this stage to look to theories that explain adoption and
implementation of international treaties to understand how both governments and
conservation organizations deal with resource management problems. The managerial
theory was the first to be examined. It emphasizes global coordination and the idea that
managers should be allowed to freely manage. Consent theory makes an assumption that
once countries consent to a treaty, they automatically comply. The other theory that was
used in this initial analysis was the legitimacy theory. It asserts that countries comply
simply because treaties come into being following legitimate processes. Finally,
international relations theorists believe that international organizations through
collaboration can bring all collaborating countries into compliance (Guzman, 2002).
These theories are each explained in greater details under the literature section in chapter
two. These theories however fail to explain how globally designed conservation policies
are adapted and how they get implemented by national governments.
The purpose of my study was to analyze the extent of influence of the Convention
on Biodiversity (CBD) on countries and implementation of specific biodiversity
protection initiatives. In addition, my study also identified approaches that countries use
for local level implementation. The study took a national and local scale approach to
compare and contrast policy development with actual national and local level
implementation. Global, national and local implementation analysis using scientific,
social, political and economic criterion was made to highlight gaps in policy between
global, national, and local implementation.
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1.1 Why the Convention on Biodiversity?
Using the CBD as a case study was ideal because it is one of the global treaties
with the highest number of countries that have signed membership now standing at 195
and with public-private partnerships of more than 250 (CBD, 2010). The present research
set out to uncover underlying capacity challenges and now presents a novel political,
socio-economic, policy, structural, institutional, and technological perspectives that
would improve compliance. This compliance is by individual countries and the nature of
support provided by conservation organizations.
Using a mixed methods approach, the current study analyzed and explained key
theoretical and practical elements that constrain or facilitate both implementation and
compliance with CBD goals at global, national, and local levels. There are interacting
external and internal factors that affect the capacity of various countries during
implementation and the level of compliance with treaties (Weiss & Jacobson, 1998).
These capacities were identified. The theoretical meaning of compliance is explained as
well as its practical implications on conservation outcomes. Cross sectors as well as
vertical political, institutional and organizational relationships were analyzed. An
analysis of the CBD’s influence and challenges faced by governments on the adoption
and internalization of global biodiversity initiatives into national and local policies aimed
at achieving the three goals of the CBD is here presented.
Compliance at global level is a total of conservation activities from local to
national levels that take into account specific policy and programmatic collaborative
actions in areas of implementation. Some of these policy issues include: capacity
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building, data and information sharing, participation, and development of institutions
within countries (CBD, 2010, Weiss & Jacobson, 1998). The study of biodiversity
protection is a broad and complex process requiring analysis from the policy perspective,
management side, science side, social capital side, and economic side of society. Social
capital is seen through active and effective participation of stakeholders, not only at
different levels of government, but also from all sectors that potentially impact upon the
existence of biological resources. Sufficiently developed conservation social capital
augments policy, management, science, institutional and economic systems.
From an economic perspective, there are two categories of local levels. These are
the communities in rural settings whose livelihood directly depends on agriculture and
land-based resources for their survival. The other category is a more privileged category
comprised of businesses that indirectly depend on land-based resources to produce and
look to the environment to deposit their waste. The business category has more claims
placed on biological resources than rural communities while, rural communities are
heavily implicated in their destruction. Looking at the management side, rural
communities have not been involved much while the business group is not only heavily
involved, but also wields a lot of influence on decisions that directly affect the
management of biological resources.
Biodiversity protection therefore is a part of a large and more complex science
and socio-political challenge of the whole society; At the international setting, that aspect
of the whole society is demonstrated by the number of CBD party membership of 195
countries, participation by so many international conservation organizations and private-
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private partnerships. Similar broad participation as seen at global settings should be
replicated nationally and at local levels, especially in rural communities that have direct
contacts with biological resources.
1.1.1 The definition of biodiversity
Biodiversity, also known simply as biological resources, is the number and
variability of all living organisms (plants, animals, fungi and bacteria). Biodiversity
conservation in the context of the CBD extends beyond just species extinction to include
conservation of natural habitats, ecosystems, and genetic materials (OECD, 1994).
Biodiversity can therefore be defined as "the variability among living organisms from all
sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the
ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species,
between species and of ecosystems" (CBD, 2002). Biodiversity supports life on earth
and is essential in the provision of environmental services like freshwater, fuel, carbon
storage and marine life.
1.2 Statement of the problem
When the 2010 biodiversity protection target of beginning to reduce biodiversity
degradation at global, regional and national settings was not met by countries, the United
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) put out a statement. This statement said that
current conservation efforts and system are not adequate to meet biodiversity protection
challenges and also meet economic development needs of the society (Koetz et al. 2011).
Key hindrances identified in the UNEP statement were lack of adequate financing,

6

incoherence amongst management institutions, weak linkages between science and
policy, low capacity at national level to implement policies, and a significant disconnect
between various management and consumption sectors (Koetz et al. 2011). At local
levels in most countries, there exists chronic shortage of trained conservation
professionals; there is no sufficient political support to biodiversity protection policies
and low capacity agencies and conservation institutions.
Although the international community, global conservation organizations, and
national governments have continued to developed programs and national laws that
govern biodiversity protection, the diversity and quality of biological resources has been
declining (CBD, 2010). As of 2006, global biological resources consumption was
estimated to exceed the earth’s capacity by 40% (Global Footprint Network, 2010).
Partly the problem is that current planning methodologies do not incorporate costs
beyond administrative restrictions and enforcement of conservation regulations (Naidoo
et al. 2006). All levels of biodiversity protection and planning come with different types
of costs ranging from specific interventions to protect areas or species to foregone
economic opportunities. These goals must be planned for and compensated, but most
national plans do not contain this level of detailed initiatives. Some studies rightfully
argue that the costs of biodiversity conservation are paid by local communities who in
most cases benefit the least from biological resources (Adams et al. 2004).
It is therefore clear that the problem is partly related to the lack of effective
engagement of local communities and private sector institutions where actual
implementation takes place. Inability to engage with local settings makes it difficult to
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bring about change to local perceptions so as to create an understanding of the value of
protecting biodiversity (Myeong & Choi, 2010). Involvement of local institutions and
communities in the design and program implementation is only possible if people at local
levels know what the government and conservation experts are doing and when their
input is sought after.
According to the Global Outlook Biodiversity Outlook (2010), biological diversity
in the world is being lost at an unprecedented rate. The loss is largely a result of habitat
destruction from land use changes that include overconsumption of natural resources,
pollution of the environment, climate change, invasive alien species and development
(CBD, 2010). Continued degradation of biodiversity reveals non-compliance with the
CBD goals. Various theories that explain compliance fall short of ideas how countries
comply with international treaties (Guzman, 2002).
Reducing consumption, changing lifestyles and the current business operate to
bring about sustainable use and reduce overexploitation of biodiversity comes with
opportunity costs. Communities and businesses will not undertake protection of
biodiversity if this comes with high opportunity costs. Effects of biodiversity degradation
are viewed as distant issues in nature whereby a local loss in forest resources due to
agricultural expansion or overexploitation to provide timber do not manifest themselves
to communities. The manifestations of such effects are likely to be felt and paid for by
future generations. There are two types of opportunity costs, opportunity costs of current
biodiversity consumption against the externality effects on future generations, and
opportunity costs of sustainable use.
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Table 1: The status of biological resources globally as of 2008
Populatio
n
(millions)

Total
Consumed
(Ha/person)

Total
biological
capacity
(Ha/person)

World

6739.61

2.70

1.78

-0.92

High-income countries
Middle-income
countries
Low-income countries

1036.98

5.60

3.05

-2.54

4394.09
1297.55

1.92
1.14

1.72
1.14

-0.20
0.00

938.45

1.40

1.50

0.10

382.65
3725.16
390.13

2.45
1.63
2.70

0.92
0.86
7.38

-1.53
-0.78
4.68

66.77
448.94
495.12
238.09

1.68
6.17
4.71
4.00

0.97
4.08
2.25
4.87

-0.71
-2.09
-2.47
0.87

Country/region

Africa
Middle East/Central
Asia
Asia-Pacific
South America
Central
America/Caribbean
North America
EU
Other Europe

Biocapacity
Deficit/Surplus
(Ha/person)

Notes
Ecological Footprint measured in hectares per person
Biocapacity measured in hectares per person
Total Footprint the consumption of resources from: Cropland + Grazing lands + Forest lands +Fishing +
Built-up areas
Biological capacity = Cropland + Grazing lands + Forest lands +Fishing + Built-up areas
Source: Global Footprint Network (2008)

Table 1 above shows that as of 2008, at the world level, there were about 6.7
billion people. Total global consumption of biological resources stood at an equivalent of
2.70 hectares per person. The total global biological capacity of the planet was 1.78
hectares per person. This level of biological capacity meant that globally, there was an
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over-consumption of biological resources going into a deficit by an equivalent of 0.92
hectares per person. High income countries were home to about one billion people with
biodiversity consumption of negative 2.54 per hectare per person. Middle income
countries had about 4.4 billion people with a deficit in biodiversity of negative 0.20
hectares per person. As for low income countries, total population at 2008 was 1.3 billion
and had even levels of use and supply of biological resources at 1.14 hectares per person..
Continued overexploitation of biological resources beyond the level where the
Earth is able to regenerate brings about an ecological deficit. Biodiversity deficits leads to
higher accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, more wastes beyond the
level the Earth can absorb and could finally lead to the collapse of the ecosystems
(Global Footprint Network, 2013). Biological resources deficits should be part of the
equation in measuring compliance.
1.3 Background of the study
First of all, there is need for greater understanding that biodiversity conservation
by countries is not an inconvenient truth to be resisted. Biodiversity is a foundation of
economic development, a life support resource, provides for political and social stability
and therefore all countries must take a bold collective action to protect it (Global
Footprint Network, 2010). The Global Footprint Network (2009) report responding to
the Stiglitz Commission argues that we are living in a time when the limiting factor is no
longer our factories’ capacity to produce, but the biosphere’s capacity to provide the
ecological services needed for economic development. Therefore, rather than get
entangled in ideological debates and ignore the real problems that come with
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overexploitation of biodiversity, countries need empirical facts to facilitate in building
political consensus to support policies that guide economies to operate within the Earth’s
ecological limits (Global Footprint Network, 2010). This study was designed to provide
discussions to these empirical facts.
Tracking of distinct policies implementation as well as in combination helps in
the understanding of biodiversity degradation drivers and where these effects would most
be felt. One example is the push toward the use of biofuels such as eternal as an
alternative to fossil fuels for purposes of reducing carbon emissions to the atmosphere.
The final outcome according to the Global Footprint Network calculations represents a
shift and a net increase of environmental pressure. The reduction on carbon emissions
comes with an increase in demand on forest or croplands that in the final analysis reduce
the quantity and quality of biological resources.
Founded in 1992, the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) has made it easy for
countries, other partner organizations, and local institutions to learn from one another.
There is a clear enabling environment and so many organizations are playing critical
roles in collaboration with both government and with each other in biodiversity
protection. One challenge currently facing most governments is that rather than having
local institutions at local level implementing, many international organizations are doing
virtually all conservation work at local levels. International organizations represent both
the government and local institutions in training local people, sharing knowledge, and
doing actual biodiversity protection programs.
Although these organizations are making very important contributions, there are
many local problems they cannot solve and local institutions are supposed to step in.
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Efforts at building effective and innovative local institutions would be sustained and
continued if local expertise, knowledge, and buy-in is secured. Efforts to strengthen local
institutions should include initiatives to empower all citizens at local settings. One point
of departure is the private sector businesses who wield a lot of influence on individual
countries policy development usually, toward their profit motives (Coglianese & Nash,
2004).
National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs) provide a roadmap for
implementation of the CBD goals. Guided by NBSAPs, individual governments have
over the years developed various national and local initiatives that help in the
implementation and compliance with CBD goals. The international community in 2002
met and encouraged all parties to the Convention on Biodiversity to start drawing
national protection plans. It was expected that as soon as governments ratified the
convention on biodiversity and began to draw national plans, implementation of the CBD
goals and progress towards beginning to reverse biodiversity degradation globally will be
realized (CBD, 2010). National governments continue to face implementation challenges
and movement toward compliance has been a very slow process.
1.4 Objectives of the study
National biodiversity conservation initiatives need to secure institutional as well
as society’s confidence in the justification of conservation efforts. Biodiversity
conservation is undertaken to ensure continued existence and adequate flow of biological
benefits. A framework for collaboration by parties to the CBD and various partnerships is
needed for better outcomes; information and data sharing, and capacity building to
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facilitate implementation of CBD goals (Stephens et al., 2002). The broad objective of
this study was to analyze and explain how globally designed biodiversity conservation
policies get adapted by national governments and are finally passed to local levels for
actual implementation.
Specifically, the study has tried to:
i.

Uncover critical policy, administrative, economic and political factors
affecting the implementation and compliance of international treaties

ii.

Describe how national and local environmental policies and priorities evolve
and adapt under international environmental treaties.

iii.

Estimate opportunity costs of biodiversity protection in local rural settings as
well as in the private sector and industry settings

iv.

Examine specific combinations of theory, policy interventions, and nationallocal regulatory mechanisms that can move countries towards greater
compliance.
Biodiversity protection is the responsibility of governments first. It is at this level

where programs are created by law with clearly identified purpose, means and conditions
under which they will be implemented (Rose, 1991). But, the reality is that governments
have not taken the leadership. Critical structures at the national level needed for
coordination are still missing. Very few governments have built an equivalent of Clearing
House Mechanisms (CHMs). Most governments are also not publishing their own data. It
is from this lack of data at both national and local levels that questions for this research
began to emerge. Therefore, there a need to examine different decision points and how
information is shared between sectors, agencies and governments. When information and
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data gaps persist, effective policy implementation suffers, and costs of building
consensus goes up (Esty & Ivanova, 2004).
This study addresses the following key questions:
1. What are the critical policy, administrative, economic and political factors that
influence the implementation and compliance of international treaties at both
national and local levels?
2. How do national and local environmental policies and priorities evolve and adapt
under international environmental treaties?
What are the opportunity costs of compliance with all goals of the CBD?
1.5 Significance of the study
This study was about extending compliance requirements from the global setting
beyond the national level to local levels where actual policy implementation is done. This
study was not about whether countries comply or not with international treaties, but
rather, when they comply, how they meet treaty requirements and implement specified
goals, and the extent that compliance outcomes meet the biological thresholds of the
resource in question.
This present study is significant in many different ways:


There is no literature that has documented the adoption stages that international
treaties go through from international conferences where agreements are made to
villages and private enterprises that implement these global agreements. This
research was designed to fill this gap.
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For effective analysis and compliance outcomes, this study divided compliance
into three distinct stages: compliance on paper at global level, compliance as a
policy process at the national level, and compliance as an act of actual
implementation at local levels. The study analyzed compliance based on these
three stages to see exactly what needs to happen and how each stage is developed
to drive compliance to higher levels.



Compliance should take into account the range of capacities of national
governments, institutions, communities and the status of biological resources
(Ringquist & Kostadinova, 2005; Weiss & Jacobson, 1998). I therefore assert
that in addition to other measures of compliance such the signing of a treaty by a
country, submitting reports and creating institutions, the degree of understanding
and knowing the extent to which every country is able to meet the demand for
biological resources, without out-stripping its supply, is a tangible platform to
measure compliance. This can about through effective mobilization of all
stakeholders at both national and local levels.



At both national and local levels, there has to be an understanding of the
compliance threshold and which components of implementation each sector at
different levels in society should put into place so as to comply. The earth’s
regenerative capacity provides for the ecological threshold which if exceeded, the
quality of life on earth begins to get compromised (Borucke et al. 2013).
Compliance with CBD goals should take into account the fact that the planet has
ecological boundaries within which consumption of natural resources and
development has to be secured (Borucke et al. 2013; Rockström et al. 2009).
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Purposely, I have tried to connect compliance at different levels of policy
environments and local implementation. I also examined institutional, political, structural
and economic aspects of the CBD beyond national levels to include its causal effects on
local institutions. How conservation organizations work with both government and
communities and the challenges that come with such relationships was analyzed.
Uncovering various national and local capacities, strengths and weaknesses that affect
most of the compliance theories is critical for effective decision making.
Linking local decision making and implementation challenges to global policy
commitments requires a comprehensive examination of capacities; political, and socioeconomic priorities within countries. Although there are many studies that have examined
global compliance challenges with international treaties (Jacobson & Weiss, 2010;
Ringquist & Kostadinova, 2005; Guzman, 2002; Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1995; Chayes
et al., 1998), my study examines compliance at three levels: Global compliance, national
compliance and local compliance. Central to overall compliance is what countries are
doing to comply with global treaties, what local communities and institutions are doing at
local levels to facilitate compliance, and how global conservation initiatives are taken to
local settings where actual policy implementation takes place. My study has generated
valuable grass-roots perspectives on compliance, implementation, institutional capacities
and relationships at the national and local levels.
Non-compliance with the goals of the Convention on Biodiversity can best be
explained by the level of support given and sanctions placed on individuals, communities
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and institutions at local levels within countries. Furthermore, compliance with CBD goals
also depends on the nature and strength of cooperation between various stakeholders.
Theories that try to explain why countries comply with international treaties make
mere assertions that either lack specific structures or stop short of explaining why and
how compliance is attained (Guzman, 2002). It is not through internalization of
international treaty norms that national institutions move toward more compliance as
asserted by Koh (1996), but through improvement of capacities of both human and
national bureaucracies (Guzman 2002; Wilshusen et al. 2002)). I demonstrate that low
capacities, weak policies and institutions in society can be strengthened and improved
through capacity building, cooperation with more established organizations, through
information sharing and human resources training.
Using systems theory, the present study examined the strength of working
relations, the extent that problems are shared between government and conservation
organizations and the nature of support that exist between governments and conservation
organizations.

The use of Information Technology (IT) facilitates not just information

sharing, but also experiences, and resources. The CBD is using information technology to
share reports, data training and conservation information with parties and partner
organizations. Countries are encouraged to develop national information sharing tools.
Analysis of factors that facilitate governments to create better and more effective tools
for information sharing across all institutions so that local level institutions are
constructively involved in the implementation, data collection and sharing of biodiversity
information nationally was done.
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1.6 Interface between policy and implementation
Although governments play a significant role, science has been the guiding policy
framework for biodiversity protection and continues to play a significant role in decision
making. With the ever rising conservation constraints, there is an increasing need to
move toward incorporating the scientific framework with governance and political policy
considerations. Finding ways in which various stakeholders cooperate will help to pool
more resources to adequately address biodiversity conservation challenges that have
persisted through the last four decades. The present study has established institutional
linkages based on both science and governance approaches to explain global biodiversity
protection and national public policies.

Explaining public policies to the public is

necessary for the awareness raising of the social and political constraints with regard to
conservation at local levels. Public policy is based upon government action in providing
guidelines to carry out various government functions that provide for public goods to
society (Martin, 2003). My study has put together factors that facilitate understanding of
how governments adopt global policies and facilitate their implementation at local levels.
At the national level, critical decisions are made, plans are drawn and programs
get created by law with clearly identified purpose, means and conditions under which
they will be implemented (Rose, 1991). Notably, under agenda 21, more detailed
guidelines and policy recommendation are established, such as development of national
strategies, plans and process for effective implementation. The at implementation levels
is establishing clear linkages between all sectors and institutional levels.
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Linking local decision making and implementation challenges to global policy
will facilitate greater understanding between government, international organizations and
local level institutions. This understanding will help in the setting of realistic and
achievable goals that take into account local needs and global priorities (Gordon et al.
2005). When governments are involved, political institutions play a central role in either
aiding or constraining implementation of any law or plan. According to Gordon et al.
(2005), global conservation strategies concern themselves with “where” to protect rather
than “how” to protect biodiversity. In doing so, the scientific criteria are used in decision
making and not the broader social, economic and political considerations that are
sensitive to local needs. The study has tried to find ways to make biodiversity protection
more politically appealing.
1.7 Understanding compliance as a system
Understanding of compliance in totality requires a systems theory approach. A
systems theory is a broad framework that allows different agencies and organizations to
work as a collective whole for an overall mission. A system is a combination of many
different parts that are meant to work together in order to achieve a specific goal. There
are interacting external and internal factors that affect the capacity of various countries
during policy formulation and implementation to determine the level of compliance with
treaties (Jacbson & Weiss, 2010). An analysis of the CBD’s influence and challenges
faced by governments on the adoption and internalization of global initiatives helps to see
how the three goals of the CBD are being met.
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Compliance at the global level is a collection of locally and nationally generated
systems of policy. Also, compliance entails programmatic collaborative actions cutting
across implementation, capacity building, information sharing, participation, and
development of institutions within countries (CBD, 2010, Weiss & Jacobson, 2010).
Compliance is a broad and complex process requiring analysis of actions from the
various policy perspective, management, scientific understanding, social capital
development and economic considerations of society.
Social capital is seen through the active and effective participation of stakeholders
not only at different levels of government, but also from all sectors that potentially
impact upon the existence of biological resources (Pretty & Smith, 2003). Sufficiently
developed conservation social capital augments policy, management, science,
institutional and economic systems (Ostrom, 2010). From an economic perspective, there
are two categories of compliance. These are the communities in rural settings whose
livelihood directly depends on agriculture and land-based resources for their survival.
The other category is a more privileged category comprised of businesses that indirectly
depend on land-based resources to produce and look to the environment to deposit their
waste. The business category has more claims placed on biological resources than rural
communities while rural communities are heavily implicated in their destruction (Pretty
and Smith, 2003). Looking at compliance from the management lens, rural communities
have not been involved much while business groups are not only heavily involved but
also wield a great deal of influence on decisions that directly affect the management of
biological resources.

20

Globally, compliance means the extent to which states participate and sign onto
the CBD goals (Weiss & Jaconson, 2010). Domestically, compliance depends on a wide
range of institutional, political and socio-economic mechanisms cutting across many
sectors and governance levels within countries (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Compliance
means more than just signing a treaty by government if the goals of the CBD are to be
met. Various theories used to explain compliance do not agree on what it would take for
governments to comply (Guzman, 2002; Weiss & Jacobson, 2010). Most studies do not
connect compliance with implementation. Other studies examine how reputation and use
of various incentives facilitate compliance but these too do not analyze or take into
consideration local levels.
Most institutions and individuals involved with biodiversity management within
countries seek compliance only if it aligns with their own interests (Rees, 2003).
Moreover, they also lack technical capacities and policy conceptualization skills in
biological resources management (Kline & Raustiala, 2000). Prior research has found
that strong parliamentary and local legislation enables the development of sound
organizational ethics where terms of the treaty are given priority (Oliver, 1991). Political
stability as a sign of strength of parliamentary systems and legislative developments is
questionable in a lot of countries.
Compliance therefore needs to be seen as a large and more complex system of
science and socio-political challenges for the whole society. In the international setting,
all governments should be willing not just to participate but also to implement the
agreement at the national level. The global broad participation must be seen to be

21

replicated within countries by having all sectors and institutions participating in
biodiversity protection.
1.8 Defining compliance elements
ON the basis of the current global status of biodiversity, investments and efforts
all countries have put into conservation, the time to re-evaluate what to consider when
defining compliance is now. Compliance can be viewed as performance-based
measurement of implementation, a concept often used in areas of energy or other systems
of engineering (Eisenhower, 2014). Existing efforts and investment are either not taking
all countries fast and far enough or there are important compliance elements missing
from the equation. According to the Global Footprint Network (2010), the current rate of
natural resources consumption have moved the world much closer to an era of peak
energy, climate change, food shortages, biodiversity loss and freshwater stress. An
“overshoot” situation where people are using more resources than the earth can support is
now being experienced and getting worse. For instance, most land conversion in tropical
regions (where most of biodiversity lives) is under pressure from consumers living
outside the tropics. Lands allocated to forests are diminishing while the quality of soils is
being degraded much faster to feed the ever rising global population. A biodiversity
tragedy is not far from happening, because regardless of how successful the current
conservation programs get, outcomes will never replicate the original land quality.
It is, therefore, critical that more tangible measurement variables be included as
requirements in measuring how countries comply with all the goals of the CBD.
Countries need to be informed of their national footprint, their biological capacity and
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level of consumption in relation to available national resources. Countries as well as
conservation organizations need to know how much needs to do, and where to
concentrate more conservation efforts.
Inclusion of more measures in the definition of what is required for countries to
comply at this time when the trend is the rising demand and dwindling supply of
biological resources is critical. For countries that know that they are in an ecological
deficit, one goal toward compliance is to develop tangible initiatives to get out of the
ecological deficit. So as not to ignore overexploitation locally, countries should be
required to compare the demand on biodiversity with supply and report the same to the
CBD secretariat.
1.8.1 Role of international treaties
Environmental treaties provide structures for governments to build commitments
and negotiate for consensus on public interest management. Treaties, however, do not go
into specific actions that sanction what and how countries comply. When governments
enter into a treaty, they are simply expected to comply with the commitments they have
made to meet the terms of the treaty (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Kline & Raustailia, 2000).
Treaties are negotiated through diplomatic processes to build political consensus that
often imposes no concrete obligation, participation is voluntary, and levels of
commitments by governments are self-monitored. There is no penalty for noncompliance.
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Individual government compliance is supported through a variety of ways that
include international conferences, information sharing tools using the internet and
working in partnerships with international non-governmental conservation organizations.
Globally, compliance means the extent to which states participate and sign onto
the CBD (Weiss & Jacobson, 2010). Domestically, compliance depends on a wide range
of institutional, political and socio-economic mechanisms cutting across many sectors
and governance levels within countries (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Compliance means
more than just signing a treaty by government if the goals of the CBD are to be met.
Various theories used to explain compliance do not agree on what it would take
governments to comply (Guzman, 2002; Weiss & Jacobson, 2010). Most studies do not
connect compliance with implementation. Other studies examine how reputation and use
of various incentives facilitate states compliance but these too do not go down to local
levels where actual implementation takes place.
Biodiversity conservation can be very abstract in the sense that it is difficult to
situate in real life situations and within institutional policies. The abstract characteristic
coupled with lack of understanding and inability to conceptualize policy process requires
creates a disconnection between policy and implementation. Effective information
sharing, therefore, human and institutional capacity building, and development of
governance structures across national and local settings is needed. Some studies argue
that even when the benefits and sustainable use of biological resources may be positive,
most sectors are reluctant to justify spending time and effort unless they are either
sanctioned by law and or by the society to get involved (Coglianese & Nash, 2002).
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Most institutions, for profit organizations and individuals within countries comply
with biodiversity protection goals only when it aligns with their own interests (Rees,
2003). Moreover, most also lack technical capacities and policy conceptualization skills
in biological resources management (Kline & Raustiala, 2000). Although strong
parliamentary and legislative systems may facilitate the development of sound
organizational ethics where terms of the treaty are given priority (Oliver, 1979), weak
local and national have remained barriers to effective implementation. In addition,
political instability and parliamentary systems in most countries account much of the
conservation problems.
1.9 Implementation of CBD goals
Science has been the guiding policy framework for biodiversity protection and
continues to play significant role in decision making. There is an increasing tendency
now to move toward incorporating the scientific framework with governance so as to
adequately address the conservation challenges that have persisted throughout the last
four decades. Governments, private institutions and international conservations
organizations have begun to play critical roles in biodiversity conservation.
Guided by the global strategic plan, individual governments began in 2002 to
draw their own National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs) upon which local
initiatives and implementation of conservation policies and actions were supposed to be
clearly outlined. However, NBSAPs in most countries remain simply a mere bundle of
declaration of intentions rather than commitments to specific actions (Harrop & Ptichard,
2011). All member countries to the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) now have
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NBSAPs but most do not have the capacity nor clear commitments and strategies on how
to implement specific actions on a sufficient scale to meet all the CBD goals.
Some of the challenges start with the global approach because the CBD urges
countries rather than requiring parties to fulfill specific implementation obligations
(CBD, 2010). Effective implementation of CBD goals depends on how governments
sanction NBSAPs to lower level structures and communities. As governments try to
confront biodiversity protection challenges, they need good analysis of both the macro
and micro complex relevant factors that influence the choices that people make at
different levels in society and within government. This kind of capacity is lacking within
many government institutions.
National plans developed by individual countries fail to match the goals outlined
by the CBD with the interests of all groups in government and the communities (Tang et
al., 2009). National plans are supposed to provide feasible bottom-up means to establish
concrete strategic goals, identify biodiversity degradation drivers and establish
mechanisms for coordination, monitoring, measuring trends, and reporting performance
(Tang et al., 2010) but stakeholder participation remains very narrow and highly skewed
to those with different interests (Sajor, 2009). This study tries to reconcile NBSAPs on
paper with the on the ground realities both nationally and at the local level.
How governments take NBSAPs to lower level structures and communities where
implementation takes place is extremely challenging. Most people involved within
countries and local settings not only look after their own economic interests but also lack
technical skills, policy conceptualization, training and understanding on how to
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implement the goals of international treaties (Kline & Raustiala, 2000). The
mainstreaming of biodiversity protection initiatives into national and local day-to-day
issues so that they are seen as beneficial concrete actions and not costly abstract ideas
does not seem to be well articulated to lower level institutions and structures within
countries.
1.9.1 Local level implementation
Local policy implementation is not just about biodiversity conservation in itself.
There needs to be a clear understanding of how biodiversity conservation policies impact
upon community needs, business interests, poverty and local economic development
priorities. According to Pressman & Wildavsky (1984) out of one goal – to protect
biodiversity, multiple goals start to emerge requiring multiple decision paths. This
multiplicity of decision paths requires multiple decision makers who may have different
priorities and may not care about outcomes from other decision paths (Pressman &
Wildavsky, 1984).
1.9.2 Adaption of local and national policies to international treaties
The challenge to biodiversity protection is the inability to find ways which
policies can be widely adopted and effectively implemented at all levels in society.
Habitats that host biological resources have continued to lose out to the rising human
population and the needs of economic development (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Rands et al.
2010). Biodiversity continues to be depleted at an increasing rate (CBD, 2006). Towards
the end of the 1990s, habitat reserved for biodiversity stood at 5 percent and for humans
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at 95 percent (Terborg, 1999). Terborg (1999) calls for radical changes in conservation
governance policies in all countries to avert total destruction of biological resources.
Consumption of biological resources has persistently superseded conservation efforts
(Global Footprint Network, 2010). The ongoing development of biodiversity protection
policies and efforts put into various international and national institutions will be futile if
in the long-run these are not widely adopted, are not be effective and functioning.
Advancement in democratic international institutional instruments and use of
information technology (IT) has created awareness and global cooperation in biodiversity
management. Governments that are parties have taken up the big role of implementing
the goals of these treaties to protect biodiversity within their borders. The convention on
biological diversity (CBD) also known as the Biodiversity Convention is an international
legally binding treaty such that countries that join it are required to implement its
provisions.
1.10 Global – National – Local conservation model
At the global setting, just ratifying a treaty is seen as one aspect of complying.
Globally, many treaties are in a sense drafted to generate policy rather than as a source of
obligations (Harrop & Pritchard, 2011). Actual implementation of treaty goals locally
calls for governments to provide capacity, direction to all stakeholders and develop a fair
framework for conservation and equitable distribution of benefits of biological resources
in more practical ways. Because of perceived immediate costs of biodiversity protection
many governments are not willing to build environmentally sound protection structures
for distant biological resources (Harrop & Pritchard, 2011).

28

Any plan, therefore, that promotes biodiversity protection at local levels should be
developed with the main objective of changing people’s perceptions. This includes
improving local knowledge, developing clear sanctions and penalties, and also creating
specific institutions to manage biological resources (Alexander, 2005). This calls for
biodiversity protection to be pursued simultaneously at three levels; global,
national/country and local levels. It is the local level implementation strategies that add to
national level success/failure and finally the global status and outlook of biological
resources. It is in the local setting that government regulations/laws that govern the
society are most felt. Also it is in these settings where frameworks for political
relationships are developed and where specific policies and practices are implemented.
Effective biodiversity protection initiative and planning must be based on constant
interplay between theory and practice and thus subject to constant modification as new
information is acquired. Issues that arise out of putting together theory and practice
should be solved collaborative between government institutions across all levels and
various organizations as well as communities and private sector institutions.
Examination and analysis of country plans, progress reports, analysis of national
and local institutional developments, capacity building in the form of information
technology, human resources training to build epistemic communities, and specific
connections from the CBD to governments to local levels.
Measurement of implementation and compliance was tried by Jacobson & Weiss
(2010) but was not very clear. My study has taken the issue of measurement seriously and
wants to examine the relationship between national governments and local institutions.
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The next chapter examines theoretical constructs that speak to institutional
collaboration and international relations. A review of various literature on compliance
with international treaties and implementation in general was done. Some other literature
on the goals of the CBD and implementation of various actions to protect biodiversity
(Jacobson & Weiss, 1998), show strong indications that this is something that countries
would want to do. There are however implementation and compliance problems of
varying magnitudes in different countries (Wilshusen et al., 2002). Successful
implementation of all goals of the CBD and achievement of greater compliance rests on
collective action by all parties to the CBD, its partnerships and many other sectors.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 Introduction
Chapter 2 is a literature review on compliance and implementation of the
Convention on Biodiversity. This review of literature was done in the context of human
needs, the laws that govern human society and the forces inherent in human nature
(Thompson & Morgenthau, 1948). Specifically, the chapter examined the literature on
international and national politics, policy formulation, local leadership, institutional
cooperation, and economics of biological resources, the scientific explanations and social
capital. The study examined international relations literature from the perspective of
global, national and local policy environments and institutional evolution. The literature
reviewed thus far provided a good foundation for the methods chapter.
2.1 Management of biological resources
Biodiversity management falls under multiple governing authorities and
jurisdictions, therefore, are most likely to be under-produced if mechanisms meant to
promote and reinforce cooperation are missing (Grunberg & Stern, 1999; Esty &
Ivanova, 2002). At regional levels, government-to-government cooperation is required
for successful implementation of biodiversity protection policies. At national levels,
devolved authority and decision making to local levels so as to encourage popular
participation and capacity building for communities is required to strengthen the
implementation of the goals, therefore, leading to higher compliance (Basurto, 2008).
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The underlying conceptual framework of biodiversity overexploitation is their
public good nature. Public goods are available for enjoyment for free by the society and
are difficult to confine to a single individual or group and are non-rivalry in consumption
(Esty & Ivanova, 2002). Management of environmental public resources requires strong
public policy solutions that have to be tailored to meet social equity, ecological
effectiveness, political feasibility, and economic efficiency (TEEB, 2009). Policy making
and program implementation for public goods such as the management of biological
resources should not be based on narrow self-interests but collective action by all
stakeholders cooperatively (Esty & Ivanova, 2002; Ostrom, 1990).
The influence of the Convention on Biodiversity on government policy as well as
at local level implementation and what types of institutions get created deserves a deeper
analysis. This because over the last two decades, the goals of biodiversity protection have
not been met, implementation has not been sufficient and compliance levels have
remained below expectations. Borrowing from the theory of cross-scale linkages, this
study examined the nature of relationships that has evolved at local, national and
international levels. Specific variables looked into in these linkages were financial
support linkages, capacity building linkages, technological and management linkages
(Igoe & Kelsall, 2005). These linkages take various forms such as formal or informal
rules of interaction between international organizations and local level institutions to
define the nature and type of support, information sharing and transfer of intellectual
expertise (Basurto, 2008).
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Local implementation takes two distinct approaches; there is the political process
and the administrative process (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). The political process
takes the form of authority and power that is given to agencies created to implement
policies. Administrative process speaks to the capacity of these conservation agencies and
community institutions in management, financial and human resources (Pressman &
Wildavsky, 1984). A key constraint to implementation is that conservation of biological
resources continues to be seen as a cost to society. Since biodiversity protection is a
multi-layered and multi-sector resource of interest, explaining implementation, therefore,
requires theories that can bring order and meaning to those that are tasked with
implementation as well as to those that would be impacted most.
2.2 Theoretical framework
Although there are more than 50,000 international treaties globally today covering
most issues across the society, the general lack of central enforcement ability and the
voluntary nature of their requirements make them rather ineffective in shaping states
behavior (Hathaway, 2005). Hathaway (2005) places the power of international treaties
at the crossroads of when treaties actually influence states behavior and when they do
not. Understanding the politics that influences governments’ decision to commit and to
comply helps to see the extent that treaties influence countries (Hathaway, 2005).
Examining most existing theories from the lens of biodiversity protection, they do
not sufficiently explain compliance with the convention on biodiversity (CBD) goals. At
the global setting, just ratifying a treaty is seen as one aspect of complying. Locally,
compliance has to mean much more than just ratification of a treaty and should go
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beyond policy making. Although the Convention on Biodiversity merely urges member
states rather than requiring them to fulfill its goals, national initiatives should commit
countries to more stringent obligations for higher compliance if biodiversity protection
targets have to be met in the future.
Wilshusen et al. (2002) argues that biodiversity protection should stop being
placed secondary to other priorities by governments and instead focus on strict
enforcement of conservation laws. Compliance with the CBD should call for much more
than just state reputations and sanctions. Compliance with the CBD requires much than
political commitments. Countries must have financial capacity, human resources, strong
institutions and willingness of the citizenry to change their lifestyles and consumption.
Conservation of biodiversity presents a very long and broad chain of causality
across sectors at different levels globally (Jasanoff, 1998; Guzman, 2014). Causality
comes with numerous decision points as different levels present their aspirations and
interests to each other (Wang, 2011). Individuals and institutions tasked with the
responsibility of biodiversity protection find themselves having to answer to multiple
principals such government, communities, private sector institutions and their own
employers creating multiple decision points. Conservationists are in effect, required to be
able to balance conflicting interests and expectations of their many principals. This
makes coordination difficult and weakens enforcement of regulations.
Going forward, the key questions to ask are: (1) How much compliance and what
type of compliance is expected at every decision point? (2) To what extent are the means
matched with the ends? This kind of compliance is better explained using the managerial
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theory rather than enforcement, sanctions and reputational costs. Managerial theory is
based on a cooperative problem-solving model (Chayes & Chayes, 1993) and therefore
can serve the CBD goals better. The managerial theory allows more freedom for
managers to manage and has given rise to the popular saying “managing for results”
(Boston et al. 1996). A cooperative problem-solving approach to decision making allows
parties to identify all their strategies both strong and weak. The weak strategies get
supported without compromising their strong strategies.
Other leading theories that have contributed to explanations on compliance are:
international relations theories, legitimacy theory, consent-based theory and institutional
theory. International relations theories concern themselves more with inter-state relations
and less on what actually takes place within states (Guzman, 2002). Protection and
management of biodiversity takes place inside states so this does not really help much
going forward in this research. Consent-based theories hold that states are not subject to
any external obligations which they have not consented to (Guzman, 2014). However,
for conservation of biodiversity, consent to comply is not enough. Commitment to the
goals of the CBD requires both commitment and capacity to carry through to completion
specific implementation obligations.
According to Guzman (2002), the legitimacy and consent-based theories make
assertions that countries obey international treaties either because they have consented to
those treaties or because treaties come into being through legitimate processes. Where
there is determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence, it is assumed that
there is a strong tendency toward high compliance. Determinacy means clarity of rules,
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symbolic validation is the presence of procedural practices, coherence is the connection
between rational principles and the rules, and adherence is the connection between the
rule and those secondary rules used to interpret and apply primary rules (Guzman, 2014).
Institutional theory views countries as primary international actors and uses cooperation
to explain how institutions within countries can move countries toward greater
compliance by reducing costs of verification in international treaty commitments (Koh,
1997). Institutional theory goes deeper to explain how individuals, interest-groups and
how private actors impact upon national decisions.
The problem with these theories is that they cannot explain the acceptable level of
compliance and what it would take to attain that level. According to Guzman (2014),
consent by a country is in itself an incentive to comply. At the same time, legitimacy of a
treaty does not give capacity to countries to comply. The legitimacy theory fails to
explain why nations should actually obey a legitimate treaty.
Conservation of biological resources cannot be left to governments alone.
According to Koh (1997), there exist non-state actors that share this responsibility as
explained by the transactions theory. This theory explains how public and private sector
organizations interact to internalize international treaties, interpret rules and enforce
them. This theory goes beyond treating governments as unitary actors to also bring in all
other stakeholders into the decision making ring. These are classified as transactional
actors whose role is to facilitate interactions and help to develop patterns of behavior, and
norms that can go into supporting compliance. Actual decisions at national level to
comply or not are heavily influenced from domestic institutions (Guzman, 2014).
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However, compliance with environmental treaties requires more than participation of
local institutions and stakeholders. It requires changes in perception, lifestyles,
conservation skills, training and information sharing tools.
Going forward, this study has used game theory and living systems theory to
model compliance and implementation of biodiversity protection goals.
2.2.1 Game theory
Conservation of biodiversity has always been implemented through negotiations
by interested parties within the confinements of normative social goals such as access to
use of resources to support basic needs, poverty alleviation, economic wellbeing among
many other priorities (Frank & Sarkar, 2010). Different groups with competing interests
such as communities, conservation agencies, governments, and private sector businesses
get modeled as decisions of a single agent trying to maximize objectives of each interest.
There is potential for conflicts as each party wants to strategically get maximum
benefits out of the negotiations. When such conflicts occur, decision support tools such
as the use of multi-criteria analysis have often been used to settle the conflict (Frank &
Sarkar, 2010). However, in situations where there exist multiple interested parties, game
theory provides the best way to model strategic positions taken by all parties. Frank and
Sarkar (2010) argue that game theory helps to identify conservation conflicts with Paretoinefficient Nash Equilibrium, thus, enabling actions that achieve closer to optimal
conservation outcomes. This is based on policy solutions that use mechanisms designed
to provide optimal individual incentives structures.
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Across many sectors and geographic regions, there is evidence that conservation
negotiations lead to trade-offs between different interests (McShae et al. 2011). The full
range of trade-offs are often under-estimated and rarely lead to win-win situations. When
Nash equilibria are Pareto-inefficient, stakeholders should cooperate otherwise seek the
intervention of higher authority. This works only if the higher authority is not perceived
as a stakeholder, otherwise it gets very problematic (Colyvan et al. 2011). Game theory is
a normative approach with a precise analytical framework that recognizes sub-optimal
conservation outcomes while facilitating players (countries or conservation organizations
in this case) to see possible best solutions.
There exist two equilibriums: when conservations and owners of biodiversity
resources fully cooperate and also when they fail to fully cooperate. A full cooperation
leads to an efficient equilibrium outcome because conservation strategies get
implemented. A failed cooperation results in an inefficient equilibrium outcome because
conservation strategies do not get implemented (Hoven, 2004).
2.2.1 Systems theory
Borrowing from the living systems theory (Wang, 2004), the study examined
organizational, community, society and supranational systems that have to be designed
for purposes of information sharing and organizational learning at the international level.
Systems theory provides answers to the question how globally designed biodiversity
protection programs fit into the needs of local situations as well as effective relationship
between global and local institutions (Deming, 1986). The purpose of an institution
according to the living systems theory is to reach a desired steady state where institutions
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are effective and their existence to continue to meet specified goals is guaranteed (Wang,
2004).
In the context of information management, this study asserts that the CBD can be
viewed as a decider subsystem. Wang (2004) argues that the decider is an information
process sub-system that receives, in this case, reports, plans and data from all other subsystems and transmits information outputs for guidance, coordination and management of
the whole global structure. The relationship between the CBD, its member countries and
local institutions can be viewed as a living system. Information Technology facilitates
communication across these systems otherwise known as countries, and facilitates global,
national and local coordination. Governments with information, policy and data rich
websites will enhance local level biodiversity protection through better communication,
sharing ideas and feedback (Witzel, 2012). The systems concept is a presentation of how
the different units/structures in different hierarchies within an organization interact and
manipulate when it is convenient or adapt the organization to the external environmental
demands (Almaney, 1974).
Organizations are best managed when they are viewed as a form of information
network with the flow of information providing decision makers at varying management
levels with information needed to make decisions of all types (Mockler, 1968). Decisions
are made in a dynamic and interactive environment. Organizational control, decision
making and planning for specified objectives is best done by combining different
authorities with a diverse set of specializations in different organizational units using

39

systems theory. The systems approach facilitates for more comprehensive information,
faster, at the point and in the form it is needed to make better decisions (Mockler, 1968).
2.3 Institutional development
Numerous international, national and local institutions working across boundaries
at various jurisdictions to find solutions for biodiversity degradation across geographical
and political boundaries have been created (Reischl, 2012). Reischl (2012) introduces the
idea of “planetary boundaries” so as to show the shortcoming of international institutions
when working at national or local levels as these are likely to affect and be affected by
decisions taken at different levels and by different institutions. There is not enough
understanding of various global governance systems in light of interacting planetary
boundaries (Reisch, 2012). There is great concern that the capacity of international
institutions alone cannot be able to project multilevel interacting earth process (Reischl,
2012). This therefore renders support to the importance of local organizations and
cooperation with local institutions. What then has to be done is to establish linkages
between institutions with a clear consensus on how to manage the relationship (Devall,
2006; Smith, et al. 2009; Resischl, 2012).
Governments often voluntarily create institutions as they see needs. There are also
times when institutions emerge spontaneously not because they are designed but as a
response to human actions (Brousseau, 2011). The current structure by most governments
gives conservation responsibility to government institutions and not the people at local
levels to make decisions on the fate of natural habitats (Wilshusen et al. 2002). While
some literature compellingly supports the top-down approach to biodiversity protection
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(Rabinowitz, 1999), there is a general trend by more scholars to write in support of
bottom-up approach.
There is an increased tendency now to dialogue with management avenues found
in public sector institutions, communities, private sector and other international
organizations to find creative approaches and initiatives that go beyond the scientific
management in conservation (Wilshusen et al., 2002). There are more other factors such
as social, economic, political, institutional and technological that determines the success
of biodiversity conservation policies regardless of how sound a policy could be
scientifically (Carlson, 2013).
The management side takes two avenues. The top-down restrictions that stop
communities from the use of biological resources are often viewed as imposing economic
hardships. Other scholars argue that although biological resources are local, non-local
interests also have a stake in local resources. Wilshusen et al., (2002) argues that local
interests should not supersede national and global interests. Conflicts then start to emerge
and estimation of opportunity costs to determine winners and losers when conservation
goals are implemented.
2.4 What are scientists telling us?
Before going deep into the literature, it is important to find out what scientists are
saying to all other stakeholders in biodiversity management. The full story itself is very
long with too many details, but this study has instead chosen to highlight a very long
journey in very few words. Human beings have been causing extinctions of other species
for over 50,000 years (Zedan, 2004; Devall, 2006). In the past 500 years alone, the rate of
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human caused extinctions has increased exponentially (Devall, 2006). From the end of
the 20th century to date, many more types of accelerated activities are creating huge
cumulative effects that scientists call the “crisis of extinction” (Zedan, 2004; Devall,
2006).
Many scientists are now making projections that between 30 to 50 percent of the
biodiversity could be extinct by the year 2050 (Ibid, 2004). According to the World
Conservation Union (WCU), as of 2003, there were 12,259 plants and animals threatened
with extinction due to human activities. The rate of species extinction is 1,000 to 10,000
times higher than it would be under natural conditions (Devall, 2006; WCU, 2003).
According to Kremen et al. (2000), more than 13 million hectares of forests are destroyed
annually. Deforestation of tropical forests alone leads to loss of most species extinction.
2.4.1 Biodiversity protection is not a quick-fix problem
Some studies (Guzman, 2002; Esty & Ivanova, 2002) have examined the
influence of environmental treaties in countries at a national level. At a national level,
what really happens there is policy development, which in most cases does not reflect
implementation at local levels. There can be a policy on paper that does not exist at
implementation levels. At a national level, governments have been known to play what is
known as symbolic politics (Davidson & Frickel, Edelman, 1964) where rhetorical
policies are advanced to imply commitment and reinforce public’s convictions that real
implementation of policy to protect biodiversity is being competently addressed, when in
actuality this is not true.
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At the global setting, just ratifying a treaty is seen as one aspect of complying.
Locally, compliance must mean much more than just ratification of a treaty and should
go beyond policy making. Although the Convention on Biodiversity merely urges
member states rather than requiring them to fulfill its goals, national initiatives should
commit countries to more stringent obligations for higher compliance if biodiversity
protection targets have to be met in the future. Wilshusen et al. (2002) argues that
biodiversity protection should stop trying to be everything to all people and focus on
strict enforcement of conservation laws.
One key objective of this research was to examine how national policies and
institutions evolve and adapt under international environmental treaties. Policy and
institutional evolution process is still under theorized and under analyzed (Brousseau,
2011). Biodiversity protection is not a quick fix problem to be done with so that other
forms of development can proceed (Chan et al., 2006). The arguments made by private
sector institutions that environmentalism hurts economies and will cost economic growth
works against government intervention and weakens regulation meant to protect the
environment. The sticking point between full implementation of international
environmental treaties by all countries has been about the tradeoffs between more
development and environmental conservation.
2.5 Public Administration and biodiversity conservation
Biodiversity protection is sometimes regarded as a political motive skillfully
constructed with the aim of crystallizing problems in order to influence public policy
(Devall, 2006). It is the conflicting interests between development and conservation that
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infuse the scientific discourse into politics in government (Devall, 2006; Crist, 2003).
Concerns over biodiversity protection need to go further beyond scientific boundaries, to
include policy, sociological, economic and cultural issues in society. International treaties
are not adequately structured to deal with national policies.
Treaties not only lack enforcement ability, their language is mostly rhetorical in
nature and full of discretionary statements such as “where feasible” or if the “State
decides” (Devall, 2006). Biodiversity protection requires strong and enforceable
regulations that can only come from a national government. Provisions of international
treaties, therefore, have to be translated into national and local legislation for treaty
objectives to be realized. While policy making is the responsibility of elected officials,
policy implementation in conservation needs to go beyond public administrators and
bureaucracies to include communities and local organizations.
There is limited policy literature that explicitly explains the political role in
conservation policy. This limitation arises out of the distance between natural sciencetrained conservationists on one side one side and the other side, the politicsadministration dichotomy within government bureaucracies, and private sector influence
(Adams & Hutton, 2007; Fesler & Kettl, 1996). This difference is more pronounced in
the context of capacity for natural resources conservationists to engage with the politics
of conservation at both government and private sector institutional levels (Adams &
Hutton, 2007).
The status of conservation outcomes depends more on political processes, while
implementation of various conservation policies are inherently political (Adams &
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Hutton, 2007). Biodiversity protection problems have continued to persist globally
because of lack of strong public administration. By placing the political processes of
biodiversity conservation in the context of a strong public administration arm of
government, policy implementation and national compliance with biodiversity protection
goals will be transformed. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD, 1994), government intervention failure was described as an
underlying source depletion pressures of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its
components. Intervention failures result from weak institutions that implement and
enforce conservation policies.
2.6 Compliance with international treaties
Biodiversity protection and natural resources management in general do not have
developed systems of measurement, monitoring and reporting (TEEB, 2009). For
effective implementation and compliance, an understanding of quantitative measurement
of biodiversity and ecosystem values is needed to alert policy makers to possible tipping
points (TEEB, 2009). Countries are required to report their compliance but it is not
possible to develop specific guidelines for every country as to the scope and methodology
of the reports ( Esty & Ivanova, 2002). Most countries do not have the capacity in human
resources, information technology, and institutional structures to meet their reporting
obligations. Furthermore, the Convention on Biodiversity does not contain strong
enforcement provisions. Therefore, the only incentive for compliance is if there is
pressure from the public, moral requirements or local legislations. There are again
difficulties in an environment where there is insufficient performance data such that
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“name and shame” strategy fails when wanting to point out serious policy violators (Esty
&Ivanova, 2002).
Jacobson and Weiss (1998) argue that very little is known about national
compliance with and implementation of international treaties. Compliance means
observance of regulations and adherence to commitments contained in the treaty. Weak
or unenforced legislations produce weak compliance, meaning that the mere existence of
legislation does not mean that there is compliance. At the same time, there can be
compliance even when there is weak and ineffective implementation. At the global level,
the mere submission of reports by governments is a measure of compliance. Slow
movement toward meeting all the goals of the CBD provides reasons to believe that
compliance with and implementation of international environmental treaties is both
imperfect and inadequate.
Studies conducted on compliance so far (Mitchell, 1994) examines factors that
affect compliance, (Jacobson &Weiss, 1998), looks at factors that lead to improved
implementation of and compliance with environmental treaties such as political,
economic and cultural variables, (Rinquist & Kastodinova, 2005) have analyzed
effectiveness of environmental treaties and outlined the challenges of measuring
effectiveness. Biodiversity management problems have been persistent over the years,
they span jurisdictions and generations. The inter-jurisdictional and intergenerational
span of these problems calls for governance mechanisms that can alter incentives in favor
of environmentally sound choices. These choices can provide for adequate information
and establish concrete mechanisms for policy implementation (Esty & Ivanova, 2002).
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2.7 Global policy environment
The global policy formulation and implementation should be guided by first
establishing the optimal level of global consumption that can be defined as contributing
to sustainable use of biological resources. Short of this, there is no reference point. What
is being done at the moment is the historical conservation discourse, which I believ if
well understood is a good basis for conservation policies development.
According to Mangel et al., (1996), the first batches of global policies for the
protection of biodiversity were developed in 1978. These did not include explicit set of
mechanisms for implementation and were therefore not widely adopted. In the year1994,
reviews to examine why the 1978 policies failed were initiated and designed to
incorporate effective guiding principles and mechanisms for implementation. Policy
adoption and implementation still remained the key challenge. In 1992, an institution in
the name of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) was created to coordinate global
governments to start to reverse biodiversity degradation through implementation of
specific initiatives to meet specific global goals.
Since then, there has been an increasing number of global, regional and national
policy initiatives aimed at biodiversity protection and management (Rands et al. 2010).
All parties to the CBD met in 2002 and agreed to develop a framework to facilitate
implementation of the CBD goals, so as to start reversing biodiversity degradation by the
year 2010. The approach agreed to was to develop national plans. About 90% of the
countries that have signed membership with the CBD now have fully developed National
Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs). The question to ask now is whether these
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plans can actually propel national governments towards better implementation and higher
compliance.
The NBSAPs have elicited support to biodiversity protection activities from local,
national and regional civil society organizations that add to the work of international
organizations (Rands et al. 2010). Despite this growing support, biodiversity has
continued to decline (CBD, 2010). This has prompted the international community to
shift conservation approaches toward a more targeted framework of national parks and
protected area networks (CBD 2006) and Public-Private Partnerships. Over the last 20
years, protected area networks have grown steadily at an average of 2.5% and was found
to be covering 24 million Km2 with 133,000 designated sites as of 2006 (Rands et al.
2010).
The CBD initiatives were widely adopted by governments but were not effective
as all countries missed the target of starting to reverse biodiversity degradation by the
year 2010. The CBD does not have enforcement mechanisms to sanction countries and
therefore implementation has been problematic (Adenle, 2010). The capacity of most
countries does not come near the threshold of global implementation requirements. For
instance, many countries lack scientific infrastructure in the form of high quality
universities, research labs, technical institutions and network infrastructure. There exist
weak information technology linkages between governments, international organizations
and private partnerships. Biodiversity protection targets were re-set again in 2011 to the
year 2020 (CBD, 2010).
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However, the challenge to biodiversity protection is still to find ways that policies
can be widely adopted and effectively implemented at all levels in society. Habitats that
host biological resources have continued to lose out to the rising human population and
the needs of economic development (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Rands et al. 2010).
Biodiversity continues to be depleted at an increasing rate (CBD, 2006). Toward the end
of the 1990s, habitat reserved for biodiversity stood at 5 percent and for humans at 95
percent (Terborg, 1999). Terborg (1999) calls for radical changes in conservation
governance policies in all countries to avert total destruction of biological resources.
Consumption of biological resources has persistently superseded supply (Global
Footprint Network, 2010).
Advancement in democratic international institutional instruments and use of
information technology (IT) has created awareness and global cooperation in biodiversity
management. Governments that are parties to the CBD have taken up the big role of
implementing the goals of these treaties to protect biodiversity within their borders. The
convention on biological diversity (CBD) also known as the Biodiversity Convention is
an international, legally binding treaty, such that countries that join it are required to
implement its provisions.
2.7.1 Global strategic plan for biodiversity
According to the new Strategic Plan (SP) 2011 – 2020, the 2010 biodiversity
targets were both a learning process as well as an inspiration at many levels, but it
appears the resulting actions have not risen to the scale sufficient enough to reduce the
rate of biodiversity degradation. Even with many lessons learned and more awareness
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among all parties to the CBD, there is no adequate integration of biodiversity protection
initiatives, policies and programs across all sectors and levels of the economy (SP, 2011).
Key impediments to implementation at the country level include lack of financial
resources, low human capacity, lack of technological capital, and insufficient data and
information necessary for policy formulation and decision making (SP, 2011). To
adequately address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss and direct pressures that
lead to its depletion, there is need for actions across all levels from global to local levels
and across all sectors (SP, 2011). Engagement with local level consumption and
production sectors is critical, so as to identify trade-offs between basic societal needs and
conservation, and build appropriate incentives and institutions (SP, 2011).
Although the 2011-2020 strategic plan is clear on what needs to be done to avoid
the mistakes made when trying to meet the 2010 biodiversity protection targets, countries
would have to come up with more specific and concrete initiatives at national levels.
There is a desire by the international community to support national governments with
capacity building and financial resources for local policies. However, countries would
have to build mechanisms on how to respond to lack of financial resources, how to
enhance human capacities and how to build sufficient data and information for decisionmaking that is scientifically sound, socially feasible and politically acceptable.
2.7.2 National policy environment
Governments play significant roles in the development of both national and local
institutions. Institutions in this context refer to the rules or laws that govern relationships
between individuals, groups, organizational norms and practices in society. Biodiversity
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protection as is constructed is a political, economic, social and organizational process.
Biodiversity protection is embedded in all these processes. All groups, organizations and
institutions involved in biodiversity protection engage with each process differently, thus
making it difficult for collective action (Brechin et al., 2002). Only the government can
sanction all these processes to produce political justification and social justification, so
that organizational process can set in motion the collective protection efforts.
2.7.3 Global-Local policy interface
Although the international community has done a great deal of work identifying
important conservation areas and fashioning the research agenda, more successful
outcomes and larger big impact can only come from local institutions (Smith et al. 2009).
Successful conservation strategies are those that are developed with clear relationships
between local communities, national government, international organizations and the
scientific community (Devall, 2006).
The challenge is that many local institutions are greatly underfunded and
government institutions in most biodiversity rich locations are ineffective (Smith et al.
2009). Most international organizations answer to their members and donors and
therefore their priorities do not usually match those of local agencies (Smith et al. 2009).
When local institutions are weak, various problems begin to manifest: (1) projects that do
not gain local long-term support, (2) conservation approaches that are developed do not
match local needs and (3) research on local issues are overlooked. Local institutions,
agencies and other local groups should set the agenda for research, data collection and

51

decide on implementation while international organizations are only left with supportive
roles (Smith, et al. 2009).
Conservation plans are more legitimate and politically acceptable when local
institutions and groups participate in making them. These plans can be better coordinated
locally with other sectors such as land-use planning, agriculture, water and climate
change (Smith et al. 2009). In many countries, especially developing countries, national
plans are made by international experts and national bureaucrats with very little input
from communities.
Local agencies in many developing countries lack the means and influence to
implement change (Smith et al. 2009). Many conservation programs in biodiversity-rich
developing countries are driven by international organizations, an approach that causes
local resentment and makes conservation seem a marginal issue (Smith et al. 2009). This
can be overcome through the development of social-learning institutions which bring
together local and international conservationists and researchers. Government staff are
poorly trained, funded and motivated. Working with staff from international
organizations gives them access to new skills and contacts, enabling them to develop
their own conservation agendas (Smith et al. 2009).
To assist local organizations with skills and capacity to meet conservation
challenges and make the right decisions, foreign donors have to ensure good
collaboration directly with them especially in understanding their specific requirements.
Donors should also fund local groups directly to enable them to finance the establishment
of social-learning institutions and their research priorities as well as train agency staff and
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local experts. Weak institutions will not develop because currently, donor money tends to
flow through international NGOs, in so many countries (Smith et al. 2009).
2.8 Policy making and policy implementation
Just like many other public policies, biodiversity protection policies by
governments can best be created and implemented when there are separate institutions
that make policy while others implement the policy. National governments pass
legislation but implementation is done at local levels and enforced by local bureaucracies
(Vogel & Kessler, 2002; Gussman, 2004). It is movement through these different levels
of policy making and policy implementation that gaps in standards established by the
legislation and required implementation arise thus creating opportunities for noncompliance (Gjertsen & Barrett, 2003). Public policies have to be designed to make
implementation effective by facilitating adequate institutional structures, regulations and
incentives (TEEB, 2009).
There are several sources of mismatch between national legislation,
implementation and compliance. The mismatch in most countries between legislation and
implementation result from the low level of government’s administrative capacities.
Countries join and ratify treaties before they build sufficient capacities to take on added
responsibilities which lead to administrative overload (Vogel & Kesler, 2002; Perkins &
Neumayer, 2007). In other cases, this comes about because those tasked with
implementation at local levels do not contribute in any way to making legislation
(Perkins & Neumayer, 2007). Structures enabling participation by all stakeholders is key
to successful implementation. Although voluntary, treaties impose directives on
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governments that call for further directives by the same governments on local level
institutions and communities. These different levels do not share the same level of
resource capacities, administrative capacities, institutional capacities, technical
knowledge and values (Porter & Brown, 1990).
Environmental institutions in most countries are relatively new at the national
government level. In most local levels, these institutions are just being introduced and
most countries are working at replacing traditional practices with the best management
practices (Jacobson & Weiss, 1998). These processes take time to be understood
(Jacobson & Weiss, 1998). Administrative capacities are critical to successful
implementation and national compliance with environmental treaties. Although not true
all the time, national capacities, implementation and compliance are also associated with
the level of national income of a country (Porter & Brown, 1991; Vogel & Kesler, 2002;
Jacobson & Weiss, 1998). High levels of compliance should be accompanied with
advanced national environmental regulations.
Policy making and implementation within countries is influenced by various types
of groups. In some countries such as India and the Democratic Republic of Congo,
guerrilla insurgents keep their bases in tropical forests and wildlife parks and keep good
relationships with poachers. Some of these countries are not able to comply because of
unstable political environments (Vogel & Kesler, 2002; DR Congo Progress report,
2004). In other countries, policy making is influenced by elites in government, corporate
executives and industry leaders ( Feinerman & Fujikura, 2008). This locks out those
tasked with implementation from participating, thus making enforcement problematic.
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International environmental treaties do not contain criminal enforcement provisions
(Vogel & Kesler, 2002). The only reason that implementation is done is because: (1) of
the moral standpoint, (2) it benefits local communities or the industry being regulated and
(3) when there exists strong legislative and enforcement authorities.
2.8.1 National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs)
Although the goals of the CBD are very specific, different countries’ national
strategic planned goals and objectives vary because of different circumstances in those
countries. What should not vary are the consistence and details, timelines and funding
sources, including the measure and how well a plan is being implemented. In addition,
most plan preparation activities should not overly orient to the production of a plan as a
product that becomes a formalized series of words on paper (Tang et al., 2009).
According to Chapin and Kaiser (1979), there are three definitions of a good national
plan.
National plans should contain specific goals linked to local conditions rather than
vague umbrella goals such as protection of biodiversity, economic development or
greater governmental responsiveness that are non-substantive. These goals must represent
the general aspirations, problem alleviations, and needs that are premised on shared
national values of each country.
A plan should have fact-based specifics on the existing local conditions with
identified needs related to the community’s physical development. High quality plans are
produced by fact finding, frequent community-wide exchanges of information and
proposal for action. Such plans are more effective in facilitating government
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responsiveness because guidelines are predicated on a fact basis tailored to local
conditions and expected patterns of public behavior. Policies or actions within a plan
serve as a general guide to decisions about the location, density, type and timing of public
and private development to ensure that plan goals are achieved. Good plans contain
policies that are specific and stated in action-oriented language, using words like will or
must, rather than might or should. Good plans contain data and analysis that is essential
for building the foundation for meeting objectives and developing policies.
A plan is a product from a planning process that forms a foundation for future
actions and therefore must continuously undergo revisions and updates. This is necessary
because plans have to be made to constantly adapt over time to needs of the society and
the changing physical environment (Brody, 2003).
2.8.2 Local policy environment
Local policy environment at both community and business levels features
significant shortcomings as a result of either the perceived costs associated biodiversity
protection, low institutional capacities or lack of sufficient knowledge (TEEB, 2009;
Brechin et al. 2002). Current local policy approaches to biodiversity protection
emphasize three frameworks of protecting biological resources: sustainable use, protected
area networks and mainstreaming (CBD, 2010). There is a shift from strict protection
toward broader participation. This, however, cannot succeed without building structures
that can connect people, institutions and organizations across different levels and sectors.
Such participation is important for developing epistemic communities necessary for
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mobilization of political constituencies from various civil and private sector organizations
to build resilient conservation institutions (Rands et al., 2010).
At local levels, one can experience the argument often discussed in the literature
is that infinite growth does not exist in a finite environment. Demand for natural
resources that far exceeds the capacity of natural environment will eventually overwhelm
the natural resources base (Mangel at al., 1996). Compliance with all goals of the CBD
cannot be realized unless resource use is guided by policies that would maintain levels
that provide for future generations that policies also should minimize changes in the
structure and dynamics of ecosystems to the extent that any damage can be reversed
within one human generation (Mangel et al., 1996). These are very complex statements
especially when there is a lot of literature that highlights the difficulties communities at
local levels experience in the context of pollution, deforestation, poverty, landlessness,
insecure land tenure and political oppression (Myer 1998; Myers et al. 2000).
Opportunity costs of biodiversity protection at local levels have direct impacts on
communities. The levels of opportunity costs of foregoing consumption at present for the
sake of future generations as well as opportunity costs of sustainable use, determines how
compliance will be attained. Policies that link biodiversity protection to economic
benefits, such as REDD+, have great potential to provide revenue benefits to
communities to protect forest resources (Rands et al. 2010). Biodiversity degradation is
not the intended consequence of human actions but rather it is an unintended
consequence of actions taken for other reasons. Biodiversity protection can therefore be
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seen as an economic externality of outcomes of doing what is perceived as normal
business by the society (Rands et al. 2010; Dasgupta, 1979).
Communities and businesses have no incentives to change their consumption,
lifestyle, and way of doing business if opportunity costs of change are too high (Atisa et
al. 2012). This calls for biodiversity protection to be managed as a public good provided
collectively through conscious choices (Rands et al. 2010). Valuation techniques that
quantify economic values of biodiversity are not well developed to provide close to exact
measures of biological resources (TEEB, 2009). Economic value of biodiversity has to be
built into the social, economic, legal and political decision making institutions across
sectors and at all levels in a country to facilitate acceptable policy changes (Rands et al
2010).
Local institutions and community based organizations at local levels provide a
platform for building partnerships with international organizations, government
institutions and private sector businesses to promote effective policies for biodiversity
protection (Colyvan, 2010). Rands et al. (2010) argues that policy responses to
biodiversity degradation fail because they do not establish appropriate institutions,
governance and behaviors. Partnerships provide a learning environment where
experiences and resources are shared to build a sound knowledge base where policies
generated are more acceptable to all. The challenge to local level biodiversity protection
is that key and the much needed institutions are either non-existent, lack sufficient
capacity or are just being created and are at learning stages (Atisa et al. 2012).
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2.9 Global-National-Local model
The global-national-local model is a framework that has been developed by this
study to examine conservation policies meant to resolve conflicting use of biodiversity at
national and local levels. These conflicts emerge when policies created to further global
interests are in conflict with national interests. National conflicts also emerge when
policies created by national governments through the influence of global policies conflict
with local interests. It is important to resolve conflicting interests that arise at different
levels so that there is no perceived inherent policy superiority in the way resources are
either used or conserved. There is a need for a clear separation of basic interests and nonbasic interest. The process of global policy making should be designed in ways that allow
national and local interests the same worth for basic and non-basic interests (Sagoff &
Taylor, 1988). The challenge is how to ensure that interests at all levels are taken into
account as much as it is clear that not all stakeholders from local levels can participate in
policy making at global and national levels.
The use of biodiversity falls into either basic need or non-basic category.
Conservation policies should not be seen as denying communities an opportunity to either
develop or meet their basic needs. Basic human resource interests are those which are
morally legitimate to be fulfilled, such as land to grow food (Sagoff & Taylor, 1988).
Violating people’s moral and legitimate rights to basic needs deprives them of their
ability to live at the best minimum living standards. When conflicts of this nature occur,
there must be appropriate compensation mechanisms for the forgone resources. It remains
challenging to conservationists to separate basic needs and non-basic needs so as to
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develop appropriate compensation mechanisms. There are resources that are non-basic to
the industry but basic to rural communities. Some are basic to plants and wildlife but
non-basic to human beings, while their use is not based on whether they are basic to
specific categories.
Ability to identify and develop policies that separate basic and non-basic
biodiversity needs by different categories of consumers and users is difficult. It is full of
uncertainties, pervaded by information asymmetry problems, imbalance of power, and
legitimacy conflicts among irreconcilable representations and incompatible interests
(Boisvert & Vivien, 2005). Most studies examining conflicts in the consumption and use
of biodiversity have unanimously advocated for compromises and sustainable use. This
study brings into the equation two factors, appropriate compensation mechanisms and
capacity building. It is not so much about efficiency and equity but how much
communities can afford to forego for the sake of conservation. How much can businesses
afford to cut and still remain profitable?
2.10 Sustainable use and equitable sharing of biodiversity benefits
Sustainable use and equitable sharing are the other two goals of the CBD. The
“Sustainable development” model was born out of the Brudtland Commission created by
the United Nations in 1983 to address concerns that the rate of resources depletion and
environmental degradation by current generation was disabling the ability of future
generations to meet their needs. This commission defined sustainable development as the
use of resources now without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
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own (UN, 1987). The big challenge to global economies is how to balance economic
development and natural resources consumption (Carlson, 2013).
Carlson (2013) argues that sustainable development is a risk minimization and
risk management initiative that supports economic development within environmental
resources constraints and scientific uncertainty. As the global society has continued to
adapt to sustainable development, progressive degeneration of biological resources and
loss of species has continued at an accelerated rate (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Carlson,
2013). Many of the current approaches to biodiversity protection do not provide adequate
measures that can protect biological resources up to the rate of current consumption
(Brechin et al. 2002). Social stability in many countries depends on high rates of
biodiversity consumption that supports economic growth (Carlson, 2013). Policies that
curtail the free use of biodiversity have raised concerns among businesses who argue that
such policies hobbles economic development.
The greatest threats to biodiversity come from the desire by humans to pursue
economic development and to provide for basic needs. Although sustainable development
approaches to sustainable living and natural resource use has been successful at changing
the way various sectors use natural resources, it does not provide concrete and verifiable
targets on many fronts. Sustainable development fails to show a concrete relationship
between total available resources and total consumption so as to see whether the two are
converging or diverging.

Going the sustainable development route in biodiversity

conservation will miss big opportunities as this does not advocate for a cap on the pursuit
of economic growth (Carlson, 2013). Sustainable use of biological resources does not
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provide any targets that have to be attained for a specific level of biological resources in
relation to demand or level of consumption (Carlson, 2013).
Studies of various sustainable development literature in relation to biodiversity
protection does not show how implementation of sustainability approaches affect national
and local biodiversity protection policies (Rosales, 2005). The basic definition of
sustainable use is to continue to use biological resources so that there are some left for
future generations. This statement does not provide both the economic demand and
biological resources threshold that can meet both today’s and future generation’s needs.
There is tremendous literature on the adoption of various sustainable development
mechanisms (Porter and Brown, 1991; Rosales, 2005), such as green technology in
various sectors, but not much is known about the final outcomes on actual positive
impacts on biodiversity. Rosales (2005) argues that initiatives that have been developed
to address the root cause of environmental decline cannot be successful unless there is a
cap on economic growth based on ecological thresholds.
The way to ensure sustainable use of biodiversity is to restrict economic activities
at a level that is ecologically sustainable (Rosales, 2005). The problem is that there is no
identified threshold level of economic development that provides for sustainable use. It is
this cap that will provide guidelines to local, national and global policies (Rosales, 2005).
The biggest challenge of capping growth at local levels is that biological resources
consumption by some of the rural communities can be classified as basic needs.
Opportunity costs of foregone use of biological resources might mean life or death for
some people. This kind of situation requires a mixed bag of policies that protects
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communities from an unfair deprivation of resource use while at the same time protection
biodiversity from overexploitation.
Rapidly rising population growth leading to higher per capita consumption causes
overexploitation of biological resources. No matter how sustainably resources are used,
depletion will continue ( Rosales, 2005; Wilshusen et al. 2002). However, successful
conservation depends upon rewarding communities at local settings for the opportunity
costs of conservation (Atisa et al. 2013; Rosales, 2005), otherwise future generations will
pay.
2.11 Opportunity cost considerations
Implementation and compliance with international environmental treaties
concerns more than just global consensus building toward agreed conservation
objectives. Opportunity costs of economic development, geopolitics of global
consumption of biological resources and wealth distribution are central to any success
with implementation of conservation goals and the level of compliance realized (Drumbl,
2002). Interdependence of economic development and environmental regulations pits the
more developed North against the less developed Southern countries that requires
compromises to be made, both in terms sharing financial resources to go towards
reducing opportunity costs of conservation by the South and technological transfer to
ameliorate conservation challenges from the North (Drumbl, 2002).
Jacobson and Weiss (1998) use costs and benefits calculation to argue that the
smaller the costs and the greater the benefits, the greater the probability of
implementation and compliance. The nature of these costs needs to be clearly identified;
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they do not do that. They make another assumption that countries with large gross
national product and higher per capita Gross National Product (GNP), have greater
probability of implementation and compliance. In some cases, this is usually the opposite.
Drumbl (2002) asserts that more developed nations of the North show more
demonstration toward proposing international treaties than the developing nations. The
reason for this observation is that developing countries priorities are more to carter for
basic needs such as safe provision for safe drinking water, healthcare, education and food
(Drumbl, 2002). In addition, implementation and observation of international treaties
come with associated costs. Some of these costs go toward supporting legislation,
institutions and enforcement of laws required to give force to an international treaty
including investments in technology and manpower development (Strategic plan, 2011;
Drumbl, 2002).
The desire by both developed and developing countries to continue to grow their
economies as a priority creates fears of economic decline if nations were to strictly
implement the requirements of international environmental treaties. Economic
deceleration is a big opportunity cost (Drumbl, 2002).
2.11.1 Global opportunity costs
Global consumption of natural resources and waste generation has reached a
tipping-point (Drumbl. 2002). It has become abundantly clear that the planet can longer
be able to supply resources that meet the demand placed on it as well as absorb the
amount of waste generated (Global Footprint Work, 2006). There are conflicting global
views on who should do more to ameliorate the impeding biodiversity crisis. Global
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opportunity costs of biodiversity protection is what it costs the world now to reverse the
degradation of biological resources and what it would cost the future generations to
acquire the same resources to meet their own needs. The main point is that the future
generations should not be made to pay for unnecessary overexploitation of natural
resources by this generation.
Under the North-South global relations, developing countries have entered into a
negotiation strategy where the more developed Northern nations are to pay for
implementation and compliance costs incurred by the developing nations (Drumbl, 2002).
Financial commitments to developing nations have evolved into solid obligations upon
which developing countries who are combating global environmental threads is
predicated (Drumbl, 2002).
2.11.2 National opportunity costs
International treaties lack enforcement authority over nations and therefore
nations have to design and implement conservation objectives which entail various costs
(Adams et al. 2010). Some of these costs may come in the form of welfare loss. Nations
need to develop mechanisms for assessing benefits and costs of biodiversity protection
(Sinden, 2004). Treaties, therefore, have to be seen to provide more benefits to all
participating nations for successful adoption and implementation of treaty goals. In
addition, credible, transparent and simple punishment options need to be institutionalized
within the treaty to ensure compliance and avoid “loophole-effects”. The costs associated
with filling in the gaps in welfare loss or gain is the national opportunity cost.
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National plans for biodiversity protection should adequately take into full account
the economic costs of conservation that arise in the form of acquisition, management,
damage, transaction and benefits (Adams et al. 2010; Naidoo et al. 2006). One example
to show this is the establishment of a protected area networks. The government has to
acquire land, and this land comes with long-term management costs (Adams et al. 2010).
National opportunity costs come in two ways, organizational and social costs. National
plans should be drawn so that they can ensure that conservation goals move to
implementation on the ground but first they need to consider both organizational and
social costs (Adams et al. 2010; Knight et al. 2006; Pierce at al. 2005).
2.11.3 Local level opportunity costs
At local levels, opportunity costs arise because sacrifices have to be made in
terms of not using some resources. Communities may forego the use of land for farming
and have it reserved for forestry purposes, or businesses may not use certain resources if
these are considered threatened by overexploitation. National governments for example
have enacted legislation to protect habitats, forests, water resources and wildlife. These
legislations protect biodiversity by preventing communities from clearing forests on their
land. Consequently, this reduces farm incomes.
“The opportunity cost of protecting biodiversity on farmland
is the income foregone in the alternative agricultural use of
land, and is the major cost of protection” (Sinden, 2004).
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Biodiversity protection legislation removes the community’s right to
develop their own lands as they wish. This does impose a cost on the community.
Opportunity costs of land use changes and natural resources conservation in many places
has not been given attention to match their economic importance in decision making
(Panyotou, 1994). The use of economic incentives for conservation has therefore
continued to be compromised as opportunity costs are not fully considered in the
valuation of biological resources (Griffiths & Southey, 1995). Opportunity costs are a
major influence on the net benefits that local communities obtain from natural resources
(Atisa et al. 2013). Increasing dependence on land due to limited employment
opportunities and high rate of population growth exacerbates opportunity costs. Although
global negotiations provide for more developed nations to finance conservation of
biodiversity by less developed countries, there are no clear compensation mechanisms for
local level opportunity costs.
2.12 Information technology and information sharing tools
Jacobson and Weiss (2010) argue that more information about conservation
problems leads to more understanding, and more effective implementation and
compliance. Biodiversity protection is the responsibility of governments first. It is at this
level where programs are created by law with clearly identified purpose, means and
conditions under which they will be implemented (Rose, 1991). The CBD encourages
national governments to establish and strengthen National Clearing House Mechanisms
(NCHM) websites which is hoped will contribute to cooperation and development of
regional, sub-regional information and knowledge sharing. Very few governments have
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built an equivalent of GBIF at national level. How governments are making effective use
of National Biodiversity Information Facility (NBIF) or a similar agency has been
analyzed in this study.
Information Technology is being used as a tool for coordination of activities
within and between organizations, governments and a host of other institutions (Dedrick
et al., 2008). Use of IT at global level allows information and data sharing, coordination,
discussions and transfer of ideas between regions/countries with high capacities and those
with low capacities. The most developed and widely available information found in the
internet is that provided by international organizations and more developed government’s
institutions with high capacities. Most of these data is only at the country level which
makes it less usable by resource managers and planners who require more human and
ecological relationships at specific local regions (Guralnick et al., 2007). This study
introduces and explores aspects of human-institutional-biological resource relationships
in the context of information sharing. It does place local communities at the center of
biodiversity protection and planning.
The Internet and the World Wide Web (www) are the most significant, cheap and
fastest communication tools so far developed and being used to share information and
data. Within the United Nations system, the CBD has a well-developed CHMs which
provides global information services to facilitate implementation of biodiversity
protection plans. The CBD website (www.cbd.int) acts as the central node. The CHM is
a place for national governments and partners to openly exchange biodiversity
information, promote and facilitate technical scientific cooperation. Also, it is for use by
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governments with limited IT infrastructure to find data and information needed for sound
decision making.
Use of IT improves communication across sectors and between countries, and
facilitates global, national and local coordination. Governments with information, policy
and data rich websites will enhance local level biodiversity protection through better
communication, sharing ideas and feedback (Witzel, 2012). Regions facing common
conservation challenges can learn from each other how to deal with problems when
policies and conservation programs are posted online. Effectiveness of programs
developed for a specific region or place can be measured by comparison with others
being implemented elsewhere (Rose, 1991) when these are easily accessible in the web. It
is also possible to obtain and adopt information from online sources to help facilitate
national policy development and local planning.
The use of IT in management is viewed as one way that efficiently meets the
demands of public institutions, lowers administrative costs and improves service delivery
(Myeong & Choi, 2010). Public institutions use IT to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity
about goals and cause-effect relationships during the time of implementation. Successful
application and employment of IT in public settings requires investments in
infrastructure, computers and relevant software which must be accompanied with training
and capacity building.
Management of biological resources is a complex process of balancing immediate
benefits with long-term conservation goals and political priorities. Generating of relevant
information and data sharing is crucial to reaching an optimal balance of various
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stakeholder interests (Simon, 1977). Emphasis on long-term conservation goals can be
viewed negatively when communities have no alternative to their immediate needs. IT
facilitates in the scanning of the conservation environment for information and data
needed to understand local and national priorities and to build a consensus on immediate
benefits and long-term conservation goals (Esty, 2004).
Environmental policy and decision-making critically depends on available
information, data and analysis. Information technology tools such as wireless
communications, remote sensing, and internet communication, have vastly increased the
capacity to collect, share and utilize data (Esty, 2004). Information technology provides
access to opportunities that make biodiversity protection more data driven, empirically
verifiable and analytically rigorous.
Biodiversity protection falls into the ranks of open projects (Witzel, 2012) that
know no boundaries. This is the reason why it is a global effort by 195 countries and
numerous non-governmental organizations working across borders, sharing resources,
information and having a common purpose. A globally unified effort for biodiversity like
this one requires systems that provide a high degree of transparence, information sharing,
and distributed accountability among all participants at all levels (Witzel, 2012). It is for
these reasons that Information Technology is of critical importance to the success of
biodiversity management and protection.
2.13 Institutional leadership
Pallemaerts (2003) argues that social responsibility activities undertaken by
different sectors or organizations are geared toward enabling them to choose
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arrangements that serve their own self-interests. The same applies to communities and
individuals. Biodiversity protection does not fall into the class of interests that private
sector and communities would have as their priority interest. Governments, therefore,
face problems trying to find ways to design and implement policies that will generate
organizational leadership that is able to solve problems in different spheres of the society
(Alkadry & Nyhan, 2005). At the same time, organizational leadership has limits in its
discretionary space. Such requirements can only be met under a leadership that has a
great deal of discretion and style that adopts power-with management approach that leads
to a win-win situation by consensus and policy expansion (Graham, 1996; Golden, 1998).
Using the structural equation model, Alkadry & Nyhan (2005) explain
bureaucratic experience and its impact on the behavior of public organizational
leadership. The best way to understand organizational behavior is to study it as a system
(Scott, 1961, Kast & Rozenweig, 2001). The systems approach has great potential in
facilitating in understanding of the complexities as open systems, closed systems,
feedback and hierarchy (Kast & Rozenweig, 2001). Vancouver (1996) examines how
living systems are used to model human, organization and communication to signify the
importance of the nature of relationships in organizations.
The international community has continued to build institutions and partnerships
that remain central at influencing the behavior of individual governments. These
institutions include the United Nations Agencies and the International Treaties. They
provide structures upon which governments come together to take actions that form
important tools for pooling resources to confront global environmental problems (Hanf,
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2000). The difficulties that exist in the implementation of international treaties are mainly
because there is no coercive body at the international level equivalent to law enforcement
agents within a country (Stretton, 2010). Institutions that are necessary for the effective
implementation of an international treaty exist at the national level where it is possible to
coerce different actors into adopting relevant environmental policies using either
sanctions or incentives.
According to the new public management (NPM), agencies create expertise to
increase effectiveness and efficiency of government intervention on issues that are
considered most important (Stampfer et al., 2010). Looking at efficiency from the
principle-agent model, principles and agents move through processes of policy
formulation, institutional development, data collection, information sharing, capacity
building and partnerships with all stakeholders.
Domestically, national decisions on biodiversity protection are shaped by national
politics of party states guided by domestic economic considerations, administrative
capacities and availability of funds (Chan et al., 2006). Implementation of the CBD goals
has continued to face great challenges because of incompatibility of basic interests,
mandates and interest between the different agencies in government and other sectors
(Wilshusen et, al 2002). Fragmented processes and structures of government agencies
impede the achievement of goals, such as when there are no formal institutional
mechanisms and institutional linkages between land and agricultural planners (Calder,
2005).
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CHAPTER III
METHODS AND DATA
3.0 Data sources and methods
This chapter is divided into four sections. It starts with a general introduction to
compliance and various measures that exist in current studies, sample selection and data
sources, and the specific hypotheses guiding the study. This is followed by an
explanation of analytical methods, both qualitative and quantitative. The next section is
where the conceptual model and factors that most influence compliance with CBD goals
are explained. The study then developed an analytical approach to explain ways of
reconciling global, national and local interest, and a shared meaning of biodiversity
protection among stakeholders. The chapter concludes with a detailed methodology that
examines opportunity costs of biodiversity conservation.
Estimation of opportunity costs of biodiversity conservation is important.
Consequently, I want to show the status of biological resources and costs of protecting
these resources in the context of compliance. Many compliance studies simply give a
qualitative measure of compliance with no figures attached. In addition, there are no
agreed measures of compliance. It is for this reason that even when some countries are
running huge deficits in the status of biological resources, they can get classified as
compliant because there is standard criterion for measuring compliance. Estimation of
opportunity costs helps to highlight what it would take countries to actually comply.
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3.1 Introduction
A number of studies have analyzed compliance with international treaties, but
substantive implementation and compliance within countries is not known (Jacobson &
Weiss, 2010). There are numerous measurement variables targeting different compliance
measures with international treaties at various levels. Guzman (2014) has analyzed
compliance with customary international law. He uses a reputational model of
compliance to explain that countries comply with treaties simply because other countries
have committed to honor the treaty. Hathaway (2005), along with Jacobson and Weiss
(2010), have examined compliance from the perspective of costs and benefits that may
arise for a country when it complies with an international treaty. Their research argues
that transnational actors and rule of law within a country are important factors that
reinforce implementation and compliance.
Perkins and Neumayer (2007) have divided compliance into four models:
domestic adjustment, reputational, constructivist, and managerial to analyze why
countries comply but they do not really explain how and what it takes countries to
comply with international treaties. There are no studies done so far to validate these
compliance levels or even try to attach numbers that could give a certain threshold of
compliance.
Even when the rules are very clear, there are always significant gaps between the
set of rules that are in force and actual implementation (Vogel & Kessler, 2002). There is
clearly a research gap on compliance at the global setting, national and local levels that
explain how countries comply and what should go into compliance at these three levels.

74

It was with these gaps in mind that I designed this research to analyze compliance
by countries with CBD goals and implementation of specific policies, knowing that there
are very different global requirements, different national capacities and different local
needs. Factors that go into compliance, and how compliance can be developed, can be
very complex. While there are clearly defined requirements at the global level, the
requirements at both national and local levels are not defined. Countries are merely urged
to implement global policies. How countries take these global policies to local levels and
ensure that they get implemented is even more difficult to determine. I developed specific
criteria in this study to try to construct what countries should do at both national and local
levels to comply.
Conservation responsibility starts at the signing and ratification of international
environmental treaties, global conferences where negotiations are held, and critical
conservation information shared. Once all negotiations are finalized and agreements
drawn, individual governments are then encouraged to implement those agreements as
they deem possible.
3.2 Sample selection
A sample of 16 countries was selected for this study. Various selection criteria
were used, namely, geographic distribution, size of administration, biodiversity richness,
and strong presence of conservation organizations In order to have a broad geographic
representation, I selected four countries from each continent (Table 3). The sample
included a sub-set of three countries, namely Canada, India, and Australia, because they
were the largest and federally administered countries. The idea was to see how central
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governments work with regional/provincial governments. Another group of three
countries was chosen because they have been identified as the richest biodiversity
countries in the world. These were Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo and Indonesia.
The study made an assumption that because these are biodiversity rich countries, it might
be easy to measure conservation efforts and compliance easily. Another criterion was
either the presence of strong conservation organizations or countries that greatly support
conservation programs globally. The countries chosen under these criteria were Kenya,
Great Britain, Switzerland and the Netherlands.
Kenya is the host country to the United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP); Switzerland is host to both WWF and IUCN head offices; both the UK and the
Netherlands are some of the largest conservation donors globally. A final group of six
countries were chosen randomly to represent all other countries who are members of the
CBD. These were South Africa, Ghana, Mexico, Jamaica, Jordan and Poland.
Table 2: Sample of countries selected
Europe

Africa

N & S America

Asia

Great Britain

Kenya

Canada

Australia

Switzerland

Ghana

Jamaica

India

Netherlands

DR Congo

Mexico

Indonesia

Poland

South Africa

Brazil

Jordan

3.2.1 Data sources
The study used mainly secondary data obtained from a variety of sources.


CBD Website – Country Plans, reports and CBD documents



Clearing House Mechanisms of the CBD and also of individual countries
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National government, international and local NGO websites



Google.com – International and local organizations websites



ASAHI Glass Foundation



FAOSTAT



Global Footprint Network



Existing biodiversity conservation literature
Key data obtained from NBSAPs were about the quality of the plans themselves.

Plans must be developed in ways that are able to effectively support biodiversity
protection. They must have a proper language, funding, timelines, specific goals and
objectives. Data obtained from national reports included implementation challenges,
funding status, capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, and building of national and
local institutions. The CHMs provided data regarding availability of national and local
data, local reports, and national, regional and local profiles.
Other pieces information came from the websites of conservation organizations
working in each country. Information on organizations working in these countries was
obtained from the Internet using the search engine via . The following criteria were used
in choosing the organizations during the search process. (1) There is a clearly identified
collaboration with government and local organizations (2) They have been in the country
for at least five years. Local organizations were selected based on the following criteria:
(1) They have been operational for at least five years (2) They work in collaboration with
international organizations.
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3.2.2 Biodiversity hotspot regions
Two to three internationally recognized biodiversity hotspot regions in each
country were identified. Biodiversity hotspot regions are defined as bio-geographic
regions with a significant reservoir of biodiversity that are under pressure of
overexploitation and degradation by humans (WWF, 2006). Biodiversity hotspot regions
are areas of great concentration of endemic species. It is around biodiversity hotspot
regions where there is the most rapid deforestation, habitat destruction and transformation
of landforms. In terms of management, these regions provide a more precise location
where conservation outcomes provide the greatest payoff (Myers et al., 2000). The
purpose for this was to help focus attention to the most important conservation areas, and
mainly to gauge how wisely conservation resources are being invested in each country.
Negative or degradation of the environment has greater impacts on biodiversity
hotspots than other areas. These are areas of the greatest focus by conservation
organizations and governments. Outcomes from conserving hotspot regions would be
more visible than many other places. How countries and conservation organizations
respond to conserve hotspot areas would provide a better understanding in terms of
whether a country is ready, its capacity, and the strength of the policies developed. It is
around biodiversity hotspot regions where it is easy to see the extent of policy
formulation and implementation.
There were no hotspots regions identified for the Netherlands and Jordan from
their respective government websites, plans or by conservation organizations working in
these countries. Poland and Switzerland each have only one biodiversity hotspot.

78

Use of biological resources beyond the levels they are able to replenish
themselves otherwise known biodiversity degradation, can be more pronounced at
biodiversity hotspots more than other areas. These are areas of greatest focus by
conservation organizations and governments. Therefore, outcomes from conserving
hotspots regions would be more visible than many other places.
Table 3: Biodiversity hotspot regions

Country
South Africa
Kenya

Biodiversity Hotspot regions
1
2
Cape Floristic Region –
Maputoland –
Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve Pondoland-Albany
Arid Horn of Africa region –
Arabuko-Sokoke Forest
NE Kenya
Reserve

Ghana
DR Congo
Switzerland
Poland
Netherlands
Canada

Atewa Range Forest Reserve
Virunga National Park
Pfynwald
Carpathians
------Broadback River Watershed

Jamaica

Cockpit County-North Coast
Forest
Atlantic Forest region
Madrean Pine-Oak
Woodlands (Sierra Madre
Occidental)
Einasleigh and Desert uplands
– Queensland

Brazil
Mexico
Australia
India

Western Ghats

Coastal Guinea Forests
Kahuzi-Biega N. Park
---------------Saskatchewan River
Delta
Portland Bight Protected
Area
Chapada dos Veadeiros
the Sierra Madre
Oriental
Mamersley-Pilbara
(Western Australia)
Eastern Himalayas

3
Karoo region
Eastern
Afromontane – Mau
Forest
---Garamba N.Park
----------------Peel River
Watershed
Surrey County
Corridor
Emas N. Park
the Trans-Mexican
Volcanic Belt
Central and Eastern
Avon Wheatbelt
(Western Australia)
North Eastern India
(Indo-Burma)

Indonesia
Sundaland
Wallacea
Jordan
-------------------Great Britain
South Uist
Lundy
Menai Strait
Source: government websites, conservation organizations websites and national plans
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3.3 Game Theory
Stakeholder strategies that would improve biodiversity protection are those that
would make one stakeholder better off without making any other stakeholder worse off.
This condition is known as Pareto improving. Compliance outcomes that satisfy this
condition exist when each stakeholder has full information concerning all other
stakeholder strategies. Stakeholders in biodiversity have been known to be self-interested
more and would care about others only when they can benefit.
A situation where all stakeholders’ benefits are improved can be achieved either
through consensus or cooperation. Consensus often involves the use of a third party to
force a decision that often may or may not be the maximum payoff (Colyvan et al. 2011).
Cooperation allows stakeholders to deal with each other directly with clearly identified
set of available strategies without relying on third parties or other authorities. Managing
conservation conflicts without relying on consensus is an important element to attaining
maximum

outcomes

and

effective

decision-making

(Colyvan

et

al.

2011).

Stakeholders/players cooperating with each other want mutually beneficial outcomes, and
know each other’s strategies that would produce maximum payoffs.
According to Villasant and Sumaila (2010), non-cooperative games are also
known as competitive games. In competitive games, stakeholders are entirely motivated
by self-interests. Also, in competitive games, there are no established lines of
communication. This nature of games, therefore, fall into what in game theory is known
as “prisoner’s dilemma”. This is often the case with biodiversity protection. Although
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information regarding biodiversity conservation is freely accessible online, the selfinterest behavior has greater influence on stakeholders.
3.3.1 Systems theory
The systems theory provided a basis upon which to examine individual and
collective institutional works and relationships within and across countries. The planning
strategies and problems identified by government documents were compared with the
works and problems identified by conservation organizations using systems approach. It
was possible to place specific works of individual institutions in a wider context of
biodiversity conservation. This was necessary to be able to see both the shared
understanding and differences in approach to biodiversity conservation at the same time.
Analytical outcomes of the works of governments were assessed against the works of
international organizations.
3.4 Research questions and hypotheses
Advancing public policies through various stages from formulation to
implementation in society is always determined by how relevant a problem is perceived
by stakeholders (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). While implementation is at specific
local settings, biodiversity protection defies fragmentation and demands the collaboration
of governments and institutions at all levels and across boundaries. Responding to
biodiversity protection problems calls for action from the political, legal and
administrative arms governmental, community, scientists and international efforts.
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In trying to address the challenges facing biodiversity protection, the research
questions were formulated to address structural, policy and multi-level and multi-sector
conservation relationships at the international level, and national governments and local
level implementation. These questions were intended to find answers for strategies
needed to identify most supportive initiatives and compliance variables to be
implemented in various countries. What happens at global and national levels is not in
direct conflict with local level consumptive priorities but rather supports local priorities
alongside implementation of conservation measures.
The key questions designed to guide this study were the following:
1. What critical factors most influence the implementation of biodiversity protection
policies at the global, national and local levels?
2. How can conservation initiatives at different levels and in different countries be
reconciled in order to support global compliance with CBD goals?
3. How do opportunity costs of biodiversity protection affect implementation of
CBD goals at the local levels?
3.4.1 Factors that most influence compliance and implementation
The level of attention and supportive efforts given to biodiversity conservation at
the global level, national level and local levels differ in many different ways. Factors that
most influence global, national and local level conservation efforts are also very different.
I argue that globally designed conservation policies that are sensitive to local level needs
have a greater chance of implementation.
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Globally designed conservation programs must be sensitive to both national
priorities as well as local needs such, as poverty alleviation, sustainable use of natural
resources, and the shielding of communities from incurring higher expenses in the
process of adopting biodiversity protection programs. The first guiding hypothesis for
this study is:
Hypothesis 1: International and national conservation initiatives fall short of
conservation outcomes, and because of inadequate support to local institutions
where actual implementation takes place, global compliance with CBD goals is
low
To test this hypothesis, qualitative content analysis of NBSAPs and conservation
progress reports was done to determine what variables either constrain or aid in the
implementation of conservation programs at international and national levels. Data
obtained from the ASAHI Glass Foundation (AGF) was analyzed and used to test
compliance at local levels. The critical variables that were used to test the above
hypothesis included the 20 criteria used for evaluating compliance in table 1. The other
variables came from the AGF data, where the survey identified global conservation
barriers to biodiversity protection.
3.4.2 Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to conservation
Many methods that analyze global compliance with international treaties have
done so in very general terms. In analyzing compliance, I argue that these treaties must
be open to what various actors bring to the negotiation table in terms of strengths,
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weaknesses and interests. Porter & Brown (1991) argue that countries do influence other
countries’ actions on the global environmental arena through roles as a lead state,
supporting state or swing state.
Hypothesis 2: Cooperation by stakeholders in the use and management of
biodiversity protection reconciles different self-interests better and, therefore,
leads to higher compliance with CBD goals.
This hypothesis was tested using game theory strategies. The central assumption
taken in game theory was that all players/stakeholders are interested in each other and
will play to bring out best outcomes in the game. The higher the outcomes for each player
the more satisfied both will be.
The advantage of game theory is that each player/stakeholder is often allowed to
consider the interests of others. Looking to reconcile multi-stakeholder interests in
biodiversity, surveys of several games were conducted, and their possible outcomes and
stakeholder conflicts were explained. Under the game-theoretic approach, it is possible to
see the different stakeholder objectives and the strategies that they will adopt when
consensus, compromise, or cooperation are feasible as well as the best types of
cooperation that reflect various interests and meet various objectives (Colyvan et al.,
2011).
Stakeholders in the use and management of biodiversity take their positions on the
negotiation or implementation table to critically examine and play using strategies they
think gives them the highest payoff. Responses from each stakeholder are anticipated
even before the negotiations begin, and therefore, the best counter-strategies meant to
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generate optimal decisions can be developed. The way governments are expected to deal
with each other is very different from the way other stakeholders such as the
communities, businesses, industries and conservation organizations play games with each
other. For example, in the case of two countries coming together to protect a specific
resource, they may be motivated differently about the details of and why it is in both their
interest to protect that specific resource. The following hypothesis was also formulated to
test question two at local levels
3.4.3 Reconciling global, national and local conservation interests
The trade-offs that exist between human basic needs and biodiversity protection
goals, and between biodiversity protection and various economic, political, and social
considerations across sectors, are extremely difficult to reconcile (McSahene et al.,
2011).

Efforts and initiatives aimed at producing outcomes that demonstrate how

biological resources can be managed to support the needs of local people while sustaining
local, national and global conservation goals have not been developed in the literature.
Therefore, the way forward would be to establish negotiations with all other salient social
and economic interests for purposes of diffusing potential conflicts (Frank & Sarkar,
2010). However, the sticking point surrounding over-exploitation of biodiversity is often
the failure of the management of biological resources to ensure equitable distribution of
the benefits of biological resources with disproportionately more benefits going to more
powerful interests. The positions held by various interest groups in the use and
consumption of biodiversity can therefore be classified as irresolvable (Colyvan et al.,
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2011). In order to address the second question, the following hypothesis was formulated
to help test how to reconcile various stakeholder interests.
Hypothesis 3: National and local environmental policies that evolve on the basis
of shared meaning at all levels and across sectors and institutions have a higher
rate of acceptance, and would therefore lead to high levels of compliance with
CBD goals.
Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, the study analyzed how policies
evolve and adapt to different levels and sectors by examining whether there is
collaboration between various institutions working on biodiversity protection in each
country. Specifically, the study examined how different institutions at different levels of
government render support to conservation activities, how well local offices work with
national government offices, who reports to whom, and the nature of collaboration
between governments and international conservation organizations. The study also
investigated the coordination between the central government and communities in the
implementation of national plans.
Environmental problems have local, regional, national and global consequences
and need to be addressed at all these levels to achieve meaningful global compliance
(Ringquist & Kostadinova, 2005; Vig & Axelrod, 1999). Commitment to all requirements
and terms of international environmental treaties calls for a national governing structure
that enables institutional capacity to be able to develop policies and to facilitate
expression of political demands for biodiversity conservation toward local regions and
other countries (Ringquist & Kostadinova, 2005).
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There is a tendency for most countries to rely on the experts and international
organizations to draw plans and public policies, especially in environmental conservation.
Borrowing from Jones (2001), there is no solid distinction between policy making and
policy administration. Jones discusses the makers of policy who are the politicians, and
doers/implementers who are the administrators. In the same way, as governments make
policy, input from local level settings where implementation takes place is hypothesized
would lead to greater compliance. The implementers at local levels are communities.
Their input towards national conservation policies is therefore very important. Input from
local level citizens and individuals was measured by looking at whether there are
structures that facilitate participation, key information sharing structures, capacity
building programs and data availability.
3.4.4 Opportunity costs of biodiversity protection
Opportunity cost estimation is one way of accounting for the status of available
biological resources. This way of accounting for biodiversity helps to strengthen support
for policies developed to protect biological resources, evaluation and ensure that the
value of biodiversity is realistically reflected alongside other national priorities within
countries (NBSAP Australia, 2011). Using market based incentives through
compensation for opportunity costs help to effectively engage resources managers to
protect and conserve the resources under their management.
The opportunity cost of biodiversity protection is a significant determinant of
implementation decisions and compliance with the goals of the CBD. There are payoffs
in terms of costs and benefits when people or organizations undertake conservation
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programs. Costs act as deterrents of positive actions, while benefits act as incentives to
adopt an action, negative or positive. Costs can come in the form of direct monetary loss,
fines or fees imposed for failure to act. Benefits also come in the form of higher incomes,
tax rebates or recognition. In order to address the third question, the following hypothesis
was formulated.
Hypothesis 4: The use of appropriate compensation mechanisms to offset
opportunity costs that would be incurred by those that supply biodiversity services
will increase the probability of effective implementation, and thus lead to higher
compliance with CBD goals.
There are various ways to measure the opportunity costs of biodiversity
protection. The first approach to measuring opportunity costs was based upon the
estimated costs of conservation as opposed to the available funding. When costs of
conservation are higher than available funding, both local and external, it is assumed that
communities or businesses will be asked to pay for the unfunded portion of conservation.
If the costs of conservation are lower than available funding, it is assumed that
conservation will easily be implemented. However, this is not always the case.
Another approach to measuring opportunity costs is by the number of taxes
initiated, fees charged for violations, and the difference between available biological
resources in each country as opposed to the level of use/consumption of the same
resource. Another source is the information on the presence or the absence of economic
incentives meant to encourage or discourage certain activities. This information may not
be easily available in the plans and reports written by various countries.
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3.5 Basic compliance requirements
At the international level, the CBD has a specific set of compliance requirements.
These requirements include submitting national plans and reports on a regular basis, and
participation at international conferences. The monitoring to ensure that what is written in
the plans and reported is actually implemented is the responsibility of the countries
themselves.
At national level, there is no country that has set any sort of compliance criteria
for monitoring and implementing of CBD goals. What emerged from the literature was
that even when there are well developed environmental laws, these are not sufficiently
implemented and enforced. Non-compliance therefore comes to light only when there are
specific measurable violations such as industries releasing a chemical into a body of
water or oil leaking into an open natural resource. There are so many other sectors whose
activities are constantly degrading biological resources such the poor agricultural
practices and deforestation, which are often not seen as violations and therefore cannot be
penalized.
At local levels, it is even more difficult because there is very scanty information
to begin to tell just how much of the influence the CBD goals have reached local levels in
various settings. These settings could be the farms in rural areas, the industries that
depend on biological resources for their business and even urban constructions that tend
to destroy natural areas. The extent that biodiversity considerations are given weight in
major investment decisions is not clear.
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3.5.1 Development of compliance criteria
The Table 4 below shows the 20 criteria developed to determine policy
compliance.
Table 4: National level compliance criterion

1
2

Criteria for NBSAPs
and National Reports
Language
Goals

3
4
5

Objectives
Depth & Scope
National Capacity

6
7
8

Funding
Surveys & Research
Coordination

9

National Institutions

10
11
12

Support to local
regions
Legislation/Acts
Timing/Milestones

13
14

Capacity Building
National Network

15

Key Activities

16
17

Outcomes
Monitoring
Evaluation
Participants

18
19
20

Information
Technology
Enforcement ability

&

Description

Sources

Specific, strong, clear, not vague
Specific, covering all aspects of a specific
resource, time-bound
Clear, covering all aspects, detailed
Covering all aspects, detailed,
Ability of the country to implement the plan,
human, financial and technological
Amount and sources of funding,
Surveys, research for information and data
Coordinating agencies, institutions and fining
common goals
The number, nature and strength of national
institutions
National support in terms funding, human
resources and technological support
The number, types and supportive
Clear timelines to meet specific targets

Tang et al. 2010
Tanget al. 2010;
NBSAPs various

NBSAPs various
NBSAPs various
NBSAPs various

institutional, people, technological
Easily identifiable relationships
between
different sectors, institutions, organizations and
public agencies
Recruitment of qualified personnel, creation of
institutions, creation of protected areas,
negotiations with donors, communities,
Clearly identified outcomes,
Taking all recommendations taken seriously

NBSAPs various

Less international and more local participation
of organizations/communities
Use of IT, information sharing tools,
Technology transfer
Ability to enforcement conserv. regulations
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NBSAPs various
NBSAPs various
NBSAPs various

NBSAPs various
NBSAPs various
NBSAPs various
NBSAPs various;
Tang et al. 2010
NBSAPs various
NBSAPs various;
Tang et al. 2010

NBSAPs various
NBSAPs various
NBSAPs various
Tang et al. 2010
NBSAPs various

At the international level, compliance was measured between zero and 100
percent depending on the number of plans, reports and whether a country had a national
clearing house mechanism (NCHM). Just submitting one plan or one report was rated
20% complaint. If a country has a NCHM, it was allocated 100% compliant. If a country
does not have a NCHM, it was allocated 0% compliant.
At the national level, 20 criteria were developed from the literature, plans, and
reports with information that spoke to effective implementation and compliance. For
instance, plans in general should have a language that is clear, specific, strong and not
vague. These criteria are listed in Table 4 below. Each criterion was worth 5 percentage
points. Compliance was measured between zero and 100 percent.
The presence of a NCHM was also evaluated against 10 criteria that were
established from the literature, national plans and the CBD website. Each criterion was
worth 10 percentage points. These criteria are listed in table 5 below.
Within countries, implementation takes place at local levels. Countries can submit
all their plans and reports to the CBD as required, but this does not mean that they are
implementing conservation programs as stated on paper. This called for a different
approach to analyze compliance at local levels. The study therefore used Likert scale data
from AGF to measure local compliance.
As for the NCHMs, there must be working links, reports from local regions,
participants and other resources that national stakeholders may need in conservation
decisions. Table 5 below shows the list of 10 criteria used to rate compliance with
NCHMs.
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Table 5. Criterion used to define compliance of the NCHMs

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Criteria for NCHMs
Working links

Description
Links that connect and cover all aspects of
biodiversity within a country
Availability of local reports/plans
Reports/plans from different conservation local
areas within the country
Participation – Individuals and Identified partnerships, epistemic groups,
Organizations
institutions, experts and local agencies
National Contacts
Online contacts to find all relevant information
National Data
Data on all aspects of biodiversity protection
Biological Resources
The extent to which all resources are covered
Funding
Funding levels, sources and
Regional profiles
Listing and description of local conditions
List of regions and focal points
List of conservation areas and focal points
from those regions
Resources for local implementation This refers to technology, trained human
resources,

Although it has been agreed that treaties do influence state behavior (Hathaway,
2005; Ringquist & Kostadinova, 2005; Weiss & Jacobson, 2010), understanding
biodiversity conservation in the national and local contexts so as to be able to start to
draw plans, formulate goals, iron out conflicts and develop implementation strategies is a
process that evolves over time (Brachthauser, 2011). This study makes the assumption
that this is the reason why there exists a big lag between the time when the treaties are
signed and when conservation outcomes start to be seen. In most countries, ministries of
the environment did not exist when the Convention on Biodiversity was created. To date,
there are not enough local institutions and trained conservation experts in most countries.
There is not enough data on biodiversity to facilitate decision making. There is also
insufficient information sharing structures within most countries to facilitate effective
engagement with local levels.

92

Global biodiversity conservation efforts do not equal national policy development
and local implementation of conservation programs. This study therefore estimated
compliance status and has examined what countries need to do to move toward a level of
compliance where they can start to reverse overexploitation of biodiversity. The unit of
analysis was the country. Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies were used.
Qualitative methodology was used in the review and analysis of country biodiversity
strategy conservation plans submitted to the CBD secretariat, country conservation
progress reports, and websites of organizations and institutions involved in biodiversity
conservation in each country. Quantitative methodology was also useful in trying to
determine the significance of various compliance variables, inputs and conservation
outcomes at various levels.
3.6 Qualitative methods
The key sources of data for this research was the country plans, reports and
information found in the websites of major conservation organizations, which was mainly
qualitative. The data is in linguistic form. A linguistic representation of data is best
analyzed using qualitative methodologies. Both direct and indirect methodology was
utilized. Direct methodology is when qualitative data is used directly in qualitative
analysis. Indirect methodology is when qualitative data is transformed into a cardinal one
and then used for quantitative analysis.
Content analysis of information in the plans, reports and conservation
organization websites was done. For each country, a folder for source documents was
created. The National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs) and the fourth
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national biodiversity implementation progress reports were uploaded to NVivo10 and
posted into a government folder. In addition, 15 websites of other organizations working
in these countries obtained from the Google.com search engine were uploaded into
NVivo10 using NCapture. A separate folder for other organizations obtained from
Google.com was created. Coding for each country was done in separate nodes. These
nodes were further broken down into national and international in order to code for
information for national institutions and international organizations.
Using InVivo coding to keep the data rooted in the original documents (Saldana,
2013), key words that made references to the research questions in this study were
identified using the word frequency query. These words were assigned their own nodes in
separate folders. For each node, a descriptive message of the word obtained from their
textual context from all documents was then coded into same nodes for each country.
This makes it easy to see these words in a passage form, see the messages they are
conveying, and be able to decipher how various plans, reports and information on
websites relate to research questions.
3.6.1 Quantitative methods
Quantitative methodology was equally useful because it helps to explain a
research phenomenon through analysis of numerical data using mathematical models
(Aliaga & Gunderson, 2000). It was necessary to complement qualitative analysis with
quantitative methodology because quantitative data is more explicit, easily generalizable,
transferable and defensible (Hargrove, 2005). Quantitative analysis was done in three
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stages: using qualitative data in a transformed form, using data obtained from the Global
Footprint Network and also data from AGF.
Using the 20 criteria identified for purposes of analyzing the quality of NBSAPs
and national reports, each criterion was scored between 0% and 100% for each country
on the NBSAPs and national reports. Averages were estimated to give the percentage
level of compliance for every country.
A second cycle of coding was done for national institutions and international
organizations for each country. This was aimed at exploring themes most emphasized by
biodiversity protection reports, plans and other documents. This was to find out how they
could be used to answer research questions and test the research hypothesis. The
emerging themes became topics for further analysis. Saldana (2013) argues that social
life happens at given coordinates or intersections of one or more actors who are engaging
in one or more activities. The study therefore examined how the emerging themes relate
to those found in the NBSAPs, government reports, government websites and other
conservation organizations. Central to understanding the critical factors that most
influence compliance with CBD goals and implementation of biodiversity protection
policies was the number of references or the frequency with which specific themes are
found at each intersection.
Themes obtained from global organizations were linked to node matrices of
national policy themes and also to node matrices of local implementation themes. Matrix
tables for each country were generated to show various relationships based on the
frequency that different national policy themes shared with local program
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implementation. The actual words used in the original documents were retained as
themes for easier reference. The data generated through matrix coding for each country
were then subjected to regression analysis to determine the significance of various
relationships between policy at the national and implementation levels.
3.7 Compliance measurement
Borrowing from measurements of diffusion of innovation in the private sector
(Bamberger, 1991) compliance can be conceptualized as either a process or an outcome
at community level, institutional, organizational, or global levels. Compliance as a
process means identifying various stages, the time taken at each stage and the key
attributes of all the stages (Daft, 1978; Van de & Chu, 1988; Bamberger, 1991).
Compliance as an outcome means the final tangible outcomes. These may include the
creation of specific programs, organizations, institutions, plans and strategies that
represent a significant departure of the state of resources from the time the problem is
identified going forward. Measuring compliance based on time is outside the scope of
this study. Instead, various compliance attributes, outcomes and stages have been
analyzed.
3.7.1 Compliance measurement as a process
Key attributes of compliance are explained in this section. When compliance with
the goals of the CBD is measured based on implementation and conservation outcomes,
conflicts emerge out of the technical, social, economic, political and value judgments
from different stakeholders (Munda et al. 1994). This means that there have to be more
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ways to measure outcomes at different levels. These conflicts are partly the sources of
non-compliance and they take forms of both quantitative and qualitative variables.
The technical conflicts arise from the global and national planning strategies that
are multi-layered across many sectors and therefore always in search for compromises in
decision making. The social conflicts come about as a result of the losses and benefits
accruing to the society when implementing specific goals required for compliance
standards. Economic perspectives of conflicting values originate from allocation
(efficiency), distribution (equity), and scale (sustainability) (Daly, 1991; Munda et al.,
1994). While it is believed that the market provides optimal allocation of resources
(Munda et al., 1994), an optimal scale of compliance with CBD goals requires more than
the market forces. This study has taken care of this by employing both the living systems
theory and game theory, where stakeholders cooperate as well as negotiate towards
arriving at a consensus through compromise. Compromised conservation strategies bring
along with them some difficulties at the implementation stages.
The political aspect of measuring compliance is in the formulation of policy
instruments, where targets to be met, or statements setting minimum threshold for the
entire community, are set. Value judgment conflicts take various forms as follows: i)
when the compliance requires minimum exploitation of natural resources but provides
optimum yield (Munda et al., 1994) while the society wants to overexploit and get
maximum yields; ii) maximum production of goods and services at minimum (private
and social) costs (Munda et al., 1994) while the society is not really worried about social
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costs; and iii) maximum sustainable use of biological resources (Munda et al., 1994)
while the society does not have any sustainable use ability, knowledge or capacity.
Solutions to conflicting conservation interests require an analysis of various
conservation alternatives from those that provide superior protection to those considered
merely rhetoric. Compliance with CBD goals calls for a collective action by the
community, a nation, non-governmental sector and the international community. These
different stakeholder levels see different acceptable compliance avenues. Greater
compliance, therefore, my study argues, can come from more cooperative strategies,
restrictive initiatives but not compromised policies and negotiated agreements.
Availability of various alternatives to conservation settings with a clear rank from most
restrictive, cooperative arrangements to incentive based policies needs to be determined.
3.7.2 Compliance measurement as an outcome
According to Bamberger (1991), when compliance is conceptualized as an
outcome requires a listing of criteria to facilitate the measuring of compliance. There are
two types of conceptualizations: a “closed list” or an “open list”. A “closed list” approach
uses a universal criterion where program reports and documents are used to generate a list
of items selected on the basis that these are critical to aiding of obstructing compliance.
An ordered rank is then placed on each criterion. The “open list” approach is when a
study uses survey methodologies to ask informants to provide the criteria and information
to help develop the rankings.
Measuring compliance is best done through the use objective or nonjudgmental
ratings. Nonjudgmental ratings are ideal when research findings need to be presented
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quantitatively (Bamberger, 1991). Under nonjudgmental ratings, a measure of
compliance was generated by identifying specific criteria and then ranking a variety of
items under each criterion from zero to 100%.
3.7.3 Compliance stages
Most literature defines compliance but does not explain in detail what actually
goes into compliance. Based on the information gathered from the existing literature, my
study has divided compliance with the CBD into three levels: i) paper compliance ii)
policy

compliance

and

iii)

implementation

compliance.

The

processes

and

implementation of programs needed to comply is not a one-time event but is an effort that
should be carried throughout the life of the program. It is through the long-term process
that institutions are built, knowledge is accumulated, capacities are improved, experience
acquired, and various obstacles get eliminated. Some of the key obstacles include
untrained staff, lack of funding opportunities, lack of communication technology, and
lack of political support (NBSAPs South Africa, 2006; India, 2000; Canada, 1999;
Ghana, 2002; Jamaica, 2004).
Paper compliance is attained when countries sign and ratify a treaty, start to draw
national policies as per the terms of the treaty and begin regular or irregular submission
of required reports and revised plans. Under the Global-National-Local Model, this type
of compliance fits at the global level. At the global level, the key to successful policy
adoption by governments is first to identify biodiversity conservation needs and match
these with government priorities. Communication should be structured so as to facilitate
reporting and planning.
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Policy compliance is a country effort when countries begin to create institutions
and structures to coordinate programs, hire conservationists, share information and build
human capacities. For most countries it is the processes and national level readiness that
defines how local level implementation is done to halt degradation of biological
resources. Structural support mechanisms and human resources are acquired to ready
national institutions.
Policies that bring about partial implementation and thus low compliance are the
result of less than ready national government in terms of human resources, inadequate
funding and legislation. Policy compliance helps to bring national policies and programs
into direct contact with local level communities, institutions and staff directly involved
with implementation. It is at this stage when local level needs have to be matched with
national biodiversity protection policies. It is at this level where major implementation
obstacles are eliminated.
Implementation compliance is the product of local level efforts that lead to the
creation of institutions, conservation structures, national governments assessment of
community needs, capacities and strengths of specific communities or organizations. By
community here it means people in a village who share common resources, a business
community, a neighborhood, a city or a group of organizations. Epistemic groups start to
emerge. However, unless communities recognize and buy into the new policies, that
biodiversity conservation is affordable and is not in conflict with local priorities
implementation will be resisted and undermined. Compliance that results from
implementation at local levels brings about changes in overall institutional and
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organizational environment that can be seen in the capacities that begin to emerge,
cultures and new social practices.
Figure 1. Compliance framework

Policy development
Paper
compliance

Signing of a treaty,
International negotiations
Geopolitics

Policy compliance

Information sharing
& reporting

Policy formation, Consensus
Building, Legislation

Implementation compliance

Capacity building, local
implementation &
biodiversity protection

Leadership, Epistemic groups,
Institutions, CBOs, NGOs, Communities

Economic/Political Institutions,

Agencies, Programs, Projects,

joint decisions/local input,

Committees Information sharing tools

Administrative Institutions

Source: Constructed by my study using information from the literature

Implementation in the context of compliance is defined as the number and types
of activities designed to put into practice a program that meets specified objectives and
goals. It is through implementation processes that programs can be seen, described, and
felt. The following conceptual compliance model has been designed to break down these
compliance activities.
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3.7.4 Compliance Model
Going by the scientific findings regarding the overexploitation and degradation of
biodiversity, each variable in the mathematical model below is in itself a step towards
higher compliance. My research indicates that global compliance should be the sum of all
the variables from the local level implementation programs to global ratification of a
treaty. The various components of compliance take both qualitative as well as
quantitative measurements. At the global level, my study has controlled for the fact that
countries have signed and ratified the CBD, attendance to conferences, country incomes,
country population and size of each country. Global compliance can therefore be defined
as in the model below. At both national and local levels, this study controlled for
availability of data, consumption of natural resources, restoration activities and costs of
conservation.
G

f Pa

Pr

I

Na

Re

OP )

…………………..

1

…………….……………

2

Where:
Gl = Global compliance
Pa

Paper compliance

Pr = Policy compliance
I

= Implementation compliance

Na = Natural resources consumption level
= Restoration activities
OP = Opportunity costs
Pa
Pa

∑ NBSAPs

∑ NRs

NCHMs

Paper compliance by country i

102

NBDSAPs

= All countries expected to have submitted up to 5 NBSAPs.

NRs

= All countries expected to have submitted up to 5 National reports.

NCHMs

= Presence or absence of National Clearing House Mechanisms

Paper compliance was scored based upon countries meeting all/some of the
specific requirements set by the CBD. These requirements were; the submission of the
first NBSAP; submission of up to four revised NBSAPs; submission of up to five
national reports; and establishment of national clearing house mechanisms by each
country. The scores were allocated according to table 6 below. These scores were
allocated simply based on the number of plans or reports submitted to the CBD. As for
the Clearing House Mechanism, it was a question of whether a country has one or not so
a country got 0% or 100%.
Table 6: Paper compliance estimation scores
Submissions

NBSAPs

1 – First plan/Report
2 – First Revised plan/Report
3 – 2nd Revised plan/Report
4 – 3rd Revised plan/Report
5 – 4th Revised plan/Report
Total Percent

20
20
20
20
20
100%

National
Reports
20
20
20
20
20
100%

CHMs

0% or 100%

3.7.5 National compliance
Estimation of national compliance was based on the quality of NBSAPs,
information on the progress of national conservation from national reports and the ability
of NCHMs to both coordinate and facilitate information sharing within a country. The
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assumption made was that the quality of planning and how countries meet planned
activities is a sign of compliance levels.
National compliance

Q

f Q

Q

…………………

3

Where
Q

Quality of NBSAPs

Q

Quality of National Reports

Q

Quality of NCHMs
National compliance was scored based on the 20 criteria identified in table 4.

Fulfilment of each criterion was scored up to a maximum of five percentage points for
the NBSAPs and national reports. The score for NCHMs was based on 10 criteria and
therefore each criterion received a maximum of 10 percentage points.
Table 7: National compliance estimation of scores
NBSAPs

National Reports

CHMs

Number of Criterion (0-5)% X 20

(0 – 5)% X 20

(0 – 10)% X 10

for developing scores

= (0% - 100%)

= (0% - 100%)

= (0% - 100%)

were 20

3.7.6 Local compliance
Implementation and compliance at the local level was estimated using data from
ASAHI Glass Foundation as presented in Table 8 below. Specific data was categorized as
measuring local implementation, local capacities and direct national and international
support for local implementation.
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The data was in the form of Likert scale responses to given statements with the
following scales: 1 (strongly disagree), 2(disagree), 3 (neutral), 4 (agree)and 5 (strongly
agree). These statements were structured in a negative way to show that what was
actually taking place with regard to local conservation was good enough to produce
positive conservation outcomes.
Table 8: Local compliance estimation
Local level implementation variable description

(N = 1009)

Agree

Disagree

Other national interests often take precedence over conservation

13

79

Individuals make decisions based on immediate benefits

12

83

Economic considerations given higher priority over environment

15

80

Policies that optimize the whole are secondary – economics & environment

10

80

1
2
3
4
5

Members of the public shoulder conservation costs

6

86

6

Conservation policies face high resistance

9

78

7

International organizations do not optimize the whole – socio-economics/enviro

7

86

8

Unanimous consent voting by the UN is not good for biodiversity conservation

11

75

9

Lack of enforcement by UN makes global coordination weak

12

79

10

Systematic and organizational reforms are lacking, are much needed now

10

71

11

There is no reference point for the natural environment and life forms

13

74

12

Society and cultural practices that support common resources are lacking

10

81

13

Societal practices that value the environment are few and far in between

15

65

14

There is capacity to recognize environmental problems locally but not globally

25

61

15

Decisions based on self-interests, not others or future generations
Human nature to care for others is often overwhelmed by economic
considerations

18

64

12

77

17

Values that respect environment and economic activities are inconsistent

11

74

18

Lifestyles towards high energy consumption cannot be abandoned

32

76

19

Easily comprehensible information is not communicated to the public

12

80

20

Conservation experts communicate more with political decision makers

26

53

21

Political decision makers do not pass on enough information to the public

10

80

22

Environmental information is valued only when disaster occurs

15

77

23

NGOs communicate more to political decision makers than local citizens

17

50

24

Certain level of environmental needed to understand environment is lacking

8

79

25

Organizations give higher priority to economics and not environmental issues

15

80

344

1868

13.76

74.72

16

Source: Asahi Glass Foundation
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A total of 1009 people responded to these questions. The percentage of people
that gave neutral responses was eliminated. Those that responded strongly agree and
agree were classified as agree. In general, those that responded strongly disagree and
disagree were classified as disagree. Table 8 above shows the percentage of those
respondents that agreed and those that disagreed. An average percentage for each was
estimated. The percentage of people that agreed was assumed to represent the level of
local compliance.
The average numbers of people that agree to the statements reflect the view of the
success of local level implementation and compliance. The responses of the people that
disagreed reflect the views that conservation of natural resources face numerous
difficulties at all levels with the greatest impacts felt at local levels.
∑

…………………………………………………..…

4

Where
= Local compliance of country i.
= Likert scale responses from table 8 above.
3.7.7 Estimation of overall compliance
The final compliance was estimated by putting together the average of
compliance level by each country as follows;
GL

Pa

Pr

Ln

Where Pa

Pr

Ln is paper compliance by country i + national compliance by

………………………………

5

country i + local implementation by country i.
Pa

∑ R

R

⋯

R

N

………………………………
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6

Pr

∑ R

Where: R

GL

∑ Pa

R

⋯

R

………………………………

7

………………………………

8

Various criterias

Pr

Ln

3.8 Stakeholder cooperation toward compliance
Many biological resources such as forests and fisheries exist in common pool
resources and are therefore easily overexploited (Basurto, 2008). Implementation of
many conservation programs especially in developing countries is done by international
organizations often serving in more than one country. According to Ostrom (2010), most
effective systems of governance require small to medium sized departments to provide
direct services such as conservation institutions at the local level such as communities.
International as well as local organizations lack enforcement ability and thus to act as
change agents without sufficient government support and local policy ownership does not
always bring about the desired outcomes.
From the perspective of the CBD, biodiversity protection is a universal
responsibility. All countries that have joined the membership of the CBD have the
prerogative to choose how they wish to carry out conservation. Factors that support or
inhibit biodiversity protection are many and vary across countries and regions. Using
game theory methodology, I have tried to examine individual country strengths and
weaknesses. Specific country strengths can be used to support another country’s
weakness under international relations theories. The key assumption made here is that
when countries cooperate, the kind of support they render each other takes them to a
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higher compliance level. This happens when the strengths and weaknesses of each
country are known to each other. Because biodiversity protection is a collective global
responsibility, countries with strengths in specific strategies will support weak strategies
in other countries.
Figure 2: Stakeholders’ cooperation

Implementation

Conservation Organizations
and Epistemic Groups -100%
Conservation Interest

Private Sector and Business
Community 100% Private
interests

National Government partly supports
Conservation and Partly Private Interests

Local Communities and Institutions 100%
Personal Interests
Source: Own conceptualization of game theory

Figure 2 above shows the initial theoretical approach to explain cooperation under
both international relations and game theories. At this stage, stakeholders are involved in
negotiations to build consensus as well cooperatively looking at the extent to which they
can benefit from the use of biological resources. In this figure, stakeholders come to the
negotiation table hoping to go away with 100% of their interests met. As negotiations
progress, realization sets in that they all have to give up a portion of their interest. A
coalition is formed which then is tasked with implementation. The same process is
repeated in all countries. These coalitions within countries then need to cooperate and

108

support conservation based on the strengths of their capacity in specific conservation
issues. These are referred to as a strategy in game theory.
This study has used theoretical relationship to examine strategic relations between
implementers or owners of biodiversity and donors or the international community.
Various benefit and loses scenarios were developed in order to see how various
stakeholder make conservation decisions. These decisions are both local when looked at
from the lens of implementers (owners of biological resources) and global if we were to
look at them from to donors perspectives. Local conservation decisions reduce the
benefits that communities enjoy from using more biological resources. It is only logical
that these communities be compensated for more sustainable long-term conservation
goals. The type of compensation mechanisms developed greatly depends on the type
governmental and organizational cooperation with local institutions.
3.8.1 Determinants of institutional cooperation
The challenge to determining institutional cooperation arose from insufficient
literature that explains how institutional arrangements work in various places and how
they are able to work with each other across multiple countries. Within a country, there
are differences at the operational level (how resources are used), the collective choice
level (policy making level), and the constitutional level (making of laws that govern
institutions) (Ostrom, 2010). It is for this reason that collaboration between global
institutions, international organizations, national and local governments is important for
successful local conservation efforts. Borrowing from Ostrom’s identified structural
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elements of a game used to predict outcomes (Ostrom, 2010), the table below was
constructed to show how institutions could work with each other.
Using the components in column one under the rules of game theory (Ostrom,
2010), the study was able to build an institutional working model in column 2. The study
developed an analytical framework where analysis of different actions at different levels
in different organizations was clearly displayed, see Table 9 below. There are numerous
structures that arise when organizations work in cooperation that warrants the analysis of
rules and other factors which usually affect how organizations work together.
Table 9: Determinants of institutional collaboration
Elements of Game Theory
Number of actors

Institutional arrangement
Number of institutions

Positions players occupy
(Rows or Columns)

Origin of and
organization/institution (local,
national or international
Amount of information available to
each organization/institution

Amount of information
available to each
stakeholder/player
Set of Actions that players
take at specific nodes in a
decision table
How much to give up, how
much to gain, joint losses or
joint benefits
Outcomes that players jointly
affect
Benefits and costs assigned to
actions and outcomes

Factors to consider
Knowledge and
Resources available
Working relationships

Organizational
capacity, Information
sharing tools
Set of actions different
Legislation, policy
organizations take at different levels making,
Implementation
How legislation, policy and
What each organization
implementation connect with
brings in, Impact
intermediate or final outcomes
Outcomes that organizations jointly How courses of action
affected
are selected,
Benefits and costs assigned to
Available incentives to
actions and outcomes at different
act or not to act,
levels and organizations
Opportunity costs

Source: Ostrom, 2010
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Cooperation is the working together of biodiversity stakeholders to accomplish
shared goals (Smith, 1995) while collaboration is the working together to achieve
common goals (McLnnerney & Robert, 2004). In a cooperative arrangement, each
stakeholder is responsible for that portion of conservation work that affects them directly.
Collaboration on the other hand comes with costs in the form of time and resources
devoted to establishing and maintaining working relationships, the value attached to such
relationships and the reputations for being reliable and building trust between
organizations (Williams, 1979; Breton & Wintrobe, 1982; Ostrom, 2011).
3.8.2 Application of game theory to biodiversity protection
In more practical ways, several stakeholders with differing interests are involved
in biodiversity management, policy making and implementation. Conservation efforts
will yield higher compliance outcomes if all stakeholders cooperate. Several games from
simple two-country and two-stakeholder scenario to multiple country cooperation and
multiple stakeholder complex games were analyzed.
Table 10: Game theory and conservation strategies
Implementer 1

implementer 2

implementer 3

Implementer 4

Conservation Orgn 1

X1,Y1

X1,Y2

X1,Y3

X1,Y4

Conservation Orgn 2

X2,Y1

X2,Y2

X2,Y3

X2,Y4

Conservation Orgn 3

X3,Y1

X3,Y2

X3,Y3

X3,Y4

Conservation Orgn 4

X4,Y1

X4,Y2

X4,Y3

X4,Y4

Conservation Orgn 5

X5,Y1

X5,Y2

X5,Y3

X5,Y4
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Table 10 shows various game combinations that can build both cooperative and
non-cooperative strategies between owners of biological resources and conservationists.
The Xs and Ys are the different strategies available to conservation organizations and
implementer (owners of biological resources) in a game. Strategies are not the same as
outcomes. The rows represent conservation organizations’ strategies and columns
represent owners of biological resources and these can be countries, communities or even
private sector institutions. Each strategy leads to a specific outcome/payoff in
conservation. The illustration in table 10 shows just one strategy for an implementer and
the conservation organization. It is important to point out that each of these players can
have more than one strategy.
3.8.3 Application of systems theory to biodiversity protection
Protection of biodiversity ideas originate from conservation organizations. The
avenues that these organizations take toward compliance are either direct, through
community involvement, government involvement or private sector involvement. Within
these avenues, there are several parties (agents) that conservation organizations will work
with. Working with any of these agents has been referred to by this study as a strategy.
Successful biodiversity protection can be realized when there are strong strategic actions
from the conservation community. These actions should favor public involvement in
public discourses through government structures in order to shape citizen’s perceptions.
Once perceptions are changed, opposition diminishes and influence toward conservation
starts to grow (Box, 2010).
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Most citizens are not well informed and not so involved in public discourse
processes such that decisions are made by self-interested people and by community
activists pushing their particular view of the public interest (Box, 2010). For public
administrators to intervene in order to protect biological resources, citizens support and
cooperation is critical. The Figure 3 below shows various avenues (strategies) available
for conservation organizations to drive the global society toward compliance. They can
work through governments directly, through communities, through private sector or
through all these avenues. When they choose to cooperate with either communities or
private sector only, the level of compliance achieved is a narrow one, therefore can be
classified as low.
Figure 3: Compliance network model

Conservation Organizations

M

Community Avenue

Compliance
100%
O

G

0%

Direct/Government Avenue

100%

Private sector avenue

Source: Own construction

C

P
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When conservation organizations drive communities, private sector organizations
and all other stakeholders to cooperate with governments, the path towards higher
compliance is longer but wider and therefore can be classified as higher. Compliance
spectrum ranges between 0% and 100%. The 100% compliance is a desired state which
can only be achieved if all stakeholders are cooperating and if the conservationists are
advancing strong strategies that are fully supported by governments. When stakeholders
work individually, compliance can only be narrowly defined, for example, when a
government submits a report to the CBD it is seen as complying even though the demand
for biological resources far exceeds national biological capacity.
Conservation organizations have to travel the distance from 0% to 100%
compliance. For explanation sake, working through governments is the shortest distance
while the strategies of working through communities or the private sector will take longer
to get to 100% compliance.
However, it is not possible to ignore communities and private sector interests if
meaningful compliance is to be achieved. Conservation organizations will therefore have
to work with governments to reach community and private sector interests. The distance
travelled from 0% compliance will go through G, to either M or P or both depending on
the socio-economic structure of a specific country.
Although the compliance network above shows a flow that does not seem to have
problems that could arise as organizations or governments work together, disagreements
on how to solve environmental problems have often played out publicly. For instance,
environmental regulations have always led to high level conflicts between private sector
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organizations, international NGOs and civil society institutions, such as what was
witnessed at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The demands for strict and compulsory
implementation advanced by environmental NGOs were disregarded and a voluntary
code of conduct developed by the Business Council for Sustainable Development that
consisted mainly of private sector corporations adopted in what should have a democratic
process (Hawken, 1995; Banerjee, 2008). Businesses do not want to be told what to do
and how to do what is perceived as beneficial for the whole society.
In figure 3 above, suppose the strategies conservation organizations employ are
,

,

,

…

if they wish to work alone. In game theory, one player game is known

as a decision problem (Turocy & Stengel, 2002). This, however, can be difficult in
biodiversity protection because of many stakeholders who have to use biological
resources. Conservation organizations have to build a working relationship with all other
stakeholders. In games of this nature, players/stakeholders have a choice to maximize
their payoff/benefits.
Strategy ( ) is when conservation organizations choose to work with the
community (OMC), (

) is when they work with government (OGC), ( ) is when they

work with private sector (OPC), ( ) is if they work with government and communities
(OGMC), ( ) is if they choose to work with government and private sector (OGPC), and
( ) is when they work with all other stakeholders. For any avenue that conservation
organizations take, there is an action profile,

,

,

,….…

. Expected compliance,

therefore, is multiplied by the probability of every action.
,

,

,……..,

……
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………
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To be able to predict various outcomes or payoffs in a conservation game, I
introduced the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies between conservationists and
owners of biological resources, also classified as implementers of conservation policies.
It is theoretically expected that cooperative strategies lead to higher payoffs/benefits
while non-cooperative strategies always bring about a lower collective payoff/benefits
(Jackson, 2011).
In any cooperative game between stakeholders, various strategies

,

can be

seen as either favoring conservation when they lead to better implementation or
constraining conservation when they obstruct implementation. For a conservation
outcome

for conservation organization

in a conservation profile ( ),

cooperative gave leads to better implementation than
Conservation organizations do better with
,

than with

in a

in a non-cooperative game.
.

…………………….…………………………….

10

In some cases, conservationists and implementers end up with less than optimal
outcomes. This arises when both conservationists and implementers fail to axecute their
portion of responsibility. This leads to what is known as prisoner’s dilemma in game
theory.
…………………………………………………..

11

The government, communities and private sector organizations are expected to
respond to conservation organizations by either embracing completely the conservation
agenda, partly embracing or completely rejecting conservation.
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Implementers of

conservation goals can choose to fit or corrupt the environment in which they find
themselves. This can be observed from claims made based on the force-field concept that
for each driving force, there is a restraining force acting to prevent the transformation
(Rago, 1996). In this context, the following strategy profile is proposed:
,……

Borrowing from Turocy & Stengel (2002),
,…..,

organization’s strategy profile, then,

,

is the conservation

,……,

. Where

is

the strategy of all other stakeholders except conservation organizations. Therefore, a
weak strategy

is advanced by all other stakeholders, such that;

,
such that

,…,

,

,

,…,

is meant to influence stakeholder position
,

lead to better conservation outcomes if
available to all stakeholders.
for every

12

,

Conservation strategy

,

……………………….

,

and is supposed to
for every strategy

will lead to more efficient outcomes if

,

≠

. Conservation will be implemented when strategies chosen do

not reduce the benefits

that communities enjoy from the consumption of more

biodiversity. When such benefits are reduced, there must be some form of compensation.
3.8.4 Cooperation and non‐cooperation approaches to conservation
It is not all the time that stakeholders in biodiversity protection have one common
agenda. Some and often very strong stakeholders from the private sector want to exploit
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biological resources for maximum benefits without hindrance. It is important to examine
how the non-cooperation from some stakeholders affects conservation.
Although there are arguments to the effect that communities cannot genuinely
participate in biodiversity protection, Future Generations (2008) asserts that it is the
question of capacity more than anything else that prevents communities from effective
participation. Sources of community capacity building include establishing linkages with
outside groups and introduction of technological innovations (Future Generations, 2008).
In many countries, national governments delegate conservation responsibility to local
levels where capacities do not match these responsibilities. There is no adequate literature
explaining capacities at local levels to enable facilitation, institutionalization and transfer
of appropriate technology to community organizations (Nagedre et al. 2005; Salam et al.,
2006; Future Generations, 2008).
Organizations are created and rely on people to guide their institutional agenda,
control systems and formal hierarchies to meet set goals and objectives. People come into
organizations as leaders, managers or as mere workers. How organizations structure
themselves and empower the people at different levels in these structures greatly
influences how successful and sustainable their programs become. Therefore, for any
meaningful cooperation to be realized between different hierarchies and across
institutions there is a need to build local level institutions (Bawa et al. 2007; Tucker
2004; Future Generations, 2008). When institutions internal to communities are too weak,
any cooperation with external institutions is most likely to fail in realizing conservation
goals (Future Generations, 2008). Building community capacities takes time, sometimes
as long 10 years (Baral & Gautam, 2007; Future Generations, 2008).
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There are specific variables that characterize action situations at these levels
of service production (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982). Game theory is a powerful tool used by
scholars to develop mathematical models that satisfy various situations and is used to
predict expected behavior of rational individuals (Ostrom, 2010). The game theory parts
of a game can be conceptualized as universal working parts of an action situation
(Ostrom, 2010). The basic components of a game in this context provide a good
foundation to build a common method for analyzing different action situations (Ostrom,
2010). In addition, the flow of activities, information sharing organizations and who
receives what benefits and who pays what costs (Ostrom, 2011).
Conservation organizations
(

,

)=

,…

,

,

…

,…,

,

…

………………
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Where B, C, ….., I are conservation organizations while the 1, 2, …n are conservation
strategies
(

,

,..

,

,

,..

,..

,

,…

……………….
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All other stakeholders = D, E, …Y with their conservation strategies
The (1…n) are different strategies employed by conservationists to convince other
stakeholders to support conservation. Other stakeholders may have their own strategies
Yi.
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Figure 4: Stakeholder strategies
Communities, local organizations, stakeholders
(implementers)
Conservationists,
donors or countries

B1,D1

B2,D2 B3,D3 B4,D4

B5,D5

B6,D6

C1,E1

C2,E2

C5,E5

C6,E6

C3,E3

C4,E4

This is a simple game theory table showing how biodiversity stakeholders play
conservation games. For instance when conservationists come forward with strategy
(B1), other stakeholders counter that strategy (D1); when conservationists come up with
strategy (B2), the other player counters with (D2). The winner of the game finally is the
player who gets highest benefits. There are situations when there can be a tie.
3.9 Institutional relationships
The systems theory facilitated this study in examining the extent that the use of
the Internet by national and local institutions. I analyzed both how programs are
connected from global settings to the local level and vice versa in terms agency and
organizational relationships. Specifically, I tried to find out the availability of
information- sharing structures across all levels. Also, how global program initiatives
bring about changes at national level and finally to local levels. This was necessary to try
and capture policy links, legislation and various initiatives that may go into a
programmatic relationship from the global to local levels between governments and
conservation organizations.
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The degree of non-compliance at global level with the goals of the CBD cannot be
explained if there is no proper understanding of implementation challenges at local and
national government levels. There has to be a system of both information sharing and
coordination. This study makes an argument that low level capacities or non-compliant
with CBD goals is partly the lack of effective engagement of local communities where
actual implementation takes place. Implementation of biodiversity protection programs is
a complex process of bringing together a combination of events and institutions all the
time. These events include the various international, regional and national conferences
involving governments, NGOs and private sector corporations all meant to facilitate
organizational learning through interaction and information sharing.
The Convention created two Information Technology (IT) sharing tools, the
Clearing House Mechanism (CHM) and the Global Biodiversity Information Facility
(GBIF). The CHM is a place for national governments and partners to openly share
information as well as promote and facilitate technical scientific cooperation
(www.cbd.int). The GBIF was created in 2001 to provide free and open access to global
biodiversity data via the Internet to foster scientific research and development globally
and to support public use of such data. International Conservation Non-Governmental
Organizations also created the Biodiversity Conservation Information Systems (BCIS).
The GBIF, CHMs and BCIS are structures that can be replicated by all members of the
CBD.
Countries are encouraged to develop their own information sharing tools for
effective engagement of local institutions, supporting collaboration and coordination of
conservation programs (CBD, 2006). The CBD website (www.cbd.int) acts as the central

121

node. However, the national information systems seem to face numerous organizational
and institutional challenges.
3.9.1 Biodiversity protection coordination problems
Most of the problems facing biodiversity protection originate from insufficient
information sharing structures as well as lack of data and coordination between different
institutions and sectors. The work done at conferences simply sets the agenda and
countries are left on their own to implement those agendas. There have to be clear
systems providing universally-accessible data and information that is fully integrated at
national levels and that link local implementation to international compliance. This need
not be just a mere linkage but also a way to influence various authorities, facilitate the
pursuit of conservation goals, and help in the allocation of resources, and measurement of
outcomes.
The use of information technology has revolutionized the traditional methods of
public involvement by leveraging the collective interests of society in order to design
conservation solutions with communities at local levels (Lei, 2013). Various conservation
organizations are able to establish relationships with both governments and local
institutions, which get strengthened using the systems approach. The systems approach
provides structures for stakeholder involvement with greater transparency, sufficient
information and learning (Save, 2002). Table 11 below shows how the systems theory
facilitates outcomes at local, national and international levels.
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Table 11: Functional systems levels
Local

National

International

Shared meaning
Public awareness
Public education,
Communication,
experimentation,
Institutionalization,
best practices,
common objectives

Participation
Economic incentives,
regulations,
Decision-making,
Decision
implementation,
dissenting views
incorporated, change of
mental models

Building public
trust, Stakeholder
priorities, causes of
problems, seeing
actions and
systematic effects,
Policy options and
boundaries
Conferences,
planning, reporting

Problem identification,
problem focus, feedback
tools for learning,
intervention tools,
information sharing
tools,

Information sharing,
CHMs, document
depository, learning

Outcomes
Empowerment,
implementation, internal
consistency, feedback
mechanisms, dialogue,
problem definition,
consensus, accepted
regulations, available
options, knowledge
integration, community
transformation,
Documentation and
analysis, goals, plans,
reports, data, policy
levers, points of
intervention, greater
transparency, clarity of
limitations, strong
regulations
Improved coordination,
improved management,
more consensus,

Table 11 above shows activities that have to be undertaken at different levels in
society in order to develop an effective conservation system. The local, national and
global levels require specific activities to disseminate information so as to improve the
shared meaning in conservation and participation. It is out of the level of participation
with clear outcomes that there can be a working system.
…………………………………….
Where:

= Global compliance
Shared meaning
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15

Participation
Data
Stave (2002) argues that traditional methods used to involve the public in general
such as information campaigns, facilitated discussions and public hearings frequently
leave stakeholders dissatisfied. These traditional methods are essentially a one-way
communication from experts to members of the public with information that is not well
explained how it meets community interests. The key assumption made here was that the
use of information technology (IT) will facilitate the engagement of multiple stakeholders
to predictably reduce implementation barriers and increase outcomes. The following
themes were identified and used to explain the extent information systems facilitate
compliance at all levels: 1) Shared meaning 2) Participation; and 3) Data. These themes
provided the coding references which were guided by the links to all types of information
and data found in the CBD and national CHMs.
Quantitative measurement for these themes were generated from the number
coded references to each theme and were used to rank how successful systems approach
has contributed to biodiversity protection and compliance with CBD goals.
3.9.2 Stakeholder shared meaning in biodiversity management
Environmental resources are public goods and therefore environmental policies
are part of the public interest issues. Many of the problems that arise in conservation of
biodiversity are not because there is no knowledge but rather because of lack of shared
meaning by all stakeholders in the system (Stave, 2002). Environmental protection policy
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decisions straddle various societal values. There are no set standards on how to assign
value to different policy outcomes in different settings. Stakeholders in biodiversity have
differing interests and competing goals in terms of their specific needs. Information
technology has facilitated behavioral changes in information-enabled society and has
infused both learning and understanding (Lei, 2013).
Public policies continue to evolve over a long period of time after they are
legislated. Sometimes, these policies are often in a state of self-contradiction and often
end up sending conflicting signals to society (Friedrich & Mason, 1940). If there is no
clear and shared meaning, implementation in this kind of relationships will be difficult if
not impossible. For most individuals, Organizations and Corporations, the pursuit private
interest is the upmost priority, making biodiversity problems secondary.
3.9.3 Stakeholder participation in biodiversity management
Greater participation by more stakeholders improves the quality of environmental
decision-making as a result of integration of local, administrative and scientific
knowledge (Reed, 2008).

Participation in the execution and implementation by many

stakeholders and administrative arm of governments renders policy a continuous process
constantly in a state of flux making it almost impossible to state with precision what the
policy is at a specific time in a specific policy environment (Pressman & Wildavsky,
1984). In conservation, three types of participation are identified (Reed, 2008): i)
research driven ii) development driven iii) planner-centered and iv) people-centered.
Planner-centered participation focuses more on outcomes while people-centered is
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concerned with empowering stakeholders to define and meet their environmental needs
(Reed, 2008).
3.10 Information sharing and communication tools
It is unclear exactly how individuals, communities and local governments are
experiencing biodiversity protection programs at local levels. The degree of noncompliance at the global level with the goals of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)
can only be explained when there is a good understanding of implementation challenges
at the local and national government levels. My argument here is that partly the problem
is the lack of effective engagement of local communities where actual implementation
takes place. The Convention uses two Information Technology (IT) sharing tools to
engage governments, the Central Clearing House Mechanism and the Global Biodiversity
Information Facility. Countries are encouraged to develop their own information sharing
tools for effective engagement of local institutions. The CBD website (www.cbd.int) acts
as the central node. There should be national nodes in every country that connect to local
level implementation.
Table 12 below shows responses regarding how countries prioritize national
interest, how individual make decisions based on immediate benefits and the extent that
private organizations look to profits as their priority. Most people from across the world
agree that biodiversity conservation is not a priority across government and private sector
institutions, there are more people that agree as can be seen across D and E in table 11
above. This shows how biodiversity protection means different to different sectors.
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Table 12: The extent to which biodiversity protection is given priority
Responses

Rank

National interests often
take precedence.

Individuals tend to make
decisions based on
immediate profit or loss.

Economic profits of
organizations or regions
are prioritized and
environmental
considerations are not

Eastern
Europe
6
6
22
22
39
6
0
0
39
50
6
0
6
28

Asia

A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D

Western
Europe
8
2
11
30
51
3
6
7
36
48
2
7
2
31

Africa

18
35
30
137
254
30
45
32
181
199
44
61
37
147

Latin
America
6
13
13
23
39
3
3
3
13
71
3
0
0
16

0
8
4
21
67
0
4
4
33
58
0
0
4
17

Middle
East
0
20
0
40
40
0
20
0
20
60
0
20
0
20

E

57

56

206

77

75

60

Source: Asahi Glass Foundation
A: Strongly disagree B: Somewhat disagree C: Neither (I don’t know) D: Somewhat agree E: Strongly
agree

Table 13 below puts together data to show how national dynamics and influence
global management of biological resources. At national level, decisions are heavily
influenced by political, business and organizational interests and therefore the needs of
the whole society become secondary as At the international level, decision are made by
consensus which often leans more to what countries want.
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Table 13: Influence of national decisions on global conservation
Responses
National Systems
National decision-making
systems prioritize national
interests; policies that
optimize the whole are
become secondary.
National decisions influenced
by political, business, and
organizational interests and do
not reflect the will of the
public, who shoulder the
environment.
Changes in national policy
face great resistance (inertia),
and as
such it tends to stay with
business as usual.
International Systems
International organizations
like the U.N. are affected by
the will of countries, and do
not
optimize the whole.
Voting system at the U.N.
with its adherence to the
fundamental
principle of unanimous
consent, makes decisionmaking difficult.
International organizations
like the U.N. are not provided
enforcement powers or other
forceful methods of
coordination.
Systemic and organizational
reforms are needed, but have
not been implemented.

Rank

Western
Europe

Eastern
Europe

Asia

Latin
America

Africa

Middle
East

A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E

4
7
7
40
42
2
5
11
38
44

0
0
13
31
56
0
0
13
38
50

16
17
36
203
212
12
24
40
173
240

14
10
5
33
33
10
0
10
14
62

0
5
5
32
58
0
0
11
32
58

0
30
30
0
60
0
0
0
20
80

A
B
C
D
E

4
7
11
24
55

0
6
25
38
31

13
32
80
220
147

5
14
0
38
43

0
11
11
32
47

0
0
0
20
80

A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E

2
9
7
18
84
2
4
9
22
84

0
0
19
25
86
6
6
13
38
38

11
26
46
150
210
21
38
72
191
107

10
0
10
38
43
5
5
14
33
38

5
0
5
47
42
0
0
0
47
53

0
0
0
40
60
0
20
20
0
60

4
2
9
27
58
4
5
29
36
25

0
13
13
25
44
0
13
19
38
31

13
45
61
185
136
4
46
80
207
107

14
10
0
24
48
10
5
5
57
19

0
5
5
32
58
0
5
32
21
42

0
0
0
40
60
0
0
0
60
40

A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E
Source: Asahi Glass Foundation
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3.10.1 Local and national information sharing capacity
Using NVivo10, a content qualitative analysis of NBSAPs, national reports,
analysis of information obtained from government, international and local organizations
websites was done. This was mainly to see the key emerging conservation themes and the
contexts in which various key words are used. A word frequency was done to produce a
tag cloud of the most commonly used words in each of the documents and compare the
messages being conveyed. Specifically, this analysis set out to identify the input from
local levels, cooperation between all sectors, decision making and the types of decisions
made, information sharing and communication tools.
Institutions put in place for purposes of biodiversity protection exist at multiple
levels. Policies drawn at global level are meant for adoption by national governments.
Once these policies are modified and adopted to the national level, they have to be passed
down to local levels for implementation. There has to be a shared meaning of these
policies at all levels and across all institutions for them to be accepted for
implementation. A shared meaning of rules, regulations and policies help to strengthen
national enforcement of international treaties. As long as international treaties lack
sovereign authority to enforce laws, they have very little impact at implementation levels
(Hathaway, 2005). Shared meaning in this hypothesis means going beyond participation
to place externally generated goals and objectives in the context of local needs.
This is where the role of the state apparatus becomes central, as it is the
responsibility of the government to provide direction, legitimization and information to
its citizens (Adams & Hutton, 2007). One of the claims made by biodiversity protection
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experts is the contribution of biodiversity protection to poverty alleviation. How poverty
alleviation is viewed at both national and local levels from the perspective of biological
resources protection remains controversial. While there are many people who strongly
believe that biodiversity protection constrains development, there are many that believe it
is not and is therefore a good tool for poverty alleviation (Turner et al., 2012). There are
also many people that believe in sustainable use argument in biodiversity protection
while there are some that argue that sustainable use argument is presented to postpone the
conservation problems (Porter & Brown, 1991).
There is a clear lack of sufficient analysis and information to inform decision
makers and policy on the contribution of biodiversity protection in social and economic
development (Turner, 2012). This study therefore tried to uncover and explain the shared
understanding using information from the existing national plans, reports and the
literature. The CBD goals and emerging conservation policies at the local levels in the
light of national and global conservation agendas require to be carefully bridged.
Examining the existing literature points toward a clear lack of shared
understanding in the language used, policy processes and sharing the benefits from
biodiversity. The role of government is to create binding regulations that mandate all
stakeholders to act responsibly in the course of their business towards environmental
protection. Governments build structures and networks that recruit expertise needed for
effective intervention on issues that are considered most important (Stampfer et al.,
2010). At the same time, governments have also been known to play what is known as
symbolic politics (Davidson, Frickel & Edelman, 1964), where countries develop
rhetorical strategies designed to manufacture and reinforce public’s convictions that
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biological resources protection is being competently addressed when in fact the opposite
is true. Developments over the last two decades of trying to implement the goals of the
CBD reveal some major disconnection between what is said and what is actually being
implemented at the local levels (Davidson & Frickel, 2004).
Biodiversity protection needs to be legitimated across all sectors with relevant
rules and laws supported by prevailing social norms, traditional, charismatic or
bureaucratic leadership (Weber, 1968). Sound organizational ethics where biodiversity
protection interests take center stage can only thrive where all stakeholders share the
meaning and are guided through use strong tougher enforcement mechanisms (Oliver,
1991).
3.10.2 Local input to national policy development
There is overreliance by national institutions on international experts to develop
domestic policies and also on international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
the implementation of conservation programs worldwide (Basurto, 2008). International
experts on policy making do not often understand local conditions. Although NGOs have
been portrayed as providing better avenues for more participation and less bureaucratized
approaches that allow the meeting peoples’ needs with greater efficiency and at lower
costs, recent studies have shown that this is not always true (Chapin 2004; Igoe and
Kelsall 2005; Basurto, 2008).
It has also been established that international NGOs cannot be classified as part of
the civil society as they are not membership based, governed or financed and therefore
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cannot play a representative role (Abramson 1999; Gaventa 1999; Nelson 1995; Fowler,
2000). This leaves governments as key players in facilitating more participation and thus
input from local communities. Although partnerships with the international community
are extremely important for purposes of accessing financial resources and scientific
information (Basurto, 2008), best policies are formulated using local institutions.
3.11 Opportunity costs of biodiversity protection
According to the global Footprint Network, wastes generated from the
consumption of natural resources can be measured, quantified and tracked by using the
amount of land that is required to maintain those (Borucke et al. 2012). Human demand is
expressed in the form of an ecological footprint on global natural resources where supply
is compared to demand based on biological hectares available to every person. When
demand exceeds supply, biological resources start to be degraded. Compliance
measurement should therefore include the difference between available biological
resources and the level of consumption/use in each country. Countries that are
consistently in a biological resources deficit should be classified least complied
regardless of their quality of planning and reporting. Minimum level of compliance
should be defined starting from a situation when the supply of biological resources is
either equal or greater that consumption as expressed in the equation below.
Opportunity costs arise from restrictions imposed on the use of land, forest and
water resources that are set aside for conservation purposes. These restrictions may
involve stopping communities from converting land to the use of their choice or are
allowed limited acceptable usage. Communities therefore forfeit all future streams of
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income from the land that is restricted (Kaphengst et al. 2011; Chomitz, 2005).
Restrictions on land use can be measured using foregone income. However, when land is
converted to serve industry and manufacturing facilities that pollute the environment,
opportunity costs are on the side of the environment. Estimating such costs is extremely
difficult and opportunity costs in biodiversity degradation are this type of costs. Industry
has been known to use environmental resources that come from biodiversity and dispose
off waste to the environment at no cost.
Opportunity costs
total costs

of biodiversity protection ($/ha) were estimated based on

of conservation less external funding

and also less national budgetary

allocation to conservation. If the final answer is positive, owners of biological resources
would be expected to incur that cost. If the final answer is negative, the cost of
conservation is fully covered and communities or private sector organizations will not
incur opportunity costs

).
……………………………….

For each country, total opportunity costs (

16

will be the number of hectares in

biological deficit/surplus times the value of positive opportunity cost. For countries in
biodiversity deficit, opportunity cost estimates was based on complete conservation of the
number of hectares in deficit. In other words, an equivalent of the total number of
hectares in deficit need to brought into outright protection in the same country, if not
cooperate and support such conversion in another country. For all other countries, a
partial conversion was used to estimate opportunity costs. This is because unless these
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countries continue to pay attention to conservation, they are most likely to also end up in
biodiversity deficit.
………………………
17
3.11.1 Opportunity cost estimation
Estimating opportunity costs of protecting global biodiversity is necessary for
appropriate planning, fundraising and implementation of targeted conservation strategies.
However, there exists no sufficient biodiversity cost data on leading to conservation
organizations promoting conservation strategies with no costs and budgets (Frazee et al.,
2003). Some of the information needed for opportunity cost estimates includes lost
revenue arising from foregone use of natural resources, as well as costs of capacity
building for local conservation institutions. Data on foregone opportunity costs of
biodiversity protection does not exist.
Based on available biological resources measured in hectares and level of use for
each country, opportunity costs were estimated in this research.
Opportunity =
{Available biological Resources – Level of use of biological Resources} X Cost
per hectare.
…………………………

3.11.2 Opportunity cost compensation mechanism
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One of the objectives of this research was not really to estimate the opportunity
costs but rather to show that it needs to be the core component in defining compliance
with the CBD goals. Current consumption and degradation of the quality of biodiversity
far outstrips available quantity and quality of biological resources (Myers et al., 2000).
The gap between funding opportunities and biodiversity conservation targets in most
areas is rather growing wider than closing (Kaphengst et al., 2011). Increasing financial
resources is critical to successful conservation but it will require innovative approaches
such as the inclusion of opportunity costs in conservation efforts (Kaphengst et al., 2011).
Accurate estimates of opportunity costs and total costs of conservation leads to a more
focused approach to the areas of the greatest need thus enabling informed decision
making and efficiency in the allocation of financial resources (Kaphengst et al., 2011).
Protecting biodiversity is always in conflict with human activities and economic
development as unless human activities are restricted, they lead to habitat loss,
fragmentation and loss of biodiversity. Restricting human activities using only legislative,
legal or physical restrictions leaves people worse off economically (Bull et al., 2013).
There is therefore the need for appropriate compensation mechanisms to people for lost
economic opportunities if they get subjected to any restriction in the way they want to use
natural resources to meet their basic needs.
3.11.3 Types of compensation schemes
There are two types of compensation mechanisms (Plumb et al., 2012; Kate et al.,
2011): i) opportunity cost compensation and ii) biodiversity offset schemes. Opportunity
cost compensation is an equity based approach that applies to people directly. It is a
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mechanism where those who benefit from environmental services should bear the burden
of paying those who would incur some sort of cost to provide those services (Atisa et al.,
2014). Offset schemes are slightly different from opportunity cost approach. Offset
schemes are designed to link biodiversity conservation with development activities with
an aim of improving ecological outcomes alongside development (Bull et al., 2013).
According to Bull et al. (2013), compensation to offset opportunity costs as well
as offset schemes helps to link conservation with many other sectors that negatively
impact upon biological resources with sectors that protect these resources. There are 45
countries globally that now have mandatory opportunity cost compensation legislation for
biodiversity and compensation mechanism are being developed in another 27 (Bull et al.
2013; Madsen et al. 2011). Although compensation approach has been conceptually
attractive, it comes with numerous challenges at implementation stages (Bull et al. 2013;
Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Bekessy et al., 2010).
Once opportunity costs are determined, compensation to offset conservation costs
otherwise known as foregone benefits of use of biodiversity can be more targeted to both
people and specific resources. This can be seen in situations where people get paid for
agreeing not to use a natural resource or when a piece of land is purchased for
conservation purposes (Kaphengst et al., 2011). This is necessary if it is expected that
such use would exceeds the ecological boundary of that specific place.
3.11.4 Biodiversity Offset Schemes
Biodiversity offset schemes are compensation mechanisms designed to maintain
or improve environmental values despite the negative impact outcomes as countries
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pursue development (Bull et al. 2013; Kiesecker et al. 2009; Lindenmayer, 2007). This
literature argues that biodiversity offsets address negative environmental impacts after
efforts to minimize impacts and appropriate mitigation actions have been implemented.
There are four steps that lead to biodiversity offsets: avoid, minimize, restore and offset
or mitigate. These four steps help to balance negative environmental impacts of
development with positive environmental gains to maintain or improve environmental
outcomes (Bull et al. 2013; Kiesecker et al. 2009).
Biodiversity offset schemes stand to benefit development industries, the
government and conservation efforts. Industries with offset schemes are more likely to be
granted license for new operations with little or no resistance from the public. Offsets
provide a mechanism through which government regulators encourage industry to
contribute to conservation thus enabling broader, deeper and large-scale conservation
(Kiesecker et al., 2009). Despite paper and policy compliance, as long as industrial
development continues to erode biological resources, countries need to re-examine their
definition of compliance. It is important that environmental impacts of development are
balanced by no net-loss of biodiversity.
3.12 Decision making in biodiversity protection
Decision making can make significant contribution to effective policy formation
when a combination of expert knowledge and ordinary citizens work together. Policy
formulation and problem-solving by public administrators draws from various criteria
and rules as a basis for choosing from many alternatives (Lindblom, 1959). Grounds for
decision making in public organizations are based on partisan mutual adjustments,
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incrementalism and value clarification (Lindblom, 1959). No one organization or level
within institutions is able to produce optimal decision making outcomes. National policy
for biodiversity protection needs local inputs as well as international inputs for decision
outcomes that would move a country toward higher compliance with the CBD goals.
Decision making can be seen as a pendulum that swings across a broad range of
interests, values and hierarchies in and outside of organizations. Best decisions are made
after an extraordinary inquiry into relative values held by staff members and the society
to settle at the one that offers greatest value (Lindblom, 1959). Although decision making
is the function of the executive in an organization (Barnard, 1938), selection of available
and best alternatives and values needed to attain a specified objective calls for allowance
for a great deal of inquiry from lower levels and also other stakeholders (Barnard, 1938;
Mockler, 1968).
There are many big and influential organizations whose activities have direct
profound negative effects on the environment but have not been engaged constructively
in integrating environmental impacts into their business decisions (WWF, 2005).
Organizations are guided by economic self-interest to the extent that they are not likely to
adopt biological diversity protection initiatives if these do not meet their own profitability
criteria (Regan, 1998). Corporations focus more on efficiencies required to maximize
shareholder value where the key drivers of organizational behavior are competitive
pressures, market demand, and supply issues (Banerjee, 2008). Conservation decision
need to tap into private and other stakeholder organizations so as to make policies that
take into account all interests.
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Organizational control, decision making and planning for specified objectives is
best achieved by combining a diverse set of specializations and values from within and
outside of the organization. Organizations are best managed when they are viewed as a
form of information network with the flow of information providing decision makers at
different management levels with information needed to make decisions of all types
(Mockler, 1968). Decisions are made in a dynamic and interactive environment. The
systems approach facilitates for more comprehensive information, faster, at the point and
in the form it is needed to make better decisions (Mockler, 1968). Use of systems theory
in processing and transmitting information makes organizations aware of their internal
and external environment leading to consideration of political and social values in their
decision making process (Mokler, 1968).
Street-level bureaucrat theory argues for allowing more discretionary decision
making to low level implementers of public policies. Public organizations should seek
contribution from street-level bureaucrats when formulating policies. Changing
regulations that affect the way street-level bureaucrats do their business without their
input to satisfy a section of the policy interests can easily run into conflict with the
intended policy objectives. Discretionary decision may look insignificant, but collectively
they determine the texture of the relationship between the citizens and the government
(Watson, case 2). Policies should be adopted after taking into account regard to the
existing sum of human knowledge concerning all aspects of biodiversity conservation
and existing preferences in the community.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
4.0 Data analysis and determination of compliance
Chapter four was developed in line with the four hypothesis formulated to guide
this study and is divided into five sections. The first section presents the qualitative
analysis of key findings and the specific internal capacities within countries. The second
section presents the analysis of critical factors that influence compliance and
implementation of international environmental treaties. This is then followed by
compliance analysis using the score card methodology on NBSAPs and national reports.
Compliance analysis by way of cooperative games follows, and the last section examines
opportunity costs of conservation.
4.1 Introduction
Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies were employed to examine
compliance. Specifically, qualitative methods were used to try and define compliance as
is already defined but with more details in the form of numbers. The qualitative
compliance findings were translated and scored on a scale of 0 to 100 percent against
each criterion that was identified in chapter 3. Although it is the responsibility of each
country to conserve biodiversity within its jurisdiction, the universal nature of
biodiversity requires cooperation across countries. To examine such cooperation across
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countries, game theory approach was used. In addition, effective implementation of any
plan requires full participation of all stakeholders. Systems theory was used to analyze
how various countries, conservation organizations and communities work together.
When cooperation does not work, stakeholders involved resort to consensus
building. Hove (2004) argues that participation is a continuum between consensusoriented and compromise-oriented negotiation processes aimed at making adjustments to
stakeholder interests. Emphasis on consensus obscures adjustments that stakeholders
make in conservation decisions (Colyvan et al. 2011). I argue that participation need to be
designed so that rather than have stakeholders make adjustments to their interests, which
eventually leads to less than optimal decisions, they need to cooperate and agree on the
best collective outcome from a set of available strategies.
Game theory was employed to show the differences on compliance outcomes
between when countries cooperate and when they go through consensus to agree to use
specific conservation strategies. Compliance levels developed based on the 20 criteria
were regarded as strategies because the criteria used to determine compliance essentially
show how strong a country is in implementing specific protection initiatives. Putting
figures to compliance levels has not been tried by any study before. In this chapter,
therefore, I have further developed methods that were proposed in the previous chapter to
be able to see how countries comply at various levels and what should go into
compliance.
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4.2 Theoretical findings
The use of game and systems theories was ideal so as to distinguish the idea of
consensus building and cooperation. There can be major differences when decisions are
made under a managed consensus and when stakeholders cooperate. Consensus is always
never attained and, therefore, stakeholders have to find compromises (Hove, 2004). In the
coordination of various biodiversity conservation activities to improve overall
compliance, a consensus building model is not sufficient. There are possibilities that
some stakeholders would lose out while others gain.
The systems theory on the other hand was used in trying to elaborate how
government and various organizations identify problems and the nature of solutions
developed to address each specific problem. Analytical findings from both government
and conservation organization activities were compared to determine similarities and
differences. It was expected that the more similarities, the higher the compliance
outcomes and vice versa.
The aim of the CBD is to create a shared network of all countries to improve
global compliance simultaneously without making any one country worse off. Various
combinations of strategies that were assumed if effectively addressed in planning will
increase compliance payoffs without reducing the payoffs of participating countries were
identified.
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4.3 Qualitative Analysis of NBSAPs, National Reports and NCHMs
The use of qualitative analysis of key documents provided the best way to see
how compliance and implementation is done by countries. Various passages from the
plans and national reports were examined to see specific ideas that these documents were
conveying. Passages with similar ideas, phenomenon, or activities were grouped together
into nodes. The primary documents that were used to gather relevant implementation and
compliance data were the National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs), the
fourth national progress report submitted to the CBD and online information found on the
websites of international and local organizations. The study used NVivo10 for qualitative
document analysis to search, query and code specific texts with information referring to
specific conservation issues. The key questions that guided coding of texts from these
documents were: What is going on? What are countries doing? What are the documents
telling us? (Gibbs, 2007).
A query to identify the most commonly used words was conducted. Most of the
conservation words found to be commonly used were searched to see the context or exact
information they were conveying in the passages where they appeared. A coding process
to put similar passages together into a node was done. From these nodes, various
categories and conservation themes started to emerge. Codes are essence capturing and
essential elements of a research story that when clustered together according to similarity
facilitate to see connections (Saldan, 2013).
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For purposes of obtaining information regarding local level implementation,
codifying and categorization was done to re-group and link specific themes to local
implementation, national policies and global strategies. A third cycle of coding to
generate conservation strategies, policies, collaboration, and stakeholder participation at
various levels of conservation structures was conducted. Queries using key words to see
emerging themes (Saldana, 2013) were run. Emerging themes and information patterns
were tabulated for easier conceptualization.
The key theme that kept emerging from various plans and reports that connected
many aspects of conservation was the word “capacity”. There is either too little capacity
within countries to contribute towards meaningful compliance or too much capacity in a
few countries to continue to overexploit biological resources beyond levels where they
can replenish themselves.
Table 14: Frequency of use of the word capacity by key documents
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Country
Brazil
Jamaica
Mexico
Canada
UK
Netherlands
Switzerland
Poland
Kenya
South Africa
D R Congo
Ghana
India
Jordan
Indonesia
Australia

NBSAP
0
55
12
13
26
16
12
4
13
61
9
13
40
45
55
29

4th National Report
71
44
59
49
36
12
19
10
76
118
22
49
87
64
37
42

Source: estimated using information from the Convention on Biodiversity Website
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This section explores various contexts in which the word “capacity” is used to
bring an understanding of exactly how various countries are prepared in both the
formulation and implementation of biodiversity conservation programs.
The use of the word “capacity” was examined in the context of national and local
supportive capacities from existing plans and national reports. Context analysis of the
word “capacity” to see how it was used and what it meant when used in various contexts.
A country’s capacity in biodiversity conservation takes into account all instruments
necessary to increase a country’s ability to carry out conservation work, whether
equipment, information, knowledge or training (Kenya 4th National Report, 2006).
The Kenya 4th National Report (2006) argues that capacity building is a central
element in the implementation of biodiversity goals as well as in aiding in the successful
design and implementation of conservation goals at all levels and sectors. The specific
objectives of NBSAPs include the strengthening of national and local institutions, and
community capacity for sustainable conservation of biodiversity, including the safe
utilization of biotechnology (CBD, 2002). Inadequate resources and capacity constraints
slow implementation of conservation plans. The breadth and depth of all types of
capacities available would give an indication to how successfully the goals of
biodiversity protection are being implemented.
Tables 15a through 15d present summaries of the contexts in which the word
“capacity” was used by NBSAPs and country reports.
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4.3.1 NBSAPs and the 4th National Report for North and Latin America
Table 15a: Context in which the word capacity is used – Americas
Country
Brazil

Jamaica

Mexico

Canada

NBSAP
0

Local communities, Resources management,
National institutions, Technical, Scientific,
Regenerative,
Carrying
capacity,
Risk
assessment, Knowledge, Taxonomy, Alien
Species, Human, Climate Change, Law
enforcement, Management, Financial assistance,
implementation, Research & Training, Capital
resources, Planning, National, Lead agencies,
Living Modified Organisms (LMOs), Fisheries
Division, Monitoring, Biosafety, CHMs,
Biological data, Protected Areas, Resource
managers
Increased human, Institutional and financial
capacity, Information availability, decision
making, control, monitor and mitigate and local
capacities
National and international data base, Carrying
capacity,
Earth,
Ever-growing
demand,
Ecological carrying capacity, Management,
Museums, Institutions, Data & Information,
Dissemination, Economics & Ecological
capacity, Support to other countries, LDCS,
Planning, Implementation, Shared responsibility

4th National Report
Capacity
building
–
Humans,
Institutional, Funding, Technological,
Ecosystems,
Programs,
Communication, Conservation and
Infrastructure
Capacity building – Assessments,
carrying, Local, Ecosystems, Financial,
Technical, Planning, Implementation,
Scientific, Institutional, Conservation,
Research,
Coordination,
Human,
Marine and Recreational areas and
Planning

Human, People, Scientific, Research,
Budgetary, Institutional, Technological,
Monitoring, Decision making, local,
funding, analysis,
Adaptive, Ecosystems, Agricultural
lands, Wildlife, Assessment, Response,
Marine life, Economic, Capacity
building, Carrying, Development,
Human, Reporting, Different levels of
government, Agencies

Table 15b below shows the contexts in which the word capacity was used by
countries sampled from Europe.
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4.3.2 NBSAPs and the 4th National Report for Europe
Table 15b: Context in which the word capacity is used – Europe
Country
UK

Netherlands

Switzerland

Poland

NBSAPs
Agricultural stability, Invasive Alien
Species,
Collections
in
Zoos,
Environmental,
Carrying
capacity,
Resources management, Exceeding limits,
Ecosystems, Forest capacity, Overfishing,
Targeted
decommissioning
program, Linkages, Botanic gardens,
Productive, Support to other governments,
NGOs,
Awareness,
Funding,
Implementation
Knowledge sharing, Sustainable forestry,
Good
governance,
Management,
Ecosystems, Poor countries, Programs,
Resilience, Protected Areas, Ecological
Networks, Fishing fleets, Developing
countries, Fish meal & Fish oil chain,
Water management, Knowledge networks,
Shared responsibility, managers.
Climate
Change,
Implementation,
Protected Areas, Participatory planning,
Knowledge management, Nature to renew
itself, Performance of forests, Resilience,
Natural regeneration, Alien Species,
Ecosystems
Level of spending, Finance, Legal,
Resources,
Research,
Personal,
Institutional,
Technical,
Public
Administration

Source: NBSAPs and reports of these countries
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4th National Reports
Capacity
building,
Develop/Build,
Adaptive, Climate Change, Scientific,
Reproductive, Habitats, Ecosystems,
People, Institutions, Financial, Technical,
Local, Cooperation, implementation,
Awareness

Indigenous/local communities, Parties,
Capacity building, Financial, Human,
Scientific, Technical, Implementation,
Capacity as an indicator

Glaziers/water
holding,
production,
capacity
building,
indigenous/Local
communities,
Technology
transfer,
Networking,
Scientific,
Financial,
Communications, Ecosystems, Technical,
implementation, Parties, Switzerland,
Cartagena Protocol, Technical/Scientific
Cooperation, Knowledge, Programmes.
Financial, Gene banks, collections of
botanical/zoological gardens, Capacity
building,
Public,
Fishing,
Catch,
Ecosystems, Parties, Financial, Human,
Scientific, Technical, Planning.

4.3.3 NBSAPs and the 4th National Report for Africa
Table 15c: Context in which the word capacity is used – Africa
Country
Kenya

NBSAPs
Institutional,
Linkages,
Law
enforcement agencies, Collaboration
& Networking, Coordination, Kenya
Wildlife Service, Programs, Training,
Bioprospecting,
National,
Biotechnology,
Community,
Technology Transfer

South
Africa

Institutional,
Constraints,
Local
governments, Research, Universities,
Councils,
Institutions,
Adaptive,
Agencies, Community empowerment,
Ecosystems, Management, Climate
change, Financial, Local level, Staff
Retention, Data, Human, Planning,
Partnerships, Habitats, Economic,
Environmental, NGOs, Assessment,
Implementation, Programs, CBOs,
HIV/AIDS,
Funding,
Programs,
Trans-boundary, Carrying capacity,
Negotiations, Biotechnology, GMOs,
Monitoring and Risk Assessment,
Technology, PA Networks, Biosafety
Management, Protected Areas, Local
communities,
Funding,
Law
enforcement, Legal, Institutional

D R Congo

Ghana

Community
participation,
Management, Carrying capacity,
Akosombo dam, Scientific data,
Information, Institutions, National &
Local levels, Assessment, Human
capacity, Fire prevention and control.
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4th National Reports
Planning, financial, human, scientific,
Technology transfer, National, Institutional,
Managers, Support to fisheries, wildlife and
birds, Capacity Building, Community,
stakeholders, local resources, Poverty,
Coordination, Funding, Land degradation,
Education,
Research,
Assessment,
Implementation gaps, Information, storage
and retrieval, Law enforcement agencies,
National ICT, Taxonomic works and
surveys, NGOs and CBOs, Gene banks,
Ecosystems, Parties
Human, Capacity building, Lack of capacity,
Enforcement,
Research,
Monitoring,
National, Programs, Municipalities, Local,
Planning, Protected area systems, Future
priorities,
Compromised ecosystems, Climate Change,
Flooding, Water quality, Institutional,
Legislation,
Agencies,
Compliance
monitoring, Uneven capacities, Resources,
Stakeholders,
Mainstreaming,
Parties,
Cartagena Protocol, Overcoming constraints

Low skills, production, Financial, Technical
support, Carrying capacity, National,
Institutional,
Capacity
building,
Management, Gaps – management structures
and individuals, Implementation, Technical,
Climate Change, Biosafety, Communication,
CHMs,
Poverty,
Internal
Revenues,
Financial, Assessments, Internal wars and
Cartagena Protocol.
Inadequate management, GIS, CERGIS,
Building/Strengthening institutions, Capacity
building, Financial support from DCs,
Carrying capacity, management, Ecosystems,
Parties, Cartagena Protocol, National-Level,
Technical/Scientific Cooperation, Training,
Planning, Protected areas, Knowledge &
Skills, Participation of Local/Indigenous
communities, Fringe communities, District
Assemblies, Agricultural Production, Land
Management.

4.3.4 NBSAPs and the 4th National Report for Asia
Table 15d: Context in which the word capacity is used – Asia
Country
India

NBSAPs
Institutional, National, Human, Strengthen,
Grassroots level, On-job training, Invasive
Alien Species, Climate Change, Financial
Assistance, Natural regeneration of rivers,
Monitoring,
Enforcement,
Taxonomy,
Biosystems, New technologies, Local,
Carrying capacity, New generation of
taxonomists, Awareness, Biotechnological,
Production,
Scientific
Management,
Conservation, Risk Assessment, Genetically
Modified
Organisms,
Biosafety,
Communication, Manpower, Infrastructure,
Implementation

Jordan

Institutional,
Productive,
Ecological,
Carrying
capacity,
Bio-transformation,
Tolerance to environmental stress, Law
enforcement, Cooperation, Management,
Local ecologists, Information, Data, Wildlife
Reserves, Local communities, Authorities,
Coordination, Technical, Staff, Monitoring,
Animal care, Ecosystems, Infrastructure and
services,
Development,
Rangelands,
Economic valuation, Technical training,
Agencies, Funding, Implementation, Microbiology, Land-use practices, Safe & healthy
foods, Local species, Stakeholders
Institutional, Implementation, Management,
Institutions, Carrying capacity, Effect of
salinity on animals, Ground water, Pollution,
Education, Communication, National, Local,
Timber industry, Forest management,
Overexploitation, Data, Technical, Natural
resources, Economic growth, Laws &
regulations,
Negotiation,
Awareness,
Compliance, Fundraising, Partnerships
Food production, Ecosystem resilience,
Finite capacity, Human activities, Individual
&
Collective,
Productive,
Survival,
Underlying capacity, Earth’s capacity,
Climate Change, National biodiversity
accounting, Local, Territorial, Regional,
Private sector, Indigenous engagement,
Emissions accounting, NAILSMAN, Land
management, Back-on-Track, Corporate
planning, Land use planning, Community

Indonesia

Australia
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4th National Reports
Gaps, Constraints, National, Regional, Local,
Communities, Capacity building, Microenterprise, Self-help groups, Biosafety,
Education,
Awareness,
Coordination,
Institutional, Legal Framework, Risk
evaluation/management,
Evaluations,
Taxonomic, Ecosystems, Financial, Human,
Scientific,
Technical,
Implementation,
Planning, Management, Protected Areas,
Regulations, Inter-Ministerial, Online data
base, New Technologies, Genetically
Modified Foods, Enabling policy &
Legislation, Partnerships and Stakeholders,
Local people, Center for excellence in
Madras, Coastal systems, Farmers,
National, Communication, Administrative,
Biological,
Technical,
Financial,
Universities, Carrying capacity, Planning,
Environmental, Institutional, Knowledge
management,
Development
programs,
Awareness, Local conditions/communities,
Decision making, NGOs & CBOs, Capacity
building, Taxonomic research, Production,
Local
civil
society
organizations,
Networking,
Climate
change,
Implementation, Education and training,
Resource mobilization.
Capacity constraints, Sectoral programs,
Planning, Carrying capacity, exceeded
capacities, capacity building, Institutional,
Communication, NGOs, Local governments,
Negotiations,
Fundraising,
National,
Indigenous,
Local
communities,
Management,
Ecosystems,
Financial,
Human, Technical, Assessments, Valuation,
Forest rangers, Implementation, Parties.
Gaps in policy research, Corals destruction,
Land managers, Finite capacity, Capacity
building, Nature vegetation cover, Loss of
taxonomic workforce, NGOs, Asia-Pacific
forestry funding, Workshops, Technology
transfer, Maritime Surveillance, Protecting
Maritime Resources, Adaptive, Ecosystems,
Financing, Parties, Human, Scientific
cooperation, Short of skills, Assessments,
Implementation, Community engagement.

Networks, Program, Ecological knowledge,
Resource degradation, Self-Regeneration.

Other key emerging themes were put together and used as criteria for evaluating
compliance and implementation at local levels. This was how the 20 criteria mentioned
earlier were established. Because actual conservation activities are done at local levels
and within sectors that exploit natural resources, it was possible to analyze what countries
are doing and what these documents were saying. Key words surrounding these emerging
themes were determined to be ideal criteria to be used to measure compliance levels at
the global, national and local levels.
4.4 Factors that most influence global compliance
Information in Table 16 represents responses from a survey conducted in the year
2013 by the ASAHI Glass Foundation where people were asked to indicate which factors
they thought most influence compliance and implementation. Before zooming into
specific factors in individual countries that are being examined in this study, a global
analysis has been done to see where and how the sampled countries under study share an
understanding of overall global conservation.
Table 16: Factors that most influence compliance and implementation
Factors

Western
Europe
19

Eastern
Europe
23

107

Latin
Africa Middle
America
East
34
36
33

74

69

409

76

73

56

Global economic system

74

69

241

63

39

44

Problems in decision making
Systems
Governance problems

47

62

261

51

58

56

58

46

246

51

64

78

Lack of technical resources

5

4

124

7

18

33

Problems in communicating
Information
Pursuit of economic Profit

150

Asia

Total

277

273

1388

282

288

300

Source: ASAHI Glass Foundation, 2012

Since 1992, the AGF has been conducting global research on environmental
conservation. In 2013, the AGF sent out questionnaires to key conservation
organizations, research universities and governments, and asked staff to rank issues that
they thought were key impediments to environmental conservation in general. The way
the language in the research was framed fits very well with the questions that are guiding
this study. As can be seen from table 16, in Western Europe, 19 people said
communication was a critical factor. There were 74 people that said it was the pursuit of
economic profit by private and public sector institutions. Also 74 people said it was the
global economic systems, such as the measure of development using GDP, which tend to
exclude many other aspects of development, such as the quality of our environment.
There were 47 people that said it was decision making systems that were key
impediments to compliance and implementation of conservation goals. What the decision
making systems here means is who actually has the most power to influence what
governments do. At the moment, powerful political, businesses and other private
organizational interests wield more power and tend to influence decisions away from
favoring environmental concerns.
Governance problems were also highlighted as critical factors by 58 people.
Governance here covered many factors, such as the slow response by countries in
fulfilling their commitments to conservation, political priorities and transparency in
decision making by various organs of government, and the public and private sectors.
Only five people cited lack of technical resources as a critical factor impeding
implementation. Issues highlighted in this question were technologies that would help to
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reduce overconsumption of resources including energy. Western Europe is comprised of
the world’s most developed nations that are well endowed technologically and therefore
this view cannot apply to most of the countries.
The same explanations apply to Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America and
the Middle East.
4.4.1 Factors that most influence local level implementation
Table 17 below shows the relationship between compliance and various primary
variables. Using data from the Global Footprint Network, the following linear regression
were obtained for sixteen countries. The dependent variable was the average biological
capacity of all the sixteen countries. It was assumed that there is a direct relationship
between biological capacity and these specific independent variables.
Except for forest resources at 5% level, all other variables have significant impact
on the biological capacity. The population, networking (meaning coordination of various
agencies), community institutions and the international community, croplands, grazing,
and levels of carbon in the atmosphere have significant effects on biological capacity.
Built-up areas, which are comprised of urbanization, constructions and road networks,
were also found highly significant.
However, biodiversity conservation cannot be classified as a linear, cause-andeffect relationship. Total activities that affect biodiversity and the total conservation
efforts interact in ways that cannot possibly be classified as linear. Conservation activities
and institutional relationships, therefore, need to be examined from the lens of a whole
system.
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Table 17: Significance of primary factors that most influence implementation
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R
Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.978
0.957
0.907
1.507
16.000

ANOVA
Df

SS

Regression
Residual
Total

8
7

351.615
15.91

15

367.52

Coefficients
Intercept
Population (Ms)
Network
Cropland
Grazing
Forest
Fish
Carbon

MS

5.726
-0.004
10.630
15.820
-6.770
-3.643
-20.251
-3.830

Standard Error
1.829
0.002
1.924
3.265
2.326
3.099
10.020
0.819

43.95
2.27

t Stat
3.131
-1.900
5.524
4.846
-2.911
-1.176
-2.021
-4.674

F

Significance F
19.34

P-value
0.017
0.099
0.001
0.002
0.023
0.278
0.083
0.002

0.00

Lower 95%
1.402
-0.008
6.080
8.100
-12.269
-10.971
-43.945
-5.767

Built-up
-83.377
13.083
-6.373
0.000
-114.312
Adjusted R squared is 91% meaning that the model is well explained by the independent variables.

Biological capacity was measured in hectares per person. Population was given in
millions; network was measured in the number of institutions and organizations that work
together. Although not so significant, a unit rise in population leads to a reduction in
biological capacity by an equivalent of 0.004 hectares per person. A unit rise of the
number of conservation networks improves biological capacity by 10.63 hectares per
person. A rise in one hectare of cropland according to this analysis improves biological
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capacity by 15.8 hectares. This was not the expected outcome. A rise by one hectare of
grazing land reduces biological capacity by 6.8 hectares per person. An equivalent of one
hectare increase in fishing grounds leads to reduced biological capacity by an equivalent
of 20 hectares of fish resources. One unit rise of carbon in the atmosphere reduces
biological capacity by about four hectares per person. One hectare increase in the land
taken up by buildings and other constructions reduces biological capacity by an
equivalent of 83 hectares per person.
4.4.2 Analysis of compliance levels
It is important to note that national compliance is not only a reflection of the
strength of conservation policies and quality of conservation programs but also the
readiness of local institutions. How ready and able local institutions are, depends on
information dissemination, enforcement of conservation policies, training, incentives and
perceived costs associated with such programs. It requires guidelines, education and long
term multilevel strategies to build local capacities. Finally, program developers should
get involved on a continuing basis to identify key attributes of a conservation program
that gives best outcomes at minimum costs.
There are two national approaches to compliance: (i) countries comply because it
is appropriate to do so and (ii) countries comply just to be seen doing good without
actually fulfilling the requirements of a treaty (Hathaway, 2005). National compliance
outcomes include creation of national and local institutions, changes in community’s way
of viewing biological resources, improved communication and collaboration, and
emergence of epistemic communities. Adoption of a treaty without fulfilling its
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requirements may come about from lack of capacity, lack of political willingness, or
because other issues are given higher priorities.
4.4.3 Compliance outcomes
The estimates of compliance were analyzed from the data obtained from the
NBSAPS and National Reports. Data on local level compliance and implementation was
expected to be obtained from National Clearing House Mechanisms (NCHMs) in each
country. Countries have not developed NCHMs to serve the coordination and information
sharing with all sectors and different stakeholders. There was, therefore, no data in the
NCHMs to serve this need. Consequently, data from the AGF was used to estimate local
level compliance and implementation.
Data obtained from AGF was constructed from the Likert scale statements that
covered all aspects of local level implementation. These aspects of local implementation
included communication, decision making, societal values, traditions, economic vs
environmental considerations and

priorities of biological resources. The percentage

number of respondents, who held the view that implementation at local levels was going
on well and that it was above a certain threshold level, was used as a measure of local
compliance.
Table 18 below shows average compliance across specific compliance criteria as
well as local level compliance. National compliance based 15 of the 20 criteria
established from data obtained from the NBSAPs and national reports were 56%. These
15 criteria were selected as they were very similar to the AGF responses used in

155

estimating local compliance. This was done for comparison purposes to see the difference
between national and local compliance.
These were statements that disagreed that there were problems with local
implementation and have been re-stated in table 18 to fit the exact views of respondents.
Table 18: National and local compliance
CBD – Information from
documents
National Biodiversity
Strategy Action Plans
National Reports
Clearing House Mechanisms
The nature and type of
language used by plans

Compliance
level
31
79
81
51

National Capacity

53

Local capacity

53

Surveys, data and local
studies
Depth & Scope of plans and
reports
Goals set by countries in their
plans
Objectives – How realistic are
the objectives
Institutions created to protect
biodiversity protection

40
61
62
66

AGF Data – Information from
survey data
Ability to comprehend
information
Adequate Information
Education and training
Consideration of future
generations
Balanced economics and
Environmental Decision
National Decisions reflecting
local conditions

Compliance
Level

Societal and Cultural practices
Organizational and institutional
reforms
Acceptance in changes to
national policies

10
10

Coordination

12

61

Sustainable lifestyles
Ability to recognize
Funding allocations
46
environmental conditions
Legislation that biodiversity
Making decisions that equally
51
protection
support conservation
Willingness to conserve
Clear timelines in the plans
49
biodiversity freely
Total
784
Total
Average
56%
Average
Overall global compliance = the average of 56% + 14% = 35%
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12
18
8
18
10
6

9

32
25
12
17
199
14%

The criteria that reflect local level implementation were selected from both the
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) data as well as data from the AGF. As can be seen
from table 17 above, overall national compliance is at 35%. This confirms most of the
fears expressed in the literature that biodiversity degradation has continued to accelerate
over time. At 35% compliance means that only 35% of all activities that people do go
towards improving biodiversity protection. It also means that about 65% of all human
activities at the national level go towards both over-exploitation and degradation of
biological resources.
The next step in the analysis was to test hypothesis one by examining the level of
support and types of support indicators. Some of these indicators include decision support
mechanisms to local levels and societal priorities that either support more or less of
conservation, communication, local practices and cultural influences. Table 18 below
presents the percentages on how different respondents agreed to or disagreed to the given
statements.
It is clear from table 18 above that 79% of the respondents feel that other national
interests take precedence over conservation. About 83% felt that individuals make
decisions based on immediate benefits that are often not about the protection of
biological resources. It was also found from the respondents that there is more priority
given to other societal needs, communication is not well targeted and that decisions are
made to satisfy immediate needs and not long-term conservation objectives.
On average, about 73% of these respondents in table 18 were of the opinion that
all the 17 statements on the table support less conservation but support other activities
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more. Compliance has been estimated to be at 35% in table 18. This confirms the first
hypothesis that International and national conservation initiatives fall short of
conservation outcomes, and because of inadequate support to local institutions where
actual implementation takes place, global compliance with CBD goals is low.
Table 19: Confirmation of hypothesis one
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Statements
Other National interests often take precedence over
environmental conservation
Individual make decisions based on immediate benefits
Easily comprehensible information is not communicated from
conservation experts to the public
Environmental experts focus communication of information too
heavily upon political decision makers, failing to reach the public
Political decision makers do not communicate information from
environmental experts to the public
Public does not value the information provided by environmental
experts unless disaster occurs in their vicinity
Non-profit organizations overemphasize Communications efforts
on political decision makers
Minimum environmental education level is necessary for
understanding of environmental information but is lacking
The economic profits of a corporation/organization/regions are
prioritized so much that environmental considerations are not
taken into account
Absence of reference towards natural and different life forms
Societal and cultural practices and bases that place importance on
“common good,” like environment, are lacking or fragile.
Societal practices and traditions that value the weak, including
environment, are few and far between.
At most, people have capacity to recognize environmental
conditions and effects on local level, but are incapable of
recognizing problems globally
Human decision-making process is based on self-preservation; it
does not consider happiness of others or of future generations
Human nature to care for others is overwhelmed by behavioral
principles based on economic considerations
The value systems that respect one’s own environment and daily
economic activities are inconsistent with each other
Current lifestyles based on large consumption of energy cannot
be abandoned
Average
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Disagree
13

Agree
79

12
12

83
80

26

53

9

80

15

77

17

50

8

79

15

80

13
10

74
81

15

65

25

61

18

64

12

77

11

74

32

76

16%

73%

Table 19 above shows the percentage of people that disagreed and that agreed that
existing local conservation efforts cannot drive compliance to higher levels. The
percentage of people that think local initiatives are good were only 16%. A total of 1009
people responded to these statements. The 16% level does really drive down compliance
level when an average is estimated with the national and CBD levels.
Table 20: Overall global compliance by all countries
Paper
Compliance
%

Policy
Compliance
%

Canada
Mexico
Jamaica
Brazil

67
67
67
73

86
46
48
49

UK

80

77

Switzerland
Netherland

67
67

75
72

Poland

80

34

Ghana
DR Congo
Kenya

60
73
33

30
24
23

S. Africa

40

36

India

73

54

Indonesia
Jordan
Australia
Total %
Global
Compliance

73
27
73

40
29
75

Average 63.75

Average 49.88

Countries

AGF Data
Ability to comprehend information
Adequate information
Education and training
Consider future generations
Balanced economics and
environment
Decisions reflecting local
conditions
Societal and cultural practices
Organizational and institutional
reforms
Acceptance to changes brought by
national policies
Coordination
Sustainable lifestyles
Ability to recognize environmental
conditions
Making decisions that support
conservation
Willingness to conserve
biodiversity freely
Total

Local
compliance
%
12
18
8
18
10
6
10
10
9
12
32
25
12
17
199

Average
14%
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The Table 20 above shows compliance levels for each country at paper, policy
and local levels. The average paper compliance is 63.75%, policy compliance is 49.88%
and local implementation is compliant at a mere 14%.
The paper compliance column represents the percentage level that each country
has met with the CBD requirements. The UK and Poland had the highest compliance at
80%. What this means is that they have submitted more reports and revised their
NBSAPs more than other countries. Jordan had the lowest compliance at 27%, followed
by Kenya at 33% and South Africa at 40%. These countries have made minimum
revisions to their NBSAPs and submitted the least number of reports. On average,
international compliance is about 64%.
The Policy compliance column was estimated using the 20 criteria that were
established from the literature, plans and national reports.

Canada had the highest

compliance at 86% and Kenya was lowest at 23%. Nationally, the average compliance
was about 50% when looking at policy alone.
Country compliance column is the average of paper and policy compliance. The
global compliance without local level implementation was 57%. Compliance data on
local level implementation is missing from Table 20 above Local level compliance was
estimated separately using data from AGF. This data contained responses to a 5-point
Likert scale questionnaire. where people were to either a Local level compliance has been
analyzed using organizational and stakeholder cooperation and implementation strategies
using game theory.
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Table 21 below presents some of the critical factors that influence the
management and implementation of biodiversity goals. These factors were scored
between zero and 100%. Columns one, two and three show the percentage performance
of each country based on the number of NBSAPs and National Reports submitted to the
CBD and the creation of National Clearing House Mechanisms. Columns four through 15
are part of the 20 criteria used to evaluate compliance by countries. Only 11 out of the 20
criteria have been used here, first because of space and secondly, these 11 are the core
variables that influence compliance and guide implementation.
The columns show the average compliance level by each factor for all countries.
The bottom row presents average compliance by each factor. The rows show the average
compliance for each country across various factors. The last right column presents the
average compliance by each country. Overall compliance by these countries measures up
to only 49%. Based on these factors, Canada had the highest compliance at 70%. United
Kingdom and Australia had compliance with CBD goals at 67%. Kenya, Jordan and
Democratic Republic of Congo had the least compliance at 31%, 33% and 33%
respectively. With respect to individual factors, the NBSAPs that are supposed to be the
roadmap for compliance and implementation comply only up to 31%. Surveys and data
collection activities comply at only 40%, funding at 46% and setting timelines at 49%.
Compliance based on paper and policy levels does not really tell the whole story.
It is therefore necessary to find ways of analyzing local level implementation to be able
to present a true reflection of actual compliance level.
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Table 21: Compliance level by 15 out of the 20 criteria
1

2

3

4
Lang

5
Nationl
Capac

6
Local
capac

NBSAP

Reports

CHM

Canada

20

80

100

80

75

Mexico

20

80

100

30

Jamaicaa

20

80

100

Brazil

40

80

UK

60

80

Countries

7
Surve

8
Depth
Scope

9

10

11

12

13

14

Goal

Objectiv

Institutn

Fund

Legisla

Timing

15
Comp
level

80

80

100

100

100

90

70

80

60

70

40

40

60

60

40

60

60

40

40

30

44

40

40

50

60

80

70

75

50

40

50

70

52

100

40

50

60

40

50

60

40

60

40

70

30

48

100

80

80

80

70

70

75

80

90

80

70

60

67

Switzerland

40

60

100

80

80

80

20

80

80

75

70

60

80

90

62

Netherlands

20

80

100

80

70

80

0

60

80

80

80

80

30

80

58

Poland

40

100

100

30

30

30

0

30

60

80

30

40

40

30

40

Ghana

20

60

100

20

40

40

40

20

50

30

40

40

20

40

35

DR Congo

40

80

100

20

20

20

20

30

40

40

50

20

20

20

33

Kenya

20

80

0

30

50

30

40

40

50

60

40

20

20

20

31

S. Africa

20

100

0

40

40

50

30

60

60

80

60

50

60

40

43

India

40

80

100

70

70

60

80

80

70

60

80

20

80

80

61

Indonesia

40

80

100

60

40

30

30

60

40

60

50

30

30

30

43

Jordan

20

60

0

40

40

40

30

70

40

60

40

20

40

20

33

Australia
Compl
level

40

80

100

80

80

80

40

80

75

80

80

90

90

80

67

31

79

81

51

53

53

40

61

62

66

61

46

51

49

49

Source: Calculations estimated using information from NBSAPs, National Country Reports, and Clearing House Mechanisms

The criteria where a country has highest compliance was assumed also to be an area of the highest strength and therefore its best
strategy in a cooperative game.
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4.5 International relations theory analysis
Goldsmith and Posner (2005) argue that international theory is designed to
support states in pursing their own interests on the international stage. Many international
treaties also treat all countries as equals when in reality they are not. This is clearly
demonstrated in Table 21 above where compliance levels by each country across various
criteria are so different. Governments are unwilling to commit to international treaties
when doing so does not serve national interests.
National implementation and compliance is a total whole of conservation
activities taking place at local levels within a country. This also includes how well
countries are performing at a continuum from planning through capacity building to
monitoring and evaluation at national levels. In this continuum is the rest of all other
criterion used to measure compliance in my study. For international relations theories to
effectively be seen to coordinate governments, they must be able to internally coordinate
national activities to satisfy global interest. This is not practically and politically feasible.
My study examined the effectiveness of the international relations theory by using
compliance levels in Table 21 above. These compliance levels can be viewed as issues of
global concern and therefore provide excellent case studies on how countries make
decisions on what qualifies for support from outside of the country. The following
assumptions were made in order to establish international working relationships between
countries
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1. Compliance levels established through scores given to each criterion shows the
level of conservations support needs for each criteria.
2. When governments cooperate, they should support each other in areas where they
both have highest compliance so that the overall average compliance remains
high.
For explanation purposes, compliance levels on national capacities (NC), local
capacities (LC), funding levels within each country (FG), and the strength of
environmental legislation (LN) were selected to compare the UK and Brazil. The same
explanations can apply to the rest of the sample of countries.
Figure 5. United Kingdom and Brazil cooperative relationship

UK

NC
LC
FG
LN

NC
80, 50
80, 50
80, 50
70, 50

Brazil
LC
FG
80, 60
80, 40
80, 60
80, 40
80, 60
80, 40
70, 60
70, 40

LN
80, 70
80, 70
80, 70
70, 70

Suppose the UK and Brazil decide to cooperate in the management and
implementation of key initiatives to help the two countries move to higher compliance.
Except legislation (LN), the UK has higher compliance in national capacities (NC), local
capacities (LC) and funding capacities (FG) than Brazil. If Brazil, therefore, were to
approach the UK and ask for support, it will most likely ask to be supported financially
(FG). This is the strategy where it has the lowest compliance at 40% and therefore stands
to gain the most. On the other hand, if the UK were to approach Brazil and ask to support
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Brazil’s conservation efforts, it will most likely want to support local capacity, which is
at 60%, because this is where the UK will incur the least cost/effort. If the two countries
were to be brought together by a third party and asked to cooperate, they may want to
negotiate and settle at a strategy where the UK does not spend too much, and where
Brazil does not benefit too little. They may go through a negotiation process and arrive at
a consensus where the UK most likely agrees to support Brazil’s national capacity, which
is at 50%.

This shows how each country’s national interests influence international

relations.
The expected outcomes from these relationships were as follows: (1) If the UK is
to agree to support Brazil by funding its conservation activities, average compliance
between the two countries will be 60% (average of 80% + 40%). (2) If the UK agrees to
support Brazil’s local capacity building efforts, average compliance will be 70% (average
of 80% + 60%). (3) If the UK agrees to support national capacity building efforts through
negotiation, average compliance will be 65% (average of 80% + 50%).
In biodiversity conservation, the aim is basically to try to minimize relationships
that lead to the lowest compliance. The strategy that would lead to a higher compliance
is if the UK supported local capacity building efforts. As currently structured,
international relations theories have no way of guiding countries to settle for best
outcomes from a relationship. In addition, governments never go through what I call selfevaluation to establish and rank national needs so that a targeted support is possible.
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4.5.1 Game theory analysis
Game theory helps to explain the conflicting interests in biodiversity protection
from an organization’s perspective in more practical ways. In any type of work, there are
the two expected outcomes: successful implementation of programs or failed program
implementation. Success or failure is a relative measure of an outcome which, in the
context of biodiversity protection, is heavily influenced by stakeholder interests. Both
success and failure help to identify strategies with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium,
meaning a situation where conservation is less than optimal. A Pareto-optimal situation is
one where it is not possible to improve the condition of one player without making
another player worse-off (Villasante & Sumaila, 2010).
For biodiversity protection, all countries should, therefore, develop policy
mechanisms and strategies to move compliance towards closer to optimal levels,
otherwise known as Pareto-efficient outcomes. Nash equilibrium is the optimal outcome,
such that no player can do better by unilaterally deviating from the current course of
action or strategy (Frank & Sarkar, 2010). To be able to put implementers and donors of
biodiversity protection in the context of a game, they are also referred to here as players.
4.5.2 Analysis of conservation in game theory
My study presents a simple two-agent type of relationship between an
implementer (country, agency, organization or local institution) of CBD goals and a
donor (another country, national government supporting local levels, or an international
organization). Under game theory, implementation of biodiversity protection strategies
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can take the form of either cooperative or non-cooperative strategies. Cooperative games
exist when players have a collective common interest on the outcomes of a game. With
proper negotiations and consensus building, cooperative strategies bring about more
efficient outcomes. Non-cooperative games, also known as competitive games, exist
where players are entirely motivated by self-interest gains (Villasanet & Sumaila, 2010).
Non-cooperative game strategies lead to inefficient outcomes.
A modified two-agent, game-theoretic analysis approach used by Frank and
Sarkar (2010) was used to construct conservation strategies in Figure 6 below. Figure 6
also includes the structure of prisoner’s dilemma in game theory. “I” represents strategies
of implementers on the rows, while “F” represents strategies of donors on the columns.
“I” stands for implement (cooperate), while “–I” stands for does not implement (defect).
As for the columns, “F” stands for fund (cooperate), and “–F” stands for does not fund
(defect). The letter “B” stand for the benefits gained from using biodiversity, “S” stands
for the subsidies (funds) given to support biodiversity protection and “α” represents the
fraction of benefits to the society after implementing a conservation program. The first
entry in Figure 6 is for donors (F), and the second entry is for implementers (I).
Figure 6: Two conservation players with prisoner’s dilemma

Donor or
Country

CBD Implementers

Fund (F)
Does not Fund (n – F)

Implement (I)

Does not Implement ( – I)

(i) (B – S), (αB + S)

(ii) (–B – S), (B + S)

(iii) B, αB

(iv) –B, B

I , –I = implement, not implement, F, –F = Fund or not fund
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0 ≤ α ≤. Where α = fraction of benefits remaining after implementation.
Expected outcomes:
i.

The Fund and Implement (F, I) strategy leads to an outcome where donors
benefit because their funding is used in conservation, but their financial
resources are reduced by (–S). The amount that donors use in this case is
equivalent to foregone benefits by the community who implement
conservation activities. This can be classified as compensation to local levels.
Implementers overall benefits are equal to the total of the fraction of benefits
received from biodiversity after implementation (αB) and the compensation
received from donors (+S). This shows a cooperative situation where both
stakeholders benefit.

ii.

The Fund and does not implement (F, –I) strategy is a situation where donors
give funding but implementation is not done. Donors, therefore, lose
financially (–B) by compensating (–S) to implementers for a service not
delivered. Implementers benefit from full use on biodiversity (B) as well as
compensation (+S) from donors. This is the worst outcome for donors but
very good for implementers, especially if they do not care about conservation.

iii.

The does not Fund and Implement (–F, I) strategy arises when donors fail to
provide funding, but implementation is still done. Donors benefit by B, as
implementation is effected without funding. Implementers lose out on the
benefits from biodiversity as they have access to only a fraction (αB) after
implementation. This is the best outcome for donors, but it is bad for
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implementers because their benefits of biodiversity are reduced with no
compensation.
iv.

Does not fund and does not implement (–F, –I) is a strategic combination
when donors give no funding and implementers do not implement
conservation policies. From the eyes of the CBD, biodiversity continues to be
depleted (–B) while implementers enjoy the full benefits of biodiversity (B).
This is the situation Frank and Sarkar (2010) describe as the prisoner’s
dilemma. Most biodiversity conservation activities can be classified under
prisoner’s dilemma.

4.5.3 The Prisoner’s Dilemma in conservation
Prisoner’s dilemma arises when both implementers and donors decide that their
individual interests are more important than the collective responsibility of protecting
biodiversity. Donors are better off not spending their money to reduce overconsumption,
while implementers are also better of using more of biodiversity. The benefits of
biodiversity to the whole society are well understood, but often times donors find it either
expensive or not in their immediate interest to support other countries or regions that are
rich in these resources. On the other hand, when local regions find that the costs of
conservation are higher than the immediate benefits, they will not implement
conservation activities. Both donors and implementers, therefore, have an incentive to
free-ride.
From Figure 6 above, the most favorable outcomes for implementers is not
implement (– I) while donors go ahead and fund (F). As for donors, their most favorable
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outcome is implementers implement (I) and they (donors) withhold their funding (–F).
When, B ˃ S, there are more biodiversity benefits to the society than the cost of
implementation. At the same time, when the society feels they are better off to not
implement conservation programs, –I strategy is better than I strategy; donors need to
cooperate with implementers. Also, if (B + S) ˃ (αB + S), benefits after implementation
are lower and, therefore, donors and implementers need to cooperate. However, when B
˃ αB, implementers will defect. For the donor country, –F is superior or individually
rational whether the implementing country implements CBD [B ˃ –B – S] or not [–B ˃ (–
B – S)].
Assumptions
1. αB + S ˃ B
2. S ˃ (1 – α)B
The key question is: why do countries end up with low compliance due to nonimplementation of CBD goals even in the presence of donor support? The answer
depends on the type of cooperation between countries and the payoff structure.
Application of game theory helps to navigate through both the thinking and the nature of
self-interest that countries have on the use of biodiversity. Implementing countries find
non-compliance more rational in their self-interest irrespective of what donor countries
can do, leading to low compliance. However, if the two countries collectively strive for
cooperation through negotiation and compensation, the outcome will be Pareto-efficient.
This need to be supported with a situation where donor funds are greater than the
opportunity costs of conservation, such as when S ˃ (1 – α)B. reword
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Finally, support to conservation activities globally falls far below conservation
needs. At the same time, local communities and institutions have none or limited
alternatives to their basic needs. Systems theory was therefore deigned going forward to
try and analyze specific country and organizational capacities to provide solutions to the
prisoner’s dilemma.
4.6 Systems theory
Although the United Nations (UN) has delegated policy-making and
implementation of biodiversity goals to governments, international conservation
organizations are leading governments in conservation programs internally. Borrowing
from the “representative bureaucracy” theory, international organization’s power to mold
national governments to be more responsive to implementation of biodiversity protection
programs is an important consideration. The need to understand government capacities in
all aspects of biodiversity protection in order to address the weaknesses specifically, and
strengthen the high capacity areas, is likely to improve implementation and lead to higher
overall compliance. On the other hand, governments also should have access to the
decision making processes of conservation organizations, as this is likely to lead to some
forms of trust, socialization experiences that easily shape others’ values, and would
facilitate collective decision making.
In order to define the most efficient form of collaboration between governments
and conservation institutions, it is necessary to know the least complied parts of
conservation as this is where more effort is needed. Capacities can only be seen from the
level of success or failure in performing specific tasks. By focusing on capacities that
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governments have on one hand and how conservation organizations can improve them
produces more efficient outcomes.
4.6.1 Governments and NGOs collaboration outcomes
The next major question examined is the extent that nonprofits and international
organizations work with governments in the implementation of biodiversity protection
policies. To explain collaboration outcomes based on compliance levels, international
organizations’ conservation strategies in the most biodiversity rich countries were
examined to find their main focus and priorities in these countries. This was done to
establish how international organizations’ missions, values and goals are both aligned to
improve the weakest policies of countries as well as provide a roadmap for countries to
inform conservation initiatives in individual countries.
There are three approaches to implementation here: (i) international organizations
draw agreements with governments that allow them to implement conservation programs
on their own; (ii) international organizations identify the problem and ask governments to
find ways of implementing policies that would remove the problem; (iii) organizations
create a partnership with governments and implement conservation programs jointly. The
first two approaches are the most popular, and this is where the problem lies. Without
direct partnerships and collaboration with governments, it is extremely difficult to see
weaknesses in governments and therefore be able to give support to address those
specific weaknesses. The organizations that were found to have the greatest capacities
and currently working in most of the sampled countries were: World Wildlife Fund
(WWF), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Conservation
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International (CI), and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). Activities
of these organizations were therefore evaluated against the weaknesses identified in
governments with highest biodiversity hotspot regions.
Many organizations often come together, discuss, and go away hoping that what
has been agreed upon will be implemented without discussing the process. In this
process, the key to successful implementation is the nature of the contract that establishes
relationships between various organizations. Contracts between conservation institutions
should have both short and long-tern solutions because that is how conservation problems
arise.
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Table 22a: Government and NGOs collaboration in the DRC
Areas of lowest conservation
compliance

Problems: Low quality of the NBSAPs
given the vague and non-committal
language. The timelines for all the goals
and objectives is not specified. In
addition the goals and objectives as
stated do not adequately address the
conservation challenges. The depth of
NBSAPs is rather shallow and their
scope fails to cover all critical and
underlying conservation barriers. The
desired conservation outcomes have not
been clearly established.
The National capacities – institutional,
scientific and social are low. There are
no
adequately
trained
local
conservationist personnel. Coordination
of conservation activities across sectors
and jurisdictions is weak and national
support to local level institutions of
does not exist. Local reports do not
exist in the NCHM. Public-private
partnerships are very weak.

Key focus areas by Conservation Organization
World Wildlife Fund

International Union for
Conservation of Nature

Conservation International

Problems identified include:
Poaching, very little research
in this region, logging
concessions, hunting, river
pollution and sedimentation,
land degradation, erosion and
desertification.

Problems: Illegal bushmeat trade
and habitat degradation, political
instability, widespread poverty,
wildlife poaching, deforestation,
mining, poor water quality,
agriculture and logging. There are
no
adequate
environmental
institutions, no adequate funding
for conservation, government is
not able to enforce environmental
laws, big gap between legislation
and
practice.
Missing
mechanisms
to
coordinate
cooperation between various
sectors,

Problems: Habitat destruction,
conversion of forest lands to
agriculture, and pastures, fuelwood, unsustainable logging,
great dependence on natural
resources by communities,

WWF has focused on:
reducing illegal offtake of
wildlife, partnering for new,
effective and sustainable
protected
areas,
Advancement
of
green
economy
and
building
durable
mechanisms
to
conserve biodiversity, and
that forests and carbon.

Assessment of at risk species of
both plants and animals, assisting
with the development of Ape
conservation plans, and works in
close collaboration with ministry
of
environment,
nature
conservation
&
tourism.
Conducting studies to identify
critical threats to gorillas,
chimpanzees and their habitats.
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Conservation International has
developed partnerships with
local communities to improve
human
well-being
while
conserving natural resources,
design strategies to mitigate
causes of forest loss, identify
main agents and drivers of
deforestation.
Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (REDD),

Table 22b: Government and NGOs collaboration in Indonesia
Areas of lowest conservation
compliance

Key focus areas by Conservation Organization
World Wildlife Fund

International Union for
Conservation of Nature

Conservation International

Both national and local institutions
are weak. Capacity building activities
are not well targeted and are not
adequate. The country does not
conduct enough surveys, research
and data collection activities. The
goals and objectives developed in the
plan documents are not deep enough
to tackle the underlying conservation
barriers and are also not broad
enough to address all biodiversity
resources. Funding opportunities are
limited and funds allocated to
conservation are extremely low.

WWF's mission is to stop the degradation
of the planet's natural environment and to
build a future in which humans live in
harmony with nature. Pulp and paper
Industries and oil palm plantations are the
leading causes of rapid rates of
deforestation.

Problems
identified:
Loss
of
habitats
through deforestation,
shifting
agriculture,
livestock
grazing,
urban
development,
commercial
logging
and
industrialization
leading to reduced
forest cover, pollution
from wastes, industries,
military
and
agricultural effluents.

Problems: Over-exploitation of
marine resources, poor coastal
development, poor planning,
water pollution, air pollution, unprocessed waste from factories,
over-fishing,
global
ocean
acidification. Other problems
relate
to
deforestation,
greenhouse gas emissions.

Institutional capacity building at both
national and local levels is very low.
Coordination between local and
national
institutions
is
poor.
Legislation is weak, support to local
level institutions is weak, monitoring
and evaluation of implementation
almost
non-existent.
National
conservation institutions are not fully
developed. Local reports do not exist
at national level CHMs.

WWF has conducted studies on Palm Oil
management, Elephants protection in
collaboration with local institutions.

Public-Private Partnerships are not
strong.

WWF therefore supports sustainable
management of ecosystems and promotes
community welfare management efforts.
It has called upon the pulp and oil palm
industries to work with the government to
conserve elephant habitats.

Has facilitated the creation of smallholder
palm oil production certification program
that is geared towards the sustainable
management palm oil plantations.
Forests protection through pushing the
Asia paper & Pulp company to stop
clearing forests and peatlands to allow an
assessment of their conservation and
carbon values.
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Conservation measures
taken include: land and
water
management
techniques, restoration
of habitats and natural
processes,
implementation
of
species
recovery
programs and ex-situ
conservation.

CI has been helping local
governments
to
develop
environmental
assessments,
spatial planning, works with
public and private sectors to train
farmers to improve the quality
and quantity of agricultural
products. Assisitng farmers with
sustainable farming techniques,
educating local people to
improve
participation
in
conservation, natural resources
management, conducts public
awareness campaigns. Currently
working with public and private
sectors to implement integrated
watershed
management
to
protect forests and water supply.

Table 22c: Government NGOs collaboration in Brazil
Areas of lowest conservation
compliance

The quality of NBSAPs is low
due to non-committal language
used and lack of realistic
timelines
for
stated
conservation
activities.
Funding opportunities are both
limited and extremely low.
The National and local
institutional capacities are
weak, their coordination is
poor and national support to
local level institutions is not
good enough. There are no
strong
legislations.
The
country lacks the capacity to
carry out monitoring and
evaluation. Both reports and
national plans have no
information regarding surveys,
research and data collection.
There are no local reports and
data.

Key focus areas by Conservation Organization
World Wildlife Fund

International Union
for Conservation of
Nature

Conservation International

Problems identified as barriers to conservation are:
the lack of allied planning, weak governance
systems, and failure to comply with environmental
legislation. Others include high demand for natural
resources as a result of population growth,
alarming rate of deforestation, water pollution,
logging, mining and agricultural expansion.

IUCN
is
doing
ecological restoration
in Brazil. Helping the
government
with
establishment
of
protected
areas.
IUCN
is
also
facilitating
better
coordination between
institutions.

Problems:
Expanding
road
networks, building of dams,
deforestation, climate change,
development, and violent land
conflicts.

WWF supports the government to establish
conservation budgets of 0.5% of GDP per year,
guide private companies to follow environmental
laws and seeks innovations to help reduce use of
natural resources especially water. Expansion
investment in human resources to expand
knowledge, It conducts studies, fosters public
policies, monitoring of wild species, establishment
of ecological corridors and improvement of the
management of protected areas.
Encourages the creation and expansion of
protected areas, responsible use and sustainable
management of natural resources, promotion of
environmental and social standards, technical and
community capacities.
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CI works to protect land and
cultural traditions, strengthens
surveillance and institutional
capacities
to
indigenous
associations, provides economic
alternatives to logging, supports
logistical needs for both
surveillance and data collection.
Has created a fund to support
long-term conservation, this
fund facilitates monitoring and
land protection, development of
sustainable economic activities,
and capacity building to local
organizations.

4.6.2 Application of systems theory
Tables 22a to 22c can be better explained using the systems theory. Biodiversity
protection weaknesses that exist in governments, those identified by conservation
organizations, and how these problems are collectively or singularly addressed is a
systems driven approach. It is clear that there is no uniformity between the real
challenges found in governments and what conservation organizations want to do. For
successful implementation and improved compliance, international conservation
organizations should first try to understand government systems in the context capacities,
governance challenges, and then try to develop their programs from the positions of
governments.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, some of the key national biodiversity
protection challenges are the low quality of NBSAPs, low national capacities, few and
weak national agencies, weak legislation, and poor coordination between various sectors.
The country lacks data on biological resources, and little or no studies/surveys are being
conducted. Conservation organizations are not addressing challenges that this
government seems to face, but rather, have chosen to address direct causes of biodiversity
degradation.
Indonesia is also having problems with low national and local capacities, poor
national coordination, low quality NBSAPs, weak legislation, and not fully developed
national institutions. On the other hand, conservation organizations have focused on
conservation through emphasis on sustainable management, land and water management
techniques, restoration of habitats, environmental assessments, and integrated watersheds
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management. There is no clear systems linking conservation organizations to government
initiated programs.
Brazil is facing a systems breakdown between biodiversity protection challenges
identified at the government level and what conservation organizations are doing. The
quality of NBSAPs is low, there is limited and insufficient funding to support
biodiversity protection, there is poor inter-agency coordination, there is no data, and very
little support to local level institutions. Conservation organizations are trying to institute
allied planning, asking the government to allocate funding to natural resources protection,
investing in human resources to educate and raise awareness, and asking private
companies to follow environmental laws. These organizations are also conducting
ecological restoration activities, helping establish more protected areas, and protecting
land and cultural traditions.
It was clear from this analysis that the exact nature of conservation problems that
arise within governments, communities and conservation organizations can be viewed as
autonomous independent systems. For better management of conservation problems, a
concerted action that brings all these efforts together to develop a whole system, rather
than separate systems, would lead to better implementation and higher compliance. As
can be seen from these tables, conservation problems identified within government are
different from what conservation organizations want to address. Protecting biological
resources requires a multi-dimensional relationship on the basis of a shared
understanding of the nature of specific problems and the meaning of policies designed to
address such problems. This confirms the third hypothesis because the approaches taken
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by various stakeholders toward conservation are different, and interpretation is different,
thus leading to low compliance with CBD goals.
Organizations are best managed when they are viewed as a form of information
network – with the flow of information providing decision makers at varying
management levels with information needed to make decisions of all types (Mockler,
1968). Development of systems in management is viewed as one way that efficiently
meets the demands on public institutions, lowers administrative costs and improves
service delivery (Myeong & Choi, 2010). Public institutions use systems approach to
reduce uncertainty and ambiguity about goals and cause-effect relationships during the
time of implementation. The CBD needs to find ways that link conservation efforts by all
stakeholders in biodiversity protection to improve efficiency and avoid duplication.
Management of biological resources is a complex process of balancing immediate
benefits with long-term conservation goals and political priorities (Wang, 2004).
Generation of relevant information and data sharing is crucial to reaching an optimal
balance of various stakeholder interests (Simon, 1977). Systems theory helps to find
answers to questions on how globally designed biodiversity protection programs fit into
the needs of local situations, as well as effective relationships between global and local
institutions (Deming, 1986). The purpose of an institution according to the living systems
theory is to reach a desired steady state where institutions are effective and their existence
to continue to meet specified goals is guaranteed (Wang, 2004).
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4.7 Local level implementation
My study relied on secondary global data gathered by AGF to help examine local
compliance and implementation. The data was constructed on a 5-point Likert scale
starting with “A” strongly disagree, “C” I do not know, and “E” strongly agree with
various statements relating to local level compliance. The AGF (2012) notes that there
are communication problems, and therefore, conditions of the global environment are
poorly understood at local levels. Additional data generated from qualitative analysis and
supplemented with numerical data from Global Footprint Network was used.
Quantitative analysis is more about numbers. It is a way of trying to explore what the
numbers representing specific data are saying, and what can be concluded about such
numbers.
4.7.1 Local level compliance
In addition to the communication problems, the public needs to be educated, their
conservation capacity needs to be developed, and they need funding for local
conservation activities. This is so they can understand and be able to implement
conservation programs that either stop or begin to reverse biodiversity degradation.
Education, funding and capacity building come in the context of national government
support to local governments and institutions (Lo & Fryxel, 2005; Van Rooij & Lo,
2010). In the study conducted in Guangzhu, China, Lo et al. (2012) found out that a lack
of adequate political and administrative support by the national government at all levels
seriously undermines regulatory effectiveness and implementation at local levels.
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Table 23: Analysis of local level implementation
Responses

Rank

Easy to comprehend info info
is not communicated from
conservation experts to the
public

A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D

Conservationists focus
communication too heavily
upon political decision
makers, failing to reach the
public
Political decision makers do
not communicate information
from environmental experts to
the public
Public does not value the
information provided by
environmental experts unless
disaster occurs in their
vicinity.
Non-profit organizations
overemphasize
Communications efforts on
political decision makers.
Certain education level is
necessary for understanding
of environmental information,
and environmental education
is lacking.

Western
Europe
9
13
4
39
35
4
17
22
39
17
4
9
17
35
35
0
26
9
35
30
9
22
35
22
13
4
13
13
48
22
2
7
2
31

Eastern
Europe
0
0
17
17
50
0
17
0
50
17
17
17
0
17
50
33
17
0
50
0
0
17
33
33
17
0
0
17
33
50
0
0
4
17

Asia
7
24
31
132
100
15
68
77
76
36
3
10
63
137
77
10
22
31
138
88
5
59
107
90
27
3
34
39
111
105
6
0
6
28

Latin
America
0
7
0
43
43
0
14
14
29
36
0
14
0
21
64
0
7
14
29
50
0
14
14
50
14
0
7
21
14
57
44
61
37
147

Africa
8
8
0
17
58
8
17
8
33
25
0
0
0
58
33
0
0
8
25
58
0
8
33
33
17
0
0
8
25
58
3
0
0
16

Middle
East
6
9
6
41
36
0
33
33
33
0
0
0
0
67
33
0
0
0
67
33
0
0
33
67
0
0
0
0
33
67
0
20
0
20

The economic profits of a
corporation, organization,
or a region are prioritized so
much that environmental
considerations are not taken
E
57
75
56
206
77
60
into account.
A: Strongly disagree B: Somewhat disagree C: Neither (I don’t know) D: Somewhat agree E: Strongly
agree
Source: ASAHI Global Foundation, 2012
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Local government agencies and other local institutions may be lacking in
sufficient capacities in the form of trained manpower and financial resources, thus
making them inadequately prepared to enforce and implement desired conservation
policies. Other internal obstacles include poor coordination with other stakeholders, poor
communication, poor management practices, and conflicting objectives (Lo et al., 2012).
Table 23 above highlights problems that exist when the public does not sufficiently
understand what needs to be done, and the different levels of understanding between
politicians, policy makers and conservation organizations.
Analysis of this kind of data helps to put into perspective the relationships
between different stakeholders in conservation. This helps to strengthen areas that need
attention and identify obstacles that hinder implementation. This table also presents
specific elements of local compliance on a 5-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree”
to “Strongly Agree.”
4.7.2 Reconciling conservational initiatives from local to global levels
One of the key challenges facing the international community is the ability to tell
how individuals, communities and local governments are experiencing biodiversity
protection programs at local levels. The degree of non-compliance with the CBD goals
can therefore best be explained by an understanding of actual implementation efforts at
local and national government levels. It is at local settings that government
regulations/laws that govern the society are most felt, frameworks for political
relationships are developed and where specific policies and practices are implemented.
Priorities at these levels need to be synchronized towards satisfying “common goods”
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Any plan that promotes biodiversity protection at local levels should be developed
with the main objective of changing people’s perceptions, improving local knowledge,
and creating specific institutions to manage biological resources (Alexander, 2005). This
calls for biodiversity protection to be pursued simultaneously at three levels, global,
national/country and local levels. Involvement of local institutions and communities in
the design and program implementation is only possible if people at local levels know
what the government and conservation experts are doing.
Table 24: Perceptions on compliance and implementation at local levels
Factors/Statements

Rank

Societal and cultural
practices that place
importance on “common
good,” like environment,
are lacking or fragile.

A
B
C
D
E

Societal practices and
A
traditions that value the
B
weak, including
C
environment, are few and
D
far between.
E
At most, people have
A
capacity to recognize
B
environmental conditions
C
and effects on local level
D
but not globally.
E
Human decision-making
A
process is based on selfB
preservation and not
C
consider happiness of others D
or of future generations.
E
Human nature to care for
A
others is overwhelmed by
B
behavioral principles based C
on economic
D
considerations.
E
Source: ASAHI Global Foundation, 2012

Western
Europe
2
9
9
47
31

Eastern
Europe
0
0
6
69
25

0
11
20
47
18
7
15
13
38
25
5
13
13
45
22
0
7
11
47
33

6
0
31
31
25
6
38
0
38
13
0
6
19
44
31
0
6
19
38
38

Asia
4
44
59
209
119

Latin
America
5
0
14
52
24

Africa
5
18
0
47
32

Middle
East
0
0
0
40
60

6
67
70
190
78
19
99
72
151
96
21
79
90
187
59
12
54
62
196
98

5
10
24
48
10
0
10
19
38
29
5
19
14
33
24
10
10
5
29
43

0
32
16
16
37
0
16
11
42
32
5
16
11
26
42
0
5
11
42
42

0
0
20
80
0
0
20
20
20
40
0
0
20
60
20
0
0
0
60
40

A: Strongly disagree B: Disagree C: Neither (I don’t know) D: Agree E: Strongly agree
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Inability to engage local communities makes it difficult to bring about change to
local perceptions needed in order to understand the value of protecting biodiversity
(Myeong & Choi, 2010).
Table 25: Perceptions on compliance and implementation at national and international
levels
Factors/Statements

Rank

Western
Europe

Eastern
Europe

Asia

Latin
America

Africa

Middle
East

A
B
C
D
E

2
5
11
38
44

0
0
13
38
50

12
24
40
173
240

10
0
10
14
62

0
0
11
32
58

0
0
0
20
80

A
B
C
D
E

4
7
11
24
55

0
6
25
38
31

13
32
80
220
147

5
14
0
38
43

0
11
11
32
47

0
0
0
20
80

A
2
0
11
10
5
B
9
0
26
0
0
C
7
19
46
10
5
D
18
25
150
38
47
E
84
86
210
43
42
Voting system at the U.N.
A
2
6
21
5
0
with its adherence to the
B
4
6
38
5
0
principle of unanimous
C
9
13
72
14
0
consent, makes decisionD
22
38
191
33
47
making difficult.
E
84
38
107
38
53
International organizations
A
4
0
13
14
0
like the U.N. are not
B
2
13
45
10
5
provided enforcement
C
9
13
61
0
5
powers or use of forceful
D
27
25
185
24
32
methods of coordination.
E
58
44
136
48
58
Systemic and organizational A
4
0
4
10
0
reforms are needed, but
B
5
13
46
5
5
have not
C
29
19
80
5
32
been implemented.
D
36
38
207
57
21
E
25
31
107
19
42
A: Strongly disagree B: Disagree C: Neither (I don’t know) D: Agree E: Strongly agree

0
0
0
40
60
0
20
20
0
60
0
0
0
40
60
0
0
0
60
40

National Systems
National decisions
influenced by political,
business, and organizational
interests and do not reflect
the will of the public, who
shoulder the environment.
Changes in national policy
face great resistance
(inertia), and as such it
tends to stay with business
as usual.
International Systems
International organizations
like the U.N. are affected by
the will of countries, and do
not optimize the whole.

Source: ASAHI Global Foundation, 2012
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Table 25 above presents statements that contain data on local level compliance
and implementation. It is the number of people and what they think about these
statements that generated numbers for quantitative analysis of local level compliance. It
is possible to relate societal practices, decision-making and capacities to national policies
and international organizations.
4.8 Opportunity costs of biodiversity protection
Table 26 contains data from the Global Footprint Network showing the available
biological resources and the level of use by each of the countries that were analyzed.
This data provided information that was used to run regression analysis to determine the
significance of various factors that most influence compliance and implementation.
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Table 26: Status on biological resources as of 2008
Used
Populat
Millions

Crop

Grazg

Forest

Fish

Carbo

Builup

Total

Crop

Graz

Forest

Fish

BuiltUp

Total

Defi
/Surp

Africa
D R Congo
Ghana
Kenya
South Africa

62.48
23.26
38.46
49.32

0.15
0.58
0.20
0.42

0.02
0.10
0.27
0.19

0.50
0.61
0.28
0.31

0.01
0.17
0.06
0.08

0.03
0.21
0.11
1.57

0.05
0.07
0.03
0.03

0.76
1.74
0.95
2.59

0.13
0.70
0.19
0.32

0.28
0.28
0.27
0.62

2.60
0.17
0.02
0.02

0.05
0.06
0.02
0.22

0.05
0.07
0.03
0.03

3.10
1.28
0.53
1.21

2.35
-0.46
-0.42
-1.38

Asia
Jordan
Australia
India
Indonesia

5.85
21.51
1190.86
234.95

0.66
1.61
0.37
0.44

0.41
1.11
0.00
0.04

0.18
1.16
0.12
0.16

0.05
0.10
0.02
0.20

0.74
2.68
0.31
0.23

0.09
0.03
0.05
0.07

2.13
6.68
0.87
1.13

0.09
2.14
0.38
0.47

0.02
6.16
0.00
0.06

0.03
2.55
0.02
0.32

0.00
3.69
0.03
0.41

0.09
0.03
0.05
0.07

0.24
14.57
0.48
1.32

-1.89
7.89
-0.39
0.19

Americas
Brazil
Jamaica
Canada
Mexico

191.54
2.72
33.33
110.63

0.80
0.41
1.49
0.74

0.95
0.30
0.42
0.40

0.55
0.22
0.74
0.32

0.05
0.12
0.10
0.09

0.48
0.63
3.63
1.69

0.10
0.04
0.05
0.06

2.93
1.72
6.43
3.30

1.09
0.14
2.81
0.49

1.03
0.00
0.23
0.25

7.25
0.10
8.27
0.49

0.16
0.05
3.55
0.14

0.10
0.04
0.05
0.06

9.63
0.33
14.92
1.42

6.69
-1.40
8.49
-1.87

Europe
Netherlands
16.50
1.30
Poland
38.22
0.98
UK
61.50
0.88
Switzerland
7.57
0.76
Source: Global Footprint Network

1.09
0.04
0.45
0.28

0.54
0.75
0.53
0.55

0.10
0.07
0.06
0.06

3.14
2.01
2.65
3.26

0.16
0.08
0.15
0.10

6.34
3.94
4.71
5.01

0.30
0.99
0.49
0.21

0.06
0.12
0.10
0.15

0.08
0.71
0.11
0.73

0.44
0.10
0.50
0.01

0.16
0.08
0.15
0.10

1.03
2.00
1.34
1.20

-5.30
-1.93
-3.37
-3.82

Country

186

4.8.1 Estimation of opportunity cost compensation
Table 27 below shows the different levels of biological capacity each country.
Information on the level of biological resources in each country though true in many
respects still requires a deeper interpretation on the deficit and surplus levels. This is
necessary so that the real biological capacity picture is clear for each country. From the
literal observation, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Australia, Canada and
Brazil are the only countries with a surplus of biological capacity. The rest of the other
countries are in biological resources deficit. Using size of land may not be the most
efficient indicator of biological capacity because of different population densities.
Table 27: Opportunity cost and compensation estimates
Country

Deficit/Surplus
in Hectares
1

Cost of land
per Hectare
2 (US$)

Total Deficit or
surplus in US$
3 = (1X2)

D R Congo 2.35
5000
11750
Ghana
-0.46
6500
-2990
Kenya
-0.42
6500
-2730
S. Africa
-1.38
7000
-9660
Jordan
-1.89
11000
-20790
Australia
7.89
5000
39450
India
-0.39
3500
-1365
Indonesia
0.19
3000
570
Brazil
6.69
1500
10035
Jamaica
-1.4
4500
-6300
Canada
8.49
7000
59430
Mexico
-1.87
7000
-13090
Netherlands -5.3
10000
-53000
Poland
-1.93
8000
-15440
UK
-3.37
8000
-26960
Switzerland -3.82
8000
-30560
Source: data from GFN and Real Estate companies in these countries
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Total
Population in
Millions
4 = (2X3)
62.48
23.26
38.46
49.32
5.85
21.51
1190.86
234.95
191.54
2.72
33.33
110.63
16.5
38.22
61.5
7.57

Biological
capacities
5 = (3X4)
(US$)
734140
-69547.4
-104995.8
-476431.2
-121621.5
848569.5
-1625523.9
133921.5
1922103.9
-17136
1980801.9
-1448146.7
-874500
-590116.8
-1658040
-231339.2

The deficit/surplus data in hectares was obtained from table 26. The cost of land
data in table 27 was obtained from real estate companies’ websites via Google.com.
These land costs are average costs of agricultural lands (both crops and grazing). The
total deficit/surplus column was obtained by multiplying columns one and two
(deficit/surplus X cost of land). Since biological capacity was measured in hectares per
person, to obtain total opportunity costs therefore, I multiplied the total cost with the total
population of each country as at 2008 to obtain figures in column five.
Estimation of compensation across countries was assumed should be based on the
level of biological deficit a country has. All biodiversity deficit countries should support
biodiversity protection activities in biodiversity surplus countries. The difficult with this
scenario is that there are a lot of poor countries that have no capacity to support other
countries but are in biodiversity deficit. Compensation for biodiversity protection may be
a very difficult undertaking.
The DRC has a surplus equivalent to 2.35 hectares per person, Australia has 7.89
hectares per person, Brazil has 6.69 hectares per person and Canada has 8.49 hectares per
person. Canada and Australia are extremely large countries with very small human
populations. Since the units used to measure biological capacity is hectares per person,
these countries are showing a surplus not because their biological resources protection
programs are very superior but simply because of their size relative to human population.
As at 2008, Canada had a human population of 33.33 million people and is 1.17
bigger than Brazil which had a population of 191.54 million people. Canada is also 4.26
times bigger than DRC which had a population 62.48 million people, twice the
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population of Canada. Brazil is 1.11 bigger than Australia which had a population of
21.51 million people. Australia is bigger than DRC by 3.28 times. The status of
biological capacity as presently measured cannot therefore be taken figuratively at face
value.
The samples of countries selected from Europe all have a deficit in biological
capacity. This does not mean that their biodiversity protection programs are in total
disarray. It is merely a question of both lifestyle and levels of development. It is clear that
the level of development of a country cannot be stopped and it cannot be reduced.
It is for this reason why it is important to estimate opportunity costs of
conservation so as to determine the most appropriate compensation mechanisms. Some of
the existing compensation schemes so far include off-set schemes, direct payments to
those that have a surplus of biological resources to stop them from both over-exploitation,
and facilitate sustainable use so that these are available to other people. These
compensation mechanisms apply to both citizens within a country and also payment to
countries that have a surplus.
The findings from table 27 can best be represented graphically as in figure 5
below. This figure shows all the countries that are in deficit (negative) and those that
have a surplus (positive) supply of biological resources. Five out of the sixteen countries
are in biological surplus section of the graph. The deficits are much more than surpluses.
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Figure 7: The status of each country’s biological capacity
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4.8.2 Most appropriate compensation mechanisms
The most appropriate compensation mechanisms should be programs that would
compensate biodiversity rich countries the equivalent of the total of biological deficit in
deficit countries. An underside to this approach is that biodiversity deficit countries might
have their conservation capacities reduced further. This will be a bad outcome as it may
lead to lower average global compliance. These findings do not provide a clear path to
either rejecting or supporting the 4th and final hypothesis which was stated as follows;
The use of appropriate compensation mechanisms to offset opportunity costs that
would be incurred by those that supply biodiversity services will increase the
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probability of effective implementation and thus lead to higher compliance with
CBD goals.
Compensation mechanisms can vary a lot both the country depending on the
nature of the resource and cooperation between countries. Most compensation
mechanisms take the form of financial resources. It is important to point out that
compensation need not be purely in financial terms. There currently exists mechanisms
that involve technological support, but a deeper analysis of the 20 criteria used to
evaluate compliance reveals that compensation can take so many forms. Conservation
needs cannot be restricted to financial terms alone.
4.9 Implementation of the goals of the CBD
The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans (NBSAPs) prepared by
countries are the primary biodiversity protection and policy documents guiding
implementation. These are supposed to comprehensively cover all aspects on the
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity thus should facilitate better
implementation and guide countries towards higher compliance. However, most of these
NBSAPs fall short of a clear integration of many of the critical factors that most
influence implementation and thus lead to low compliance.
The NBSAPs should include mechanisms to ensure that the capacity exists to
implement projects, manage activities and monitor progress, including technology
transfer. The plans should include regular monitoring and review, and follow adaptive
management principles.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.0 Discussion of results
Chapter five puts together the outcomes of this research to show both compliance
and implementation challenges in the management of biological resources worldwide.
The first section gives a summary of national capacity challenges of all countries that
were examined. This is followed by a discussion on what is going on within and across
countries. Explanations that try to reconcile the meaning of biodiversity protection across
sectors are developed. Outcomes from game theory conservation strategies are discussed
next.

The chapter comes to a conclusion with findings from opportunity costs of

biodiversity conservation.
5.1 Introduction
Conservation efforts aimed at enhancing biological resource protection within
countries need to go beyond policy development at government level to include specific
local level implementation programs. My study findings place local level implementation
compliance level at a mere 14% and national policy level compliance at a modest
49.88%. This is a big gap and is a clear demonstration that policies being developed at
national level are not adequately supporting local level implementation. Development of
national policies and plans are seen as first steps towards biodiversity protection, but
these will remain just steps and mean very little if they do not get implemented.
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The target set by the CBD in 2002 to reverse biodiversity degradation by the year
2010 was not met by all countries (Barbault, 2010). Analysis of individual country plans
and 4th national reports also demonstrate a shortage of means, capacities and mechanisms
to take national conservation policies to local levels for implementation. As long as there
is no strong and active linkage between national policies and local implementation,
biodiversity degradation will not be halted.
Research findings from ASAHI Glass Foundation (2012) found that
communication from scientists and researchers to politicians, strategists and decision
makers was not sufficient to promote changes in society for environmental protection.
Most of the information is focused more on policy makers and less on implementers.
Moreover, this information is not presented in a comprehensible format to the general
public, hence it is not very appealing (ASAHI Glass Foundation, 2012). Further, research
finds that once policy makers receive specific information, this information is not often
communicated to the public or implementers and when, if it is at all communicated, the
people at local levels do not have the capacity and training to comprehend it well. A
certain minimum level of education is necessary for farmers and other stakeholders, at
local levels, to fully understand conservation policies crafted at the global and national
levels.
5.2 Compliance and implementation capacity challenges
There are several compliance and implementation challenges that emerged from
analysis of data used in this study. First there are no clearly established cooperative
strategies that can be categorized as either favorable or unfavorable across national
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boundaries or sectors. Within countries, it is clear how globally designed conservation
policies get adapted to national priorities. What is not clear is how countries take these
policies to local levels where actual implementation is done.
Virtually all NBSAPs demonstrate lack of adequate funding from both national
governments and international donors for conservation programs. This leaves
international organizations that come with their own funding to take the lead mostly at
local levels. How these international organizations cooperate and work with local
organizations is also not clear. Some national reports have shown that it is not
everywhere that local institutions trust international organizations. The scale of the
impact of international organizations on local implementation is difficult to measure.
5.2.1 North and South America
The Brazilian NBSAP in the CBD website does not use the word capacity. It is
therefore difficult to tell exactly how Brazil has been planning for biodiversity protection
capacities.
Jamaica NBSAP explains that most local communities lack capacities to carry out
various types of integrated planning and management of biological resources. There are
gaps in understanding conservation in general; thus a need for improved awareness
raising, education and information sharing. There are ongoing risk assessments to
determine carrying capacity for protected areas and sustainable use of wild Flora and
Fauna. There are also capacity challenges at national policy level to reduce vulnerability
of resources, conduct adaptive planning and institutional strengthening. The country is
working at improving enforcement capacity, participating in global initiatives and is
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seeking financial and technical assistance to increase capacity to manage biological
resources. The plan puts emphasis on the development of a specified strategic direction
aimed at increasing capacity of human capital to be able to prepare, evaluate and
implement environmental impact and risk assessment.
Mexico is still working on increasing human, institutional and financial capacity
to meet biodiversity protection goals and needs, related to overall management. The
country is also developing structures that provide information to people in decision
making responsibility, for monitoring, control and mitigation of negative impacts.
Canada has an ongoing database capacities development that enables it to manage
harmful Living Modified Organisms (LMO). Canada has put great emphasis on
development of policies that reflect societal objectives and ecological carrying capacity
of the planet. Canada supports research on ecological carrying capacity, works with
national and international organizations to improve dialogue and communication,
management and planning. The international community would need to assist some
countries in their management capacities so that they can pursue economic activities in
harmony with the Earth’s biological capacity. Canada is cooperating with developing
countries in capacity development toward biodiversity protection. The degree to which
plans are able to enhance national capacities to conserve biological resources is seen as a
measure of success.
5.2.2 Europe
United Kingdom and the Republic of Northern Ireland
The UK and the Republic of Northern Ireland draws lessons from historical
agricultural development to place its NBSAP in context of current developments. The
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NBSAP argues that keeping of genetic variability is an extremely important social and
economic resource as this is what enabled early man to develop crops and livestock
which were a pre-requisite for settled agriculture. Continued development and global
stability depends on the capacity to continue to maintain genetic variability. The plan
explains that it is not desirable for invasive species to have the capacity to oust native
species. Other aspects of capacities in the UK plan include the low financial capacity of
zoos to maintain diverse collections and the land carrying capacity. Car travel in Great
Britain for example has increased dramatically in the past 40 years and is projected to
grow by a further 84% to 142% by 2025. Accommodating such rate of growth through
new capacity is likely to have a damaging impact on biodiversity, unless it is very
carefully managed.
The government is working to ensure that forests are harvested in a way that
allows capacity for renewal and is also trying to reduce over-capacity in fishing. The
government is developing new capacity building courses such as those aimed at
managing botanic gardens within the UK as well as providing support for capacity
building and policy development in other countries. This is done through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) whom the plan argues that in some countries
provide the only national capacity to address environmental issues.
Netherlands
The Netherland’s NBSAP puts more emphasis on sharing knowledge and capacity
building for purposes of developing sustainable forestry, sustainable wood production
and strengthening of governance and management. There is also emphasis to invest in
sustaining the capacity of ecosystems to continue to provide goods and services

196

especially in developing countries where most people are dependent on natural resources
but lack the capacity to invest in sustainable management. Ecosystems have a certain
level of resilience but persistent damage can lead to a dramatic decline in their capacity to
continue providing environmental services. The Netherlands plan pays great attention to
future conservation outcomes through supporting biodiversity protection by creating a
strong capacity of ecological networks that can adapt to possible climate changes. Some
of the key objectives include the promotion of sustainable fishing through innovations
meant to reduce the fleet capacity under the European Fisheries Fund. The Netherlands
government is also assisting developing countries to develop sustainable fisheries and
capacity building in relation to biodiversity and water management, and support to
international knowledge networks.
Poland
The Polish plan explains that the greatest conservation challenge in Poland is the
country’s low financial capacity. Poland does not have a good financial capacity to
enable it to spend resources at a level corresponding to the needs of the conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity. A strong financial capacity is a pre-requisite for effective
implementation of the CBD goals. In addition, Poland as a country clearly lacks the
capacity to extend conservation to most needed areas such the marine environment. The
country also does not have sufficient resources for improving research capacity.
Switzerland
The Swiss NBSAP has a well balanced approach to supporting national
biodiversity conservation policies as well as to those of other countries. It is a
government decision in line with Federal Council decision of 1 July 2008, to ensure the
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long-term conservation and promotion of biodiversity both in Switzerland and at global
levels. The plan explains that connected habitats are a basic pre-requisite for ensuring that
biodiversity is rich and has the capacity to remain resilient to climate change. There is a
shared responsibility between the central government and its regions, and implementation
is done in a participatory manner. Sustainable use of forest resources, the plan argues,
contributes to the productive and performance capacity of the forest. Moreover, the
resilience of forest ecosystem and sufficient habitat offers tranquility for wild animals.
The word “capacity” is also used to describe the spreading capacity of invasive alien
species, and their very high adaptability as well as competitive superiority.
5.2.3 Africa
Kenya
The Kenya NBSAP addresses concerns such as institutional capacities alongside
biodiversity management incentives, research and training as well as impact assessments.
The plan presents a clear proposal that capacity building should target law enforcement
and regulatory agencies for the purposes of enhancing and streamlining implementation
of environmental policies. The plan highlights the need to strengthen institutional systems
for collaboration and establish linkages and networks to improve coordination. The plan
also talks of capacity building in environmental economics, resource accounting, audit
and valuation of biodiversity at tertiary levels. There is a need to strengthen bioprospecting capacity by equipping the national institutions to carry out research relevant
to biotechnology, technology transfer, communication and linkages. The weaknesses
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identified in the Kenyan NBSAP include the low capacity for monitoring and evaluation,
research and training, technical and scientific cooperation.
Ghana
The Ghanaian NBSAP is constructed as though biodiversity protection is for the
international community’s sake rather than as a national tool to protect national
resources. The plan explains that capacity building is essential to ensuring an in-depth
assessment of biological resources, promotion of community participation, strengthening
the management of forests and protected areas. For instance, soil erosion has reduced the
land carrying capacity, ground water re-charge and regeneration of vegetation in heavily
settled areas. Further, the Akosombo dam’s generation capacity is hindered by siltation.
There are initiatives to strengthen institutional capacities to gather and manage
biodiversity scientific data and information. The plan talks of building human capacities
at both local and national levels for assessment, conducting studies, ecosystems
management through long and short-term training courses. There is a proposal to
strengthen data and information management capacities to control and prevent fires for
tourist areas and to stay within the resource carrying capacity.
South Africa
The word “capacity” was heavily used around institutional capacity building to
conserve and prevent threats to biodiversity including capacity for sustainable use, access
to benefit sharing, economic integration and poverty alleviation. However, there exists a
financial and human resource capacity constraint at the government level. Specifically,
the government lacks the ability to make negotiations, implement projects, monitor the
implementation, offer effective participation and conduct risk assessments on Genetically
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Modified Organisms (GMOs), as well as manage protected areas. On the other hand,
South Africa is home to well-established research capacity with a number of world
renowned universities and scientific institutions that present good opportunities for
biodiversity conservation research, development planning and community empowerment,
as well as favorable environment for bio-prospecting.
Land degradation reduces the capacity for resources to regenerate. Across Africa,
climate change is likely to accentuate social and ecological vulnerability and limit
resources capacity to adapt to changes in ecosystem functioning. In order to implement
policy and legislation effectively at local level, institutional and capacities need to be
addressed. In addition, staff and expertise retention as well as awareness raising programs
need to be developed. National and provincial agencies should develop common
objectives, capacity sharing and joint accountability mechanisms for the management of
habitats, and species across administrative boundaries. So many institutions play a role in
biodiversity management thus a need for necessary capacity to collate data at genetic,
species and ecosystem levels, planning and decision making. Various local levels should
have the capacity to integrate biodiversity considerations into their spatial and economic
planning. Moreover, they need to review environmental management programs and
perform self-assessment to implement National Biodiversity Framework in relation to
geographic and thematic priorities.
Non-Governmental and Community-Based Organizations are important partners
in conservation and their capacity building is important. There is also mention of how
HIV/AIDS impacts upon institutional capacities. The plan talks of strengthening capacity
for international negotiation by developing common positions with other countries from
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the region. There is need for improved coordination of programs to build capacity across
all relevant departments within the government.
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
The analysis of the DRC NBSAP brings to light the key challenges of biodiversity
protection that range from the feeling of isolation by national conservationists and trust
on international organizations, in representing the views of local people to how political
instability has dealt a big blow to conservation efforts. A lot of conservation challenges
are due to the civil wars that have plagued the country for close to five decades. The
feeling of isolation comes from the fact that most conservation programs have not
involved local experts and citizens. For instance, some of the key protected areas in the
country were set up without consultation with local people which resulted in the eviction
of local people without any form of compensation.
There are indications in the plan of strengthening the management capacity of
existing protected areas and policy on national parks while taking into account concerns
of local communities. The plan explains the need for institutional capacity building to
manage funds as well as enforce legal provisions. The capacity to manage environmental
conservation requires an effective legal and institutional framework, political will and
local participation, awareness raising and private sector participation. The DRC is not
well equipped in all these capacities and lacks structures to bring various sectors together.
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5.2.4 Asia
India
The Indian NBSAP highlights the need for appropriate institutionalization and
human resource capacity building for all conservation ranging from capacities to
implement measures for captive breeding to reducing constraints faced by various
sectors. Sectors as forest sector manpower, management of river basins, grassroots levels
to enable participatory decision-making and managing invasive alien species at different
levels need to be strengthened financially, with communications and funding.
There are plans to help enhance the capacity of climate modeling in the country so
people can understand the impacts of climate change on biodiversity at national and local
levels. The country is also seeking technical and financial assistance from multilateral
agencies for implementing the recommendations pertaining to mapping of ecologically
sensitive areas along the coastline, control of pollution in the coastal waters from land
based activities and capacity building and institutional development. Although the
country has over a period of time developed a stable institutional structure for
environmental management, there is still need to improve national capacities for
biodiversity conservation and appropriate use of new technologies
Jordan
Jordan is currently building institutional capacities to implement the NBSAP. The
Jordan NBSAP calls for respect of the environment’s productive capacity. The plan
begins with highlights of historical land uses saying that land resources have been
exploited without regard to carrying capacity. The plan argues that there is now improved
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capacity building in areas of law enforcement and general environmental protection.
Efforts aimed at building capacities of local ecologists and national capacity in
conservation and management of biodiversity need to be stepped up. So far, inadequate
technical and managerial capacity has been a hindrance to the development and
implementation of protected area laws, policies and planning strategies. There is still
need for local capacity building in the management of marine resources. The carrying
capacity of many of the vegetated areas is way below current use for grazing animals as
well as production capacities of many lands. Capacity to monitor alien species need
improvement.
Although the carrying capacity of many areas has been exceeded, establishing
limits is fraught with difficulties. Some areas such the embryonic eco-tourism market in
Jordan could be developed and promoted to support biodiversity protection, there is no
clear vision or the capacity to ensure that it is developed correctly. Rangelands are
experiencing management difficulties and there is now a plan to build capacities of range
managers. There is also a plan for building capacities for economic valuation of
biodiversity. The country is putting in place a national and human capacity building
structure to ensure a safe and healthy food and pharmaceutical products, and prevent
transmission of diseases. Capacity building for the staff and stakeholders of the National
Cleaner Production Center and Biotechnology is also being developed.
5.3 Compliance within federally administered countries
Large countries as well as small ones all seem to fit into one description – local
and national institutional working relationships are weak and sometimes non-existent.
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National government agencies are weak and also in some countries too few to mount the
level of effort that would implement strong conservation initiatives to drive the whole
world towards higher compliance with CBD goals. Reports from local jurisdictions as
well as key biodiversity hotspots are missing at national level. Support to local levels is
weak both in funding as well as capacity building. Investment in human resources,
appropriate technologies and institutional development is limited. Although Canada,
India and Australia all have NCHMs, these have not been developed to effectively serve
these countries.
5.3.1 Countries with strong presence of conservation organizations
The presence of international conservation organizations’ headquarters in a
country does not seem to have significant difference in compliance from other countries.
One good example is Kenya that is home to the global UNEP headquarters and major
regional headquarters of both WWF and IUCN. Kenya is one of the least compliant
countries of the 16 countries analyzed. The Kenya NBSAP was not launched. It is not
clear who drew the plan. The same plan has not been revised as required by the CBD.
Other examples are Switzerland, Netherlands and the UK that have continued to overexploit their marine resources beyond levels that these can regenerate themselves. One
interesting observation was that rather than these countries look to investing in
conservation of national and local resources, they are supporting other countries to
protect their resources.
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5.3.2 High capacity countries and compliance levels
High capacity countries are those that were seen as donors thus providing funding
for other countries to do conservation. Compliance within these countries was therefore
expected to be better than most countries. However, the findings from this study were
disappointingly the opposite. High capacity countries face the same conservation
challenges as low capacity countries of over-exploitation of biological resources. These
countries not only over-exploit resources within their jurisdictions but also aid in the
over-exploitation in other countries through international trade.
5.3.3 Systems theory and information technology in conservation
Very few governments have built an equivalent of GBIF at the national level.
Some governments are not participating in the CHMs. Most are also not publishing their
own data. Use of IT helps to relay information between different decision points to create
an interactive environment between sectors, agencies and governments (Myeong & Choi,
2010). An inclusive strategy encompassing implementation of IT interventions for
communication, data gathering, sharing and policy evaluation provides a feasible and
reliable way forward in attaining better results in biodiversity conservation. When
information and data gaps persist, effective policy implementation suffers, and costs of
building consensus go up (Esty & Ivanova, 2004).
The use of information technology across all levels is not developed in most
countries. Even in countries that have the CHMs, these are merely documentation
depository warehouses. They are static in the sense that the links do not have updated
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data, no local reports except a few that have been submitted to the CBD. There is not
sufficient information to facilitate learning, and are not designed to engage all
stakeholders effectively.
5.4 Reconciling conservation initiatives for higher global compliance
Compliance needs to be seen as a multi-level undertaking ranging from global,
national to local level implementation. Conservation exists at three levels: global,
national and local levels. Conservation issues are so different between these levels yet it
is their sum that can either lead to better protection or continued biodiversity degradation.
Furthermore, at these different levels, there are numerous sectors, all with very different
interests. Against the perception that conservation programs are in conflict with both
development and community needs, conservation initiatives need to be reconciled
vertically across these levels and horizontally across all interests. Different stakeholders
across sectors need to be made to feel that biodiversity conservation serves their needs as
much it serves conservation interests. Only broad policies that address both conservation
and stakeholder needs can achieve such a goal.
According to Wilshusen et al. (2002), the moral conservation argument supports
the idea that the international community should act on behalf of nature in all countries.
However, there is tension all the time between local and non-local interests. Findings
from the analysis of NBSAPs, national reports and works of conservation organizations
demonstrate how the same biodiversity problems are seen differently and how different
solutions are offered to same problems by different stakeholders. There is a clear
disconnect in the way conservationists work with governments as well as communities.
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There is need for an expanded dialogue between all stakeholders to help rank priorities,
determine the level of commitment required across sectors and how to measure such
commitments.
For many individuals, organizations, private sector institutions and governments,
the pursuit of profits and economic development are of upmost priority and biodiversity
conservation needs are secondary (AGF, 2012). The figure 8 below present findings from
data of people interviewed globally on information how individuals, organizations and
governments prioritize their interests. These findings do support the analytical findings
from NBSAPs and various government national reports.
On average, about 80% of the respondents agree that other national interests take
precedence over biodiversity protection. At the individual level, decisions are made based
immediate benefits and economic considerations are given a higher priority over the
needs of the environment. Respondents that felt that environmental considerations were
given adequate attention across all sectors averaged about a mere 10%.
Figure 8: Priorities of most sectors in society
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Source: Own Estimates using data from AGF

207

Figure 9 below present findings from a Likert scale data about how countries
make decisions and the limitations that they are likely to experience when making
conservation decisions. This analysis also includes findings how international
organizations facilitate the management of shared interests across countries and various
sectors. Statements that generated these responses are found in table 28 below and were
assigned numbers corresponding to the columns in figure 9.
About 80% of the respondents agreed that national decisions are based on partial
priorities that often relegate policies that optimize the whole to secondary considerations.
More than 85% of respondents agreed that national decisions are heavily influenced by
political, business and organizational interests which in most cases leave out the will of
the public, who end up shouldering the costs of biodiversity degradation. About 78% of
the respondents agreed that changes to environmental policies are often met with great
resistance and as such, there is more support to the business as usual. More than 86% of
interviewees agreed that International organizations are affected more by the will of
countries thus fail to optimize their biodiversity protection goals alongside other national
priorities. About 75% of the respondents also see a problem with the unanimous
consensus principle especially with the United Nations system and agree that this leads to
less than optimal decisions. There were more than 79% of the respondents that see the
lack of international enforcement powers in the hands of international organizations as a
source of weakness to global coordination. Finally, about 72% of the respondents felt that
there is need for reforms in both systems and organizational structures so that new
challenges as a result of environmental degradation can be taken into account.
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Figure 9: National decision making does not prioritize biodiversity protection
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Table 28: National decisions give low priority to biodiversity protection
Numbers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Description
National decision-making systems are based on partial optimization
prioritizing national interests; policies that optimize the whole become
secondary.
National decisions influenced by political, business, and organizational
interests and do not reflect the will of the public, who shoulder the
environment.
Changes in national policy face great resistance (inertia), and as such it
tends to stay with business as usual.
International organizations like the U.N. are affected by the will of
countries, and do not optimize the whole.
Voting system at the U.N. with its adherence to the fundamental principle
of unanimous consent, makes decision- making difficult.
International organizations like the U.N. are not provided enforcement
powers or other forceful methods of coordination.
Systemic and organizational reforms are needed, but have not been
implemented.

Source: Asahi Glass Foundation
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Figure 10 below was constructed using data that examined limitations to
individual decision making at local levels. Information in the figure 10 takes into account
the societal, cultural and behavioral scientific problems. The responses to the statements
in table 29 below were used to generate figure four.
Up to 74% of the respondents to these statements agreed that there is no reference
point for the natural environment as well as for the different life forms to aid in decision
making at local/individual levels. About 81% agreed that local and cultural practices that
give importance to “common resources” are lacking or weak. About 65% of the
respondents agreed that local practices and traditions that value biological resources
conservation are few and far in between. There were 61% respondents that said that most
people have the capacity to recognize environmental conditions and effects on local
levels but are not able to recognize the same problems globally. About 64% of the
interviewees agreed that human decision making process is based on the “now” selfpreservation and does not consider that of future generations.
There was a statement that read “Human nature to care for others is overwhelmed
by behavioral principles based largely on economic considerations”. To this statement,
77% of respondents agreed. There were 74% respondents that agreed to the statement that
value systems that respect one’s own environment as well as daily economic activities are
not consistent with each other. About 76% of the respondents agreed that current
lifestyles based on large consumption of resources and energy cannot be abandoned.
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Figure 10: Support given to biodiversity protection is low
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Columns one through to eight corresponds to the numbers assigned to the
statements in table 29 below.
Table 29: Limitations to individual decision making at local levels
Columns
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Corresponding statements
Absence of reverence towards the natural environment and life forms.
Societal and cultural practices and bases that place importance on “common
good,” like environment, are lacking or fragile.
Societal practices and traditions that value the weak, including environment,
are few and far between.
At most, people have capacity to recognize environmental conditions and
effects on local level, but are incapable of recognizing problems globally.
Human decision-making process is based on self-preservation; it does not
consider happiness of others or of future generations.
Human nature to care for others is overwhelmed by behavioral principles
based on economic considerations.
Value systems that respect one’s own environment and daily economic activity
are inconsistent with each other.
Current lifestyles based on large consumption of energy cannot be abandoned.
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Figure 11 below presents the percentage number of people that agreed and those
that did agree to statements in table 30. These were statements regarding communication
between different levels and different sectors.
About 80% of the respondents agreed that information communicated from
conservation experts is not easily comprehended by the public. Also, 53% of respondents
agreed that communication from conservationists is geared more towards political
decision makers rather than members of the public. Following the same statement, 80%
of the people who responded agreed that political decision makers do not communicate
conservation information given to them from conservationists to members of the public.
Figure 11: Communication in support of global biodiversity conservation is poor
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Another important piece of information was that about 77% of respondents agreed
that members of the public do not value conservation information unless disaster occurs
in their vicinity. About 50% of the respondents agreed that non-governmental
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organizations overemphasize communication with political decision makers. In
communication, a certain level of education is necessary for members of the public to
understand conservation needs. For this, 79% of the respondents agreed and 6% said this
was not necessary. About 80% of interviewees also agreed that economic profits get a
higher consideration in communication much more than environmental concerns.
Table 30 below presents the Likert scale statements used to generate figure 10. The
numbers before the statements correspond to the numbers assigned to the columns of the
figure 10.
Table 30: Communication and global understanding of biodiversity conservation
Columns
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Statements
Easily comprehensible information is not communicated from
conservation experts to the public
Environmental experts focus communication of information too heavily
upon political decision makers, failing to reach the public
Political decision makers do not communicate information from
environmental experts to the public
Public does not value the information provided by environmental experts
unless disaster occurs in their vicinity
Non-profit organizations overemphasize Communications efforts on
political decision makers
Certain education level is necessary for understanding of environmental
information, and environmental education is lacking
The economic profits of a corporation, organization, or a region are
prioritized so much that environmental considerations are not taken into
account.

Table 31 below shows a big difference between those that agree that aspects of
biodiversity protection are good and those that disagree that conservation is not being
implemented. Going by these findings, majority of the people seem to disagree that
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enough efforts, programs, effective decisions, good communication and capacities exist
to reverse biodiversity degradation.
Table 31: Reconciling different levels and different sectors
N = 1009

Agree
1
2
3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

13
12
15
10
6
9
7
11
12
10
13
10
15
25
18
12
11
32
12
26
9
15
17
8
15

Disagree
79
83
80
80
86
78
86
75
79
71
74
81
65
61
64
77
74
76
80
53
80
77
50
79
80

Source: Estimated using data from Asahi Glass Foundation

These can be viewed as indications that not enough is being done to take all
countries to higher compliance and there not enough support given conservation
programs. The big question then is why with such high mobilization of governments
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globally, conservation organizations, and other experts, is biodiversity conservation
facing huge challenges? Estimating the overall differences between those that agree and
those that disagree, 14% agree and 75% disagree. This brings a total to 89%. Those are
neutral were only 11%. This is an insignificant figure to tilt overall perceptions and
opinions. The conclusion is that more people share the idea that more needs to be done.
The high percentage of people that disagree with existing conservations practices
which does not in general optimize the whole confirms hypothesis 2b which was stated
as: National and local environmental policies that evolve on the basis of shared meaning
at all levels and across sectors and institutions have a higher rate of acceptance and would
therefore lead to high levels of compliance with CBD goals.
5.5 Theory in biodiversity conservation
International relations theories try to galvanize global governmental cooperation
to develop solutions to conservation problems, but this is only the first steps. Galvanizing
global cooperation need to be accompanied with innovation, education and training, and
transparency in order to be able to break away from traditional belief systems and
mindsets of self-interest behavior. Findings from compliance levels established by this
research show the clear need for cooperation as various countries have specific
weaknesses and strengths in biodiversity protection. The 20 criteria used in determining
compliance levels show the need for institutional cooperation within countries.
Biodiversity protection must and should have the support of various institutions across
different levels and sectors working together.
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Governments as well as all other organizations involved in biodiversity protection
need to know all available conservation options from other stakeholders. This is
information is not often available, thus making it difficult to arrive at appropriate
decisions. For instance, it is not enough to ask communities to implement conservation
programs if there no clearly established compensation mechanisms for reduced/lost
biodiversity benefits. People are not empowered and key supportive institutions are either
too weak or missing all together. It is at this point that the wheels of biodiversity
protection begin to grind to a stop. National and local capacities within countries need to
be continuously improved so as to effectively address biodiversity challenges.
5.6 Systems theory in biodiversity protection
According to AGF (2012), there is a limit to conservationists being able to
speak to people outside of the field in a language that is easily understandable.
People in governments, private sector institutions and communities should also be
able to speak a conservation language alongside other priorities within their own
settings. What is needed is properly trained science communicators, policy
developers and effective implementers (AGF, 2012) across different levels and
sectors.
For example, The South Africa NBSAP (2006) asserts that scientific experts,
policy makers and local policy implementers should be able to work together to
determine the carrying capacity of a specific area or resource. Such carrying capacity
cannot be defined in absolute terms because of the dynamic nature of resources use. It is
only after the carrying capacity of a specific area has been established that managers are
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able to provide appropriate forms of management to ensure that use of that area is kept
within sustainable limits. Local communities need to have the capacity also not just to
understand the management aspects but to also be able to implement remedial measures
should the carrying capacity be exceeded at some stage. This means that local level
institutions should be able to understand and establish standards that a farmland can
withstand without acceptable physical damage, or how much water can be taken from an
aquifer without going beyond recharge level, or how much pollution rivers can withstand
before the fish are killed.
In the context of information management, the CBD can be viewed as a decider
subsystem (Miller, 1978). Wang (2004) argues that the decider is an information process
sub-system which receives, in this case, reports, plans and data from all other subsystems and transmits information outputs for guidance, coordination and management of
the whole global structure. The relationship between the CBD, its member countries and
local institutions can be viewed as a living system. Information Technology facilitates
communication across these systems otherwise known as countries, and facilitates global,
national and local coordination. Governments with information, policy and data rich
websites will enhance local level biodiversity protection through better communication,
sharing ideas and feedback (Witzel, 2012). The systems concept is a presentation of how
the different units/structures in different hierarchies within an organization interact and
manipulate when it is convenient or adopt the organization to the external environmental
demands (Almaney, 1974).
The level of support in financial terms, technical, education and communication
given to national governments should be replicated within countries to their local levels.
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The people and institutions at all levels in society should have a sound understanding of
how vulnerable and fragile various species and ecosystems are to land use changes. It is
important to communicate and explain conservation to all sectors at all levels of society
so as to sufficient supply knowledge that can bring positive changes and change
perceptions of people on biodiversity conservation. How such communication is done
needs a thorough analysis and evaluation.
There is inertia in the public and private institutions, and community beliefs
against movement towards adoption of stronger biodiversity policies (Bickford et al.
2012). Partly, the problem is due to low environmental literacy thus no shared meaning
and this makes it difficult for stakeholders and consumers to make informed decisions
that support conservation (Bickford et al. 2012; Jordan et al. 2009). What is needed is
more effective communication and outreach. In addition to my study, other studies have
found big gaps between knowledge and action and efforts should be placed upon making
everybody engaged in lifestyles that reduce this gap (Bickford et al. 2012; Daily and
Matson, 2008). Higher level of environmental literacy correlates with a higher degree of
supportive lifestyles and small gaps between knowledge and action (Bickford et al. 2012;
Rickinson, 2001).
Brechin et al. (2003) makes a compelling argument that biodiversity protection is
a social and political process requiring human organization. Interactions among
governments at global level need to recognize the strong links between human wellbeing
and biodiversity. Ecologically sound conservation programs also need to be socially and
politically feasible, and morally just (Brechin et al. 2003).
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5.7 Application of game theory strategies
From a practical point of view, game theory approach to conservation is a
continuous exercise that does not limit any country from cooperating with any other
country. It is therefore possible that countries will cooperate with several other countries
simultaneously. For purposes of this study, two assumptions were made: (1) two players
are cooperating at any given time (2) these players are not in competition with each other
but want to support each other to move to more efficient outcomes/higher compliance.
When players (donors and implementers) base their conservation priorities on
self-interests, both follow a maximin (low-risk) strategy. With a maximin strategy, a
player would determine the lowest outcome for each option, and then choose the option
that provides the highest benefit at the expense of the other player. Conservation is thus
driven into the prisoner’s dilemma situation which is characterized with a free-rider
problem. As for biodiversity conservation, best strategies would be when countries
cooperate and support each other at conservation points that lead to highest compliance
for the two cooperating players.
5.7.1 Cooperation and consensus compared
The best conclusion to draw from maximin strategic cooperation between various
countries was that conservation through cooperation allows countries to carry on with
many aspects of conservation that they feel are their best strategies or have the capacity
to handle. Those aspects that specific countries are weak in are identified and therefore
can get supported under a cooperative arrangement.
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Under international relations theories, conservation through a managed consensus
is not structured to identify strengths and weaknesses of specific countries. This is
because different parties come to a negotiation table often to win an argument. This leads
to less than optimal decisions for some countries. Parties to the negotiation could easily
be made to surrender their strong capacities and instead be made to implement strategies
that they have no advantage. It is not easy to determine areas that may need more support
under a negotiation.
This outcome supports hypothesis 2 which was stated that Biodiversity protection
efforts undertaken cooperatively leads to higher compliance with CBD goals.
5.8 Opportunity costs of biodiversity protection
Opportunity cost estimates presented in this study was based on the number of
hectares a country has either in deficit or in surplus. There exist several types of costs and
categories that various policy actions can take into consideration. The findings by this
study on opportunity costs may not reflect the full range of variables that could go into
measuring conservation costs. These findings by this study are very important in
determining compensation levels by biodiversity deficit countries. Financial support to
biodiversity protection by countries should be calculated based first on the deficit status
of each country, secondly, on the country’s level of development. Every country should
compensate for biodiversity protection the equivalent of its biodiversity deficit.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
6.0 Discussion and conclusions
This chapter brings together all the key findings regarding the strengths and
weaknesses of biodiversity protection globally. The challenges that the CBD faces and
the ways governments are managing conservation programs have been summarized.
Limitations, the gaps and policy implication of the findings from this research are also
explained.
6.1 Introduction
My research examined a broad and yet focused biodiversity conservation
strategies globally. It was broad enough to bring to light the extent to which the CBD has
influenced conservation of biodiversity by countries. Yet, the study conducted a detailed
investigation into the extent to which the global policies penetrated into local levels
within countries to effect changes. I argue that it is not enough to for countries to send
representatives to treaty conferences, draw national plans, submit reports and claim that
treaty goals are being implemented at all levels from global to local levels based on
written words. The drawing of plans and writing of reports is the first step in a very long
and difficult journey towards implementation of goals and compliance.
It was against this background that my study was designed to analyze multiple
levels of CBD implementation. I have examined how globally designed biodiversity
conservation policies are adapted into national programs and then passed down to local
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settings where they are implemented. Implementation and compliance was divided into
three levels: (i) global compliance; (ii) national compliance; and (iii) local compliance.
The requirement to comply with the CBD goals at these three levels was found to be very
different taking into account different actions on the part of those implementing the goals
of the convention. What emerged was that those involved in both decision making and
negotiations at different levels wanted to see final policy decisions that satisfied their
own interests first. Although conservation outcomes have been clearly stated by the CBD,
parties have been conducting negotiations without a model that is able to align global
conservation interests with national and local interests, and private sector priorities.
Key variables that most influence implementation and compliance at global,
national and local levels were examined. Ways to reconcile local, national and global
conservation challenges were analyzed. Two variables that emerged as the most
influential and also that appeared to present numerous conservation challenges were
communication and national capacities. Although the CBD has well-established
information sharing tools, these have not been replicated by national governments to
allow for sufficient sharing of knowledge between sectors and governments. Global
biodiversity conservation policies have not been localized. This was evidenced by the
complete lack of data that links global conservation initiatives and national policies to
local level implementation.
Hathaway (2005) argues that countries with robust domestic institutions on one
hand can have better implementation. At the same time such countries are more reluctant
to commit themselves to international treaties. However, findings from this research point
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to who actually makes the decisions. If decisions are made at national level without
structures that involve local level institutions, implementation of the CBD goals will
remain problematic. Commitments to international treaties should be clearly worked at
local levels using support mechanisms ranging from funding, actual capacity building and
developing information sharing tools.
6.2 Historical context
International treaties are created and recognized through the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties of 1969. The Vienna Convention was entered into force on
January 27, 1980 and has been ratified by more than 100 countries. Since then, more than
500 international treaties dealing with environmental problems have been created
(UNEP, 2008). However, the rising number of treaties being created has not translated
into greater achievement of environmental conservation (CBD, 2010). It is clear that with
the rising number of treaties, environmental challenges are increasing too.
It was with this knowledge in mind that the CBD was created at the Earth Summit
in Rio de Janeiro on June 5, 1992 and entered into force on December 29, the same year.
Under the CBD, conservation of biological diversity is recognized as a common concern
of all countries and as an integral part of economic development. The treaty covers all
ecosystems, species and genetic resources and links traditional conservation efforts to the
economic goals of using biological resources sustainably under the guidance of national
governments (Global Biodiversity Outlook 3, 2010).
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After a period of more than two decades, tremendous amount of awareness has
been created but there is void in exactly how countries should proceed with
implementation of the CBD goals and the nature of specific actions that countries should
take to increase compliance. It should not be because the international law lacks
enforcement powers within countries as this is technically fulfilled once countries sign
the treaty and agree to abide with it. Guzman (2014) argues that treaty obligations should
be taken in many small, low cost and observable steps toward compliance and not one big
single obligation.
Findings from this study indicate that there is much more that needs to go into just
one small step that is taken to conserve biodiversity. Some countries do not simply have
the capacity and funding to facilitate implementation of specific actions. Second, there
are also those that have the capacity but have not made biodiversity protection their
priority. Thirdly, many countries are in very huge biological capacity deficit but have
instead chosen to focus their efforts to support other countries. The big problem is that
the level of support given to other countries is so insignificant because this is a mere
fraction of what it would take to bring donor countries out of the biological deficit. As of
2008, the European countries in this study are in deficit of biological capacity going into
a negative of about 3.4 million hectares. Asian countries and Australia combined are
running a negative of 765,000 hectares.
6.2.1 International treaties’ effectiveness
Going by the findings of this study, one cannot qualify the CBD as having been
very successful in all aspects of biodiversity protection. Compliance by all countries was
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found to be at about 35%. Implementation of the CBD goals at local levels cannot be
evaluated using information and data from the CBD documents. Such data is unavailable.
Countries have not invested in data collection surveys to facilitate estimation of trends
and losses of biological resources. It is extremely difficult to make good judgment and
develop policies on the basis of unreliable, insufficient or missing information. It is
therefore correct to make an assumption that the CBD may not know how and to what
extent implementation has been carried out at local levels.
Information gathered from country reports generally highlights various obstacles
to achieving the 2010 biodiversity protection targets. These were weak governance in
particular, lack of law enforcement and focusing on direct drivers of biodiversity loss
rather than underlying causes. Looking beyond the 2010 biodiversity protection targets,
governments need to re-position themselves to address these specific challenges.
It is also clear that the convention has had some tremendous first few successful
steps. The CBD has mobilized global governments and is now the international treaty
with highest membership of 195 countries. Each of these countries has a developed
National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plan (NBSAP) and some countries have made up
to four revisions to the original plan. All these countries have submitted from between
one to four national reports explaining national progress and problems countries are
facing. These are indications that discussions are being conducted at national level,
information is being shared and knowledge passed to facilitate effective conservation.
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6.3 Global biodiversity protection initiatives
So many global initiatives aimed at improving biodiversity protection efforts have
been developed. These initiatives range from public-private partnerships, creation of
ministries and government agencies targeting conservation of environmental resources,
pushing for legislation, seeking funding opportunities and developing human resources.
These initiatives face numerous challenges though. Global economic inequality
and the number of people living in poverty at the rate of one dollar per day declined in
the 1990s from 1.3 billion to 1.2 billion (World Bank, 2007). However, a large majority
of people in developing countries that are also rich in biodiversity are still living in
poverty and depend on land based resources (World Bank, 2007). There is a tremendous
pressure to expand agricultural land in both developed and developing countries (World
Bank, 2007). Expanding agriculture in the developing world will put high pressures on
many ecosystems that support biodiversity. It is a well-known fact that greatest threat to
forests, wetlands, mountains and biodiversity is the expansion of agricultural land due to
increasing demand for food and loss of arable land due to over-intensive cultivation
(World Bank, 2007)
6.3.1 Sustainable use of biodiversity
Sustainable use is one of the primary goals of the CBD which also relates to
consumption and how natural resources are used. Sustainable use is a strong assurance
for the protection of biodiversity which guarantees use of resources now without
depletion so that there is some left for future generations. From the literature and data
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examined in this study, it is not clear how and what governments are doing to find ways
and design sustainable use programs at both national and local levels.
The challenges facing the CBD under the goal of sustainable use is that rather
than countries devise policies that bring about fundamental changes into the growth
oriented cultural paradigm, the policies being developed are only producing reforms at
policy level with insignificant impact at implementation levels. Over time, there has been
an increase in high-sounding rhetoric and numerous environmental legislations in many
countries but economic growth through over-exploitation of biodiversity has continued to
be the focal political agenda (Rees, 2003). Going by the level of compliance globally as
estimated in this study, it might be necessary to advocate for much stronger conservation
measures than sustainable use approach. This is one of the surest ways to bring most
countries that are both in biological deficit status to surplus and low compliant countries
to at least 50% compliance level.
6.3.2 Implications of global biodiversity deficit
Overexploitation of biodiversity occurs because there is need to satisfy both local
needs as well as supply for the deficits in other regions and countries. The status of
biological resources globally is estimated to be in deficit by about 0.9 hectares per person
(GFN, 2013). Most developed countries have very high biological resources deficits. In
addition, local level compliance as per my study is at 14%. Global and national
consumption of biodiversity does influence local level interests and thus compliance.
Large-scale national and international trade undertaken by pharmaceutical companies, the
timber industry, high fossil fuel use and land demanded by agriculture are all meant to
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take resources from biodiversity rich to deficit regions. Compensation for the supply of
biodiversity from rich to deficit countries is not based on the need to ensure sustainable
use but rather on the economic concept of supply as much as possible and obtain
maximum payment from the sale by supplying countries.
Examining this situation from an economic standard theory, the sharing of
biological resources can be divided into two attributes: (i) the extent to which one
country’s consumption reduces the supply available to other countries (ii) the extent to
which access to the use of biological resources can be controlled so that it is not
overexploited (excludability) (Polski, 2005). Controlled use is the most difficult since
there are no mechanisms except trade that show how regions or countries share biological
resources to eliminate the biodiversity deficits. Trade between regions or countries is not
based on fair compensation of actual resources used. There is really no way of telling if
countries that consume more do care about how much is left for other countries. This is
demonstrated by the low compliance at local levels.
To adequately explain the challenges that come with overexploitation of
biological resources, the study used the figure 12 below. This is a two-by-two matrix with
high and low scales of typical consumptive resources (Polski, 2005). This figure presents
public resources that have low subtractability and low excludability, club (toll) resources
that have low subtractability and high excludability, private resources with high
subtractability and high excludability and common pool resources with high
subtractability and low excludability. Biological resources easily fit into the four sections
of the matrix below depending on the type of ownership and the specific resource.
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Figure 12 below explains the complexity of overexploitation of biodiversity either
through controlled use or developing effective compensation mechanisms. Existing
compensation mechanisms based on trade ignore many aspects of overexploitation. These
include the justification for consumption on the basis that it is paid for at a price agreed
between the buyer and the seller. As most literature has mentioned, there is no welldeveloped value of biodiversity thus making it difficult to determine a just pay to control
use.
Figure 12: The difficulties in managing biodiversity deficits
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Source: Modified from Polski, 2005

Resources at high subtractability region are those whose quantity is reduced in
direct proportion to the quantity consumed. The supply of resources with a perfect
subtractability can only be sustained if management institutions can provide incentives to
sustain adequate supply to meet the demand. It is the demand that drives how the
resource is managed and not sustainable use.
Resources located at high excludability region are those whose access can be
controlled at a low cost. Consumers of such goods cannot just take or consume without
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paying for their supply. Suppliers of these resources are incentivized to invest and
produce enough to meet the demand. Once again, the desire is to overexploit in order to
meet the demand.
Biological resources are private when owned by an individual or corporations,
they are common pool resources when communally owned, they are public when owned
by the government and club when controlled by just a few owners and a small group of
individuals/corporations. When they are considered private, control and use cannot be
interfered with because that could be considered a violation of private rights in many
countries. The benefits of private properties cannot be shared freely. Under club (toll)
ownership, when it is costly or difficult to control access, consumers are able to “freeride” effectively removing supplier’s incentives to invest in the future production. When
biological resources fall under the public resources classification, they have low
subtractability and low excludability and therefore will be undersupplied in the private
sector. The ownership and management of natural resources is in most cases inconsistent
with actual political and economic conditions of a place. The management of biological
resources cannot simply be a stated goal but there is need for an expanded dialogue
between all stakeholders to establish monitoring systems, measurement criteria and
effective compensation schemes.
According to Polski (2005), natural resources governing institutions are more
nested in numerous systems such as unified forms of self-governance by individual or
collective entities. These may include citizens, corporations, NGOs and government
agencies. Collective entities also can take other forms such as centralized, decentralized
or polycentric institutions or market mechanisms such as tradable quotas. This makes it
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difficult to determine compensation levels. Governments have not made any attempt to
develop structures that would facilitate equitable sharing of the benefits of biodiversity.
6.4 Measuring compliance and implementation
The broad goal of my research was to analyze implementation of the goals of the
CBD and estimate compliance by parties. The key challenge to my study was the lack of
agreed standard measures for program implementation and compliance. The study
designed two types of measures for international and national compliance; one based on
score card approach and the other was based on identified criteria which were determined
from NBSAPs and national reports providing information about local implementation.
Measuring local compliance was rather problematic because of missing data and reports.
The option sought was to identify primary data collected by the ASAHI Glass Foundation
from local level conservation program implementation. To see compliance in more
details, it was divided into three levels: paper, policy and implementation compliance.
Measuring compliance was meant to show the level of influence of the CBD on
countries, status of biodiversity and implementation of global policies at local levels.
Most existing measures use direct measurement of species. These measures are the Red
List developed by IUCN and the Living Planet Index developed by WWF (Barbault,
2010). Using species as a measure of the health of biodiversity tells just the scientific
story leaving out social, economic and political aspects of biodiversity protection. The
criteria used to measure compliance at national level by my study looked at
implementation, what countries are doing and how they are developing specific goals,
objectives and initiatives across various conservation elements. The 20 criteria of
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compliance provided a broad and long-term picture of biodiversity protection from the
perspective of science, policy, politics, economics and communities. There is a big gap
between the role of communities and the scientific community, political leadership and
economic considerations. Ways to reconcile interests across sectors were also analyzed.
6.4.1 Paper compliance
Compliance requirements at the CBD level can be defined as merely paper and
talk compliance, it is a participatory process meant to mobilize talks and conservations
that set agendas. Countries define and identify commitments to specified goals and
negotiate action strategies and partnerships with other stakeholders. Countries are
required to abide with the treaty by merely signing to the treaty, submitting plans, reports
and also attend conferences. Although paper compliance was found to be at about 64%,
this does not actually reflect what actually takes place within countries as well as
compliance at country levels.
6.4.2 National compliance
Compliance at national level, defined by my study as policy compliance, is much
more than paper compliance. This is where policies are made, institutions are created,
legislation is enacted, management staffs are hired and coordination structures are
created. Strong national leadership bolsters local level conservation efforts. Every
government must be a part of the local solutions to conservation problems through
coordination, training, reporting, funding and technological support.
National compliance should both define and create the intersection between
policy development and implementation. At this intersection, guidelines for
implementation and appraisal standards to help strengthen local capacities and
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implementation should be developed. Potential trade-offs and conflicts of

interests

between various stakeholders are identified and goals that take all stakeholders to higher
understanding discussed. At the moment, there is no clear relationship between national
policies development and local level implementation. The national mechanisms for
taking conservation policies to local levels are not strong while local level institutions
have no adequate capacity to implement conservation programs. This is demonstrated by
the compliance gap at national level which is about 50% and local level compliance of
14%.
6.4.3 Local compliance
There was no data and information in the NBSAPs and national reports on
specific program implementation in all the countries analyzed to facilitate analysis of
compliance at local levels.

There were no specific local reports about local level

implementation. Either very little is going on and therefore there is nothing to report from
local levels or reporting structures are not developed in most countries. I would like to
reiterate that there exists conservation programs in many local levels but most community
institutions have no sufficient capacities to develop reporting structures, collect data,
analyze and report.
National governments have not provided standards to guide program design,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. There is need for clear negotiations with
explicit interventions, expectations of all stakeholders and positions with regard to
balancing local needs with biodiversity protection. National governments should ask all

233

international and local conservation organizations to report to a central depository where
these reports are made accessible to all stakeholders.
6. 5 Policy implications
The ongoing debates on biodiversity conservation bring out the intertwined
relationships between the political, social and economic interpretations of both the
perceptions on the status and scientific understanding of the management of natural
resources (Rosenau, 1993; Brechin et al. 2002). Results from this research indicate that
compliance still remains very low, coordination at national level is weak and capacities of
many institutions are low. The challenges of biodiversity protection therefore should
involve without exclusion of scientific conservation experts, national political institutions
and communities. Herein again lies the problem because most communities and local
level institutions not only fall short in various capacities, there is also disconnect in the
re-alignment of priorities. There is a need to develop policies to bring about a common
position across sectors. There is a need to have a shared meaning and also reconciled
priorities across levels and sectors in society.
Self-interest behavior by countries has greatest influence on country decisions
when it comes to support both within and across countries. Although the benefits of
protecting biodiversity are clearly understood, free-riding by countries and high
consumption sectors is still seen as something beneficial. There is need to develop
policies and clearly compensation mechanisms to cap free-riders and also ask high
consumers for a just compensation to suppliers of biological resources.
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6.6 Limitations of the study
Measuring compliance with the CBD goals should take into account many more
factors beyond government plans, reports and works of conservation organizations. The
compliance analysis presented here though credible, could as well be a partial
compliance. The Millenium Ecosystems Assessment, for example, measures ecosystem
services using the quality of ecosystem services. Ecosystem services come from
biological resources. The quality and quantity of ecosystem services are good indicators
of biodiversity status. Major losses of ecosystem services in various countries should be
included in measuring compliance. The IUCN measures biodiversity using the number of
species. WWF measures biodiversity using the Living Planet Index. What needs to be
included in measuring compliance is a topic for future research. There is a welldeveloped methodology for measuring compliance.
The economic value of biodiversity does not exist. This makes measuring losses
as well as developing compensation mechanisms more difficult. The current use of the
number of hectares available to every individual (GFN, 2008) does not give a true status
of biodiversity in every country. This method takes into account the size of the country
regardless of the quality of land to support biological resources.
There are no clearly established methods of measuring compliance. Many
disciplines involved in biodiversity protection are likely to establish their measurement
criteria leading to more confusion on the exact level of compliance. Establishing
standards of measuring compliance is left for future researchers.
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6.7 Conclusions
The pre-2010 biodiversity protection strategies have had tremendous impact on
the relationship between countries and the CBD but not so much at local levels within
countries. Global structures that bring all countries, conservation organizations and
public-private partnerships together have been established under the CBD. Detailed
conservation plans and action strategies have been developed, and commitments by
countries to specific goals and objectives made. Although there seems to be heightened
conservation activities globally, there is insignificant impact at local level
implementation. This is partly because of inadequate capacities as well as giving higher
priority to other needs.
Going by the estimated compliance level and the approach that countries have
taken to implement biodiversity protection goals, it is unlikely there is going be any
improvement going into the future. There are numerous weaknesses and capacity
challenges that countries have not addressed in their plans. In order to increase the local
level compliance, the study recommends a set of robust policies that build local capacity,
incentivize local resource owners, and implement biodiversity protection programs that
are akin to local needs and aspirations.
The current global conservation efforts should not lose sight of the past
conservation challenges as new targets are set and plans begin to be revised. As long as
the capacity challenges of each country are not identified specifically and addressed, not
so much will be achieved. Secondly, communication between conservation experts,
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government agencies, policy makers, communities and NGOs remains weak and uncoordinated.
The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) has played a very active and constructive
global environmental role to bring governments together to debate, draw national plans
and build national conservation institutions. Going forward, more attention should be
paid to domestic economic and political factors as these are the ones that have ultimately
shaped local policies towards biodiversity protection challenges. There is not much in
terms of reporting on local level implementation and compliance. Depending on how
implementation is done at local levels, overall conservation outcomes can only get worse
than what it is at present. There is a need to do more on reporting, planning and
information sharing. Progress has also been constrained by inadequate funding for
conservation programs and weak enforcement of environmental laws. This is also
because of inadequately trained human resources.
Turning to the results of this research, compliance is lowest at local levels, is
slightly better at national level and much better at the international level. This is an
indication that both the international community and national governments need to give
more support towards local level conservation initiatives. Insufficient national and local
capacities, funding deficiencies, communication problems and coordination challenges
are not adequately planned for in most NBSAPs.
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